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Resumo
Esta tese estuda um mercado bilateral com a presença de diferenciação de produto hor-
izontal e vertical. Baseamo-nos em Armstrong (2006) [9] segundo o qual duas plataformas
horizontalmente diferenciadas concorrem em preços. A procura é composta por dois grupos
simétricos de "singlehoming" agentes que beneficiam de uma externalidade. A diferenciação
vertical é introduzida de três formas (respectivamente, nos capítulos 3, 4 e 5).
No capítulo 3, a diferenciação vertical consiste numa densidade de consumidores variando
ao longo da linha unitária, tal como em Gabszewicz e Wauthy (2012) [57]. Em equilíbrio, a
plataforma de alta qualidade cobra um preço mais elevado e capta uma quota de mercado
superior relativamente à rival. O equilíbrio socialmente ótimo requer maior assimetria entre
as quotas de mercado das plataformas. Uma alteração na densidade de consumidores no
lado esquerdo relativamente ao lado direito do centro da cidade perturba a existência de
equilíbrio tal como descrito por Armstrong (2006) [9].
No capítulo 4, consideramos uma assimetria na utilidade de reserva das plataformas. Os
preços de equilíbrio, quotas de mercado e os lucros da plataforma de baixa qualidade (de
alta qualidade) estão a diminuir (aumentar) com o grau de diferenciação vertical. Anal-
isamos também um jogo de dois estágios em que as plataformas investem para aumentar
os seus níveis de qualidade e, em seguida, competem em preços. A plataforma com custo
de investimento mais baixo torna-se o líder de mercado, mesmo cobrando um preço mais
elevado. Numa variação do modelo em que o custo de investimento difere entre os dois lados
do mercado, estratégias "dividir para conquistar" surgem em equilíbrio. A plataforma de
baixa qualidade cobra um preço menorque o seu custo marginal no lado onde a plataforma
de alta qualidade tem um menor custo de provisão de qualidade.
No capítulo 5, a diferenciação vertical é introduzida à la Neven e Thisse (1990) [87]. O
equilíbrio depende da força da externalidade vis-à-vis magnitude das diferenças de qualidade
entre as plataformas. Se a asssimetria de qualidade é suficientemente pequena, o lucro da
plataforma de baixa qualidade diminui à medida que a qualidade da rival aumenta. Um
incremento na externalidade tem um impacto negativo sobre os preços e lucros de equilíbrio.
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Abstract
This thesis studies two-sided market duopolies with simultaneous horizontal and verti-
cal product differentiation. It builds on the model of Armstrong (2006) [9] in which two
horizontally differentiated platforms engage in price competition. Demand is composed by
two symmetric groups of agents that singlehome and benefit from an inter-group externality.
Vertical differentiation is introduced in three different ways (resp., in chapters 3, 4 and 5).
In chapter 3, vertical differentiation consists of a varying consumer density along the unit
line, as proposed by Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57]. We find that, in equilibrium, the
high-quality platform charges a higher price and captures a greater market share than the
low-quality platform. As a result of the inter-group externality, the socially optimal outcome
requires a greater asymmetry between firms’market shares. A perturbation that introduces
a small difference between the consumer density on the left and on the right side of the city
may disrupt the existence of equilibrium in the model of Armstrong (2006) [9].
In chapter 4, vertical differentiation is modelled as an asymmetry in the stand-alone val-
ues of the two platforms. The equilibrium prices, market shares and profits of the low-quality
(high-quality) platform are decreasing (increasing) in the degree of vertical differentiation.
We also analyse a two-stage game in which platforms start by investing to increase their
quality levels and then compete in prices. The platform with lower investment cost becomes
the market leader even though it charges a higher price. We also study a variation in which
the investment cost differs across sides. We find that divide and conquer strategies arise in
equilibrium. The low-quality platform charges a price below its marginal cost in the side
where the high-quality platform has a lower cost of quality provision.
In chapter 5, vertical differentiation is introduced à la Neven and Thisse (1990) [87]. We
find that equilibrium outcomes depend on the strength of the inter-group network effects
vis-à-vis the magnitude of the intrinsic quality differences between the platforms. If the
quality asymmetry is suffi ciently small, the profit of the low-quality platform decreases as
the quality of the better platform improves. We also conclude that the intensity of the
inter-group externality has a negative impact on equilibrium prices and profits.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The goal of this thesis is to provide an analysis of platforms’pricing decisions dealing simul-
taneously with vertical and horizontal differentiation in a two-sided market.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) [94] define a market as two-sided if "platforms serve two distinct
groups of agents, such that the participation of at least one group raises/decreases the value of
participating for the other group". Product differentiation is a field that attracts considerable
attention since Lancaster’s (1980) [80] definition of product space.
In the Industrial Economics literature, two types of product differentiation can be dis-
tinguished: horizontal differentiation (variety) and vertical differentiation (quality).
The majority of the research related to horizontal differentiation is based on Hotelling
(1929) [68] and his principle of minimum differentiation and in d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz,
and Thisse (1979) [28] and their principle of maximum differentiation.
On the literature of vertical differentiation (see, for example, Mussa and Rosen (1978)
[85], Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) [54], Shaked and Sutton (1982) [105]) there appears an
equilibrium where firms are placed at opposite ends of the quality spectrum. Moorthy [83]
extends the model by incorporating marginal costs and allowing for partial market coverage.
Much research extended the unique dimension of product differentiation into several
dimensions (e.g., de Palma et al. (1985) [32], Neven and Thisse (1990) [87], Economides
(1989) [39] and Economides (1996) [41].
De Palma et al. (1985) [32] finds that the principle of minimum differentiation holds
when "products and consumers are suffi ciently heterogeneous". Economides (1989) [39] and
Neven and Thisse (1990) [87] analyze a two-dimensional vertical and horizontal differentiation
model in which firms compete on quality, variety and price.
Economides (1989) [39] assumes that the horizontal choice takes place before the vertical
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choice and that marginal costs are increasing in quality. He finds the prevalence of maximum
horizontal differentiation and minimum vertical differentiation. In Neven and Thisse (1990)
[87], firms first choose their location and subsequently choose their prices. Disregarding
any asymmetries between the firms, they find a product equilibrium that exhibits maximum
differentiation in one dimension and minimum differentiation in the other. However, the
maximally differentiated dimension can be either the horizontal or the vertical one.
Other contributions such as Irmen and Thisse (1998) [69], Daughety and Reinganum
(2007) [29], Daughety and Reinganum (2008) [30], Argenziano (2008) [7], Levin, Peck and
Ye (2009) [82], Griva and Vettas (2011) [63], Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57] and Amir,
Gabszewicz and Resende (2013) [4] conduct studies on simultaneous vertical and horizontal
differentiation (the last article embraces it in two-sided markets, however, not taking into
consideration the existence of access or transaction prices).
This thesis relies on an analytical toolbox based in Game Theory. The methodology is
developed in three phases: in a first phase we present the models who study the behavior
of all the players involved using mathematical tools; on a second phase we determine the
equilibrium outcomes in a static game with price competition. Finally, in a third phase we
display the results, conclusions and policy implications by analyzing the respective effects
on the consumers’and platforms’behavior, namely in terms of equilibrium pricing decisions,
equilibrium number of agents on board, profitability and welfare analysis.
The thesis is organized in six distinct chapters: this first chapter corresponds to the "In-
troduction" and the next chapter performs "A bibliometric analysis of two-sided markets".
The central chapters of the thesis are chapters 3, 4 and 5, "Nesting vertical and horizon-
tal differentiation in two-sided markets", "Endogenous quality and group discrimination in
two-sided markets" and "Price competition between verti-zontally differentiated platforms",
respectively. Finally, the conclusions of the thesis emerge in the sixth chapter. Although the
chapters are related, each one constitutes an autonomous manuscript in terms of formulation
of the theoretical setting, equilibrium computations and conclusions.
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2.0 A BIBLIOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF TWO-SIDED MARKETS
Abstract. In this chapter, we provide a characterization of two-sided markets, expose
a literature review and briefly cover the recent developments on the field under scrutiny.
We also analyze quantitatively the field of two-sided markets over the past twelve years,
proposing a categorization of a large dataset gathered from Scopus since 2002 to the end of
2013. The quantitative analysis concludes that the majority of two-sided markets articles
are published in the International Journal of Industrial Organization, especially after 2010.
Most of the research in this field is done in Europe and (North) America, and the authors
that have more quantitative and qualitative relevance are Jean Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole
and Mark Armstrong.
Keywords: Two-sided markets, bibliometrics.
JEL Classification Numbers: D40, L10, C89.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION: DEFINITIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS
The debut of a general theory on two-sided markets has essentially three main causes: the
widely spread concern with the antitrust cases against international credit card networks
(Visa and MasterCard) in the United States, Europe and Australia around 2000 (Roson
(2005) [97]), the growth of online markets and the questions concerning the respective reg-
ulation of these new emergent markets.
Several definitions are proposed in the literature to define a two sided-market. Rochet
and Tirole (2003) [94] define a market as two-sided if "platforms serve two distinct groups
of agents, such that the participation of at least one group raises/decreases the value of
participating for the other group".
Roson (2005) [97] points out that "two sided markets are defined as platforms providing
goods and services to two distinct end users, where the platform attempts to set the price for
each type of end user to get both sides on board because the benefits of one type of end user
increases as the participation of the other type of end user increases".
Rochet and Tirole (2006) [95] propose a more restrictive definition, since the term two-
sided is only applied to "cases in which prices faced by agents on each side (possibly zero
or negative) have a direct influence on market participation for the other side, so that the
volume of transactions does not merely depend on a comparison between total expected benefits
and total transaction costs". We propose a definition of a two sided market, as "a market
intermediated by a platform that allows two different but mutually attracted sides to connect
in order to achieve a particular purpose".
The platform is a physical or non-physical intermediary that may face competition or
may hold a monopoly position.
As Rochet and Tirole (2003) [94] point out, "the platforms may be classified as propri-
etary platforms meaning that they have profitable proposes" or "non-proprietary platforms
(associations), meaning that they have no profitable purposes". Some platforms’examples
on the literature are: newspapers market and the media industry in general (see, for ex-
ample, Anderson and Coate (2005) [5] and Correia-da-Silva and Resende (2013) [27]) or
dating agencies market in the case of competing matchmakers (see, for example, Caillaud
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and Jullien (2003) [21]).
In the context of the literature on two-sided markets, a side is composed by a group
of agents that only interact with other different type of agents through an intermediary.
The platform may have only one member in each side or, in the limit, an infinite number
of members. The wish for interaction between agents of different sides generates a positive
network effect. Examples of sides are advertisers and readers in the case of newspapers,
men and women in a club or a software developer and a end-user player in the case of game
consoles.
Due to inter-group externalities, platforms using conventional pricing schemes may deal
with the chicken-and-egg problem (Caillaud and Jullien (2003) [21])1. As Roson (2005) [97]
mentions, models avoid this issue by assuming a rational expectations equilibrium, that is,
the simultaneous arrival of agents on both sides of the market, which may not be consistent
with the empirical evidence2.
From a theoretical perspective, modeling a two-sided market is related with modeling
markets embracing simple network effects, widely analyzed especially since the contributions
by Katz and Shapiro (1985) [74], Farrell and Saloner (1986) [48], among others. In such
context, simple network effects models were extended incorporating cross network effects
between the sides of the market, which is one of the relevant characteristics of two-sided
markets. Thus, inter-group externalities are present in two-sided markets since the partic-
ipation of a certain side depends on the participation of agents of an opposite market side
(see, for example, Rochet and Tirole (2003) [94]).
The literature on two-sided markets also considers, according to Belleflamme and Toule-
monde (2009) [13], the concept of a positive (or negative) intra-group participation exter-
nality, that is, the participation of a certain side depends positively (or negatively) on the
participation of agents of the same market side.
1The chicken and egg problem relies on the fact that to convince some buyers to adopt a certain
platform, first it is necessary to persuade some sellers to join that platform. However, to convince
the sellers there must be some buyers on the market, creating problems in benching the market.
2Roson (2005) [97] indicates that consoles (e.g., Playstation) to get user players must appear on
the market already equipped with a huge range of games but to get the required technology, need
to adopt pre-strategies, such as the under-cost provision of some games, free trials, among others
which requires them to spend an extra-effort on the software developers side.
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Table 1 below provides real world examples of two-sided markets3.
Market Side 1 Side 2 Platform
Operating systems consumers developers Windows
Financial markets firms investors Moody’s
Online recruitment unemployed employers EraCareers
Yellow Pages consumers advertisers PAI (in Portugal)
Web search searchers advertisers Google
Healthcare patients physicians HMO
Video games players developers Playstation
B2C shoppers’ retailers Shopping mall
Social networks and dating men women Facebook
Media viewers/readers advertisers New York Times
Table 1: Examples of two-sided markets
Another relevant aspect for the theory of two-sided markets is the issue of pricing. Rochet
and Tirole (2006) [95] introduce a distinction between price level and price structure. Price
level is defined as "the total price charged by the platform to the two sides" and price structure
is defined as "the decomposition or allocation of the total price between the buyer and the
seller".
According to Roson (2005) [97], "the price structure gave rise to a notion: economic
effi ciency can be improved by charging more to one side and less to the other one, depending
on the externalities and characteristics of the market".
Within the concept of price structure, a platform may charge to both sides’transaction
fees and/or access fees. A transaction fee is charged by the platform in each transaction
between the sides and an access fee is charged by the platform only once to allow both sides
to access the market.
Two-sided markets can present specific pricing schemes. For instance, when a platform
charges transaction fees to one side of the market but pays to the other side (subsidization)
3Many examples of two-sided markets are provided in Rochet and Tirole (2003) [94], Eisenmann,
Parker and Van Alstyne (2006) [43] and Armstrong (2006) [9].
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to promote trading when the externality effect of the subsidized side is suffi ciently strong, we
say we turn to the "topsy-turvy principle" defined by Rochet and Tirole (2006) [95] where
"a factor that is conducive to a higher price in one side (such that it raises the platforms’
margin in that side), tends also to call for a lower price in the other side (as attracting
members on that other side becomes more profitable)"4.
Regarding the possibility of attending one or more platforms, the allocation of agents
through the market is another fundamental characteristic enunciated by Armstrong (2006)
[9]. Singlehoming is a concept that defines the situation where each agent on the market
only attends to one platform. Singlehoming occurs, for instance, when a reader is loyal to
a certain newspaper. Agents may also multihome5. In this case, to "impose" consumers’
loyalty, platforms may steer. Steering is an action in which a platform does not allow their
members to interact in an alternative platform. Clearly, the goal of steering is to promote
singlehoming. Competitive bottleneck arises when one side multihomes and the other side
of the market singlehomes (Armstrong (2006) [9]).
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
This section presents a brief review of the literature on two-sided markets. Firstly, we
present the seminal contributions that constitute the genesis of this field of research. Then,
considering an overall perspective, we present more recent contributions to the literature.
4The topsy-turvy principle is also connected with recent discussions towards the concept of
freemium in online markets (see Lambrecht et al. (2012) [79]), cross subsidization (see Chen and
Rey (2013) [26]) and behavior-based price discrimination (Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) [53]).
Note that, a divide and conquer strategy corresponds to an application of this principle in two-sided
markets.
5Multihoming defines the possibility of both sides to interact through several platforms. For
instance, consumers multihome when they own several credit cards, advertisers multihome using
several newspapers to advertise, people may decide to participate on several social networks, etc.
Multihoming is more easily observed when the access fees charged by a platform are low or null
(see, for example, Kaiser and Wright (2006) [72]).
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2.2.1 Seminal contributions
The seminal contributions on two-sided markets are provided by Armstrong (2006) [9] as a
general model of two-sided markets, by Rochet and Tirole (2003) [94] especially focusing the
debit/credit card markets and by Caillaud and Jullien (2003) [21] for an analytical treatment
of two sided-markets internet particularities. We briefly present their main conclusions.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) [94] build a model for a two-sided market in order to unveil the
determinants of price allocation and end-users surplus for different governance structures in
the case of an integrated monopolist and under duopoly competition.
The authors state that under symmetric information, the price structure of an integrated
monopolist is given by the ratio of the elasticities:
ps
ηs
=
pb
ηb
,
where pi is the price charged by the monopoly platform to side i and ηi is the quasi-demand
price elasticity of side i, i = b, s (buyers and sellers, respectively).
The Ramsey price is the resulting price that arises from achieving the effi cient out-
come that allows the monopolist platform to maximize the social welfare subject to some
constraints. The authors find that the outcome that maximizes welfare is the same that
maximizes the monopoly platform’s profits.
Considering competition between platforms, the authors analyze the impacts on the
sellers’ side of a decreasing fee charged by a cheaper platform, keeping constant the fee
charged by an expensive platform. In this context, the authors conclude that the seller
has three options: no trade, if the seller’s surplus is lower than the price charged by the
cheapest platform; interact with buyers only in the cheapest platform, if the seller’s surplus
is higher than the price charged by the cheapest platform but the seller’s surplus is lower
than an "indifferent surplus" between trading in both platforms or interact with buyers in
both platforms, if their surplus is higher than an "indifferent surplus" between trading in
both platforms.
The existence (or not) of steering allows to evaluate the market power of a certain plat-
form. The authors take into account the distinction between competition of proprietary
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platforms (with profitable proposes) and associations (with no profitable proposes) and con-
clude that "even when downstream markets are perfectly competitive and the price level is
socially optimal, competition between associations does not generate an effi cient outcome".
Finally, the authors evaluate the effect of the transaction fee on the volume of transac-
tions, given the presence of three features: marquee users6, installed bases (or captive users)
and multihoming7. Marquee buyers (sellers) are a type of buyer (seller) that generates higher
surplus on their respective side since they are considered as extremely valuable. Under com-
petition or under a monopoly (and considering a profitable platform or an association) and
with log-concave demand functions, the authors find that the seller price increases when
there are marquee buyers on the market and decreases with the presence of captive buyers.
On the other hand, the buyer price moves in the opposite direction.
Armstrong (2006) [9] suggests three possible models for two-sided networks: a monopoly
platform, a model of competing platforms where agents join a single platform (pure sin-
glehoming) and a model of "competitive bottleneck" where one group joins all platforms
(partial multihoming). In the case of a monopoly platform, Armstrong (2006) [9] concludes
that even when a certain side pays a lower fee relatively to its marginal cost, the platform
might hold its market position since the monopoly platform can charge a high enough fee
on the opposite side.
In the case of duopoly competition with pure singlehoming agents, Armstrong (2006) [9]
adopts Hotelling (1929) [68] by assuming that each agent joins only one platform. The equi-
librium outcome shows the prevalence of an extra effect with competition (the transportation
cost t), which measures the degree of horizontal differentiation between the platforms. When
price discrimination between sides is allowed, the author shows that the side that pays a
higher fee gets a lower equilibrium surplus and concludes that an increment on the intensity
of the inter-group externality is detrimental to the intermediaries’profit.
Under partial multihoming, the author concludes that a market failure exists in the sense
that the interests of the multihoming side are ignored. However, as Armstrong (2006) [9]
points out, at least three limitations in the analysis of competitive bottleneck are present:
6Marquee users may be buyers or sellers.
7The authors find that an increase in the multihoming index of buyers leads to an increase in
the buyer price and a decrease in the seller price, caeteris paribus.
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firstly, the population of the singlehoming side is constant (even when this group is treated
favorably in equilibrium), secondly, the population of the singlehoming side never multihomes
(however, for instance, people may decide to participate on several social networks) and lastly,
Armstrong does not consider a platform’s incentive to require an otherwise multihoming
agent to deal with it exclusively.
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) [21] concentrate on two-sided markets inspired by online
intermediation. The authors study peculiar features of two-sided markets: the presence of
indirect network externalities, the possibility of using the non-exclusive services of several
intermediaries at the same time and the widespread practice of price discrimination based
on users’identity and usage. The authors focus their analysis in a matchmaking monopoly
intermediary for dating services.
Using linear demand and a Bertrand pricing model, they explain why users register with
more than one service and how, under competition, two-sided network effects can lead to
several possibilities: (i) one platform may promote corner solutions; (ii) multiple platforms
may share the market with zero profits. In the case where all agents singlehome, platforms
face perfect competition and, consequently, the effi cient outcome is achievable when agents
use the same platform. In the case where one side multihomes the authors find that there
is a mixed equilibrium, which corresponds to the case of competitive bottleneck defined by
Armstrong (2006) [9].
2.2.2 A general overview of recent developments
The development of a general theory of two-sided markets brought the need for some theo-
retical refinements (e.g., Evans and Schmalensee (2005) [47], Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne
(2006) [43], Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne (2011a) [44] and Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne
(2011b) [45]).
Evans and Schmalensee (2005) [47] provide general features that we can find in many
two sided-markets. The first feature is related with "getting both sides on board". Here,
the authors highlight that the intermediary must take actions to allow the trade between
both sides. The second feature is related with defining an optimal price structure in order
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to carefully balance the two sides’demands. So, platforms must perform the balancing work
between the two sides demand and often regulate the terms of the transactions between
end-agents. The third idea is that multihoming affects both the price level and the price
structure. According to the authors, "the fee level tends to be lower with multihoming, since
the availability of substitute platforms ensures higher pressure on the incumbent platform"
(Evans and Schmalensee (2005) [47]).
Finally, the authors mention that monopolies are not the ideal structures for a two-sided
market, since "the customers’heterogeneous preferences on either side encourage platform
differentiation. Additionally, platform differentiation, coupled with the low level of switch-
ing costs, results in multi-homing, which in turn, provides demand for several platforms by
customers" (Evans and Schmalensee (2005) [47]).
Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne (2006) [43] reinforce that platforms adopt a specific
pricing strategy in which they have to subsidize one side of the market by setting a very
low fee, often equal to zero or even negative (subsidy), precisely a similar idea to the one
proposed by Armstrong (2006) [9] and Caillaund and Jullien (2003) [21]. They argue that "a
platform provider can increase its growth if it can commit marquee users to use its platform
without joining rival platforms" (Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne (2006) [43]). This idea
turned to be on the basis for the adoption of an exclusivity strategy by the platforms.
The same authors also give an important contribution when they mention that platforms
have overlapping user bases and, thus, it is not uncommon for a platform to be "enveloped"8
by an adjacent provider, especially when a rival platform provides the same functionalities
(see Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne (2011b) [45]).
The authors consider that, when a platform perceives that (in a multiplatform envi-
ronment) a rival delivers more intrinsic quality at a lower price, its stand-alone value is in
danger. On the other hand, if the platform is not able to reduce the fee charged or is not able
to enhance their stand-alone value, the authors propose one of the following strategies to
8In their own words, the envelopment of a platform is defined by the fact that "platform providers
that serve different markets sometimes have overlapping user bases and employ similar components.
Envelopment entails entry by one platform provider into another’s market by bundling its own
platform’s functionality with that of the target’s so as to leverage shared user relationships and
common components. Dominant firms that otherwise are sheltered from entry by standalone rivals
due to strong network effects and high switching costs can be vulnerable to an adjacent platform
provider’s envelopment attack".(see Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2011a [44]).
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overcome this issue: or to change the platform business model or to find a "bigger brother"
to help it. In the limit, another last option when platforms’face envelopment is to resort
to legal remedies, since the antitrust laws for two-sided markets are still subject of a huge
controversy (see Eisenmann, Parker and Alstyne (2011a) [44] and Eisenmann, Parker and
Alstyne (2011b) [45]).
The theoretical literature on two-sided markets has improved our understanding of a
wide range of economic problems, in particular, the definition of an optimal price structure
in two-sided markets and the debate concerning net neutrality (e.g., Hagiu (2009) [64], Weyl
(2010) [118], Economides and Tåg (2012) [42] and Brito, Pereira and Vareda (2013) [20] ).
Hagiu (2009) [64] studies a market where indirect network effects are determined endoge-
nously, through consumers’taste for variety and producer competition. He concludes that
the optimal platform pricing structure shifts towards extracting more rents from producers
relative to consumers when consumers have stronger demand for variety, since producers
become less substitutable. The argument relies on the fact that, the consumer preferences
for variety, the producer market power and the producer economies of scale in multihoming,
make platforms’price-cutting strategies on the consumers’side less effective.
Weyl (2010) [118] develops a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks, where
platforms use insulating tariffs to avoid coordination failure.
Economides and Tåg (2012) [42] discuss net neutrality in the context of a two-sided
market. They find that under a monopoly platform, net neutrality regulation (requiring zero
fees to content providers) may increase the total industry surplus as compared to the fully
private optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content providers.
Imposing net neutrality in duopoly with multihoming content providers and singlehoming
consumers increases the total surplus as compared to duopoly competition with positive fees
to content providers.
Brito, Pereira and Vareda (2013) [20] analyze the impact of network neutrality regulation
on the competition between content providers (CP) and on the internet service providers
incentives (ISPs) to invest. In their own words, "if ISPs can offer network services of
different quality to CPs, they prefer to sell the highest quality network services to the CP
that collects the highest advertising revenues". The authors also conclude that the impact
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of network neutrality regulation on the investment in the quality of network services is
potentially ambiguous and depends on the symmetry between ISPs, and on the ISPs’ability
to assign network’s capacity to CPs. The authors conclude that "if the ISPs are symmetric
and have full discretion on how to allocate the level of quality of network services among
CPs, investment and welfare are higher under the discriminatory regime".
In the context of quality investments on platforms, Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) [14]
show that for-profit intermediation may lead to overinvestment and free access leads to
underinvestment since investment decisions influence the strength of indirect network effects
and access prices.
Two-sided markets researchers also address special attention to the new phenomenon of
multihoming and its relationship with compatibility between platforms (e.g., Doganoglu and
Wright (2006) [38] and Armstrong and Wright (2007) [10]). Doganoglu and Wright (2006)
[38] find that policymakers should be more worried about the lack of compatibility in the
presence of multihoming and Armstrong and Wright (2007) [10] reveal the prevalence of
exclusive contracts to prevent multihoming.
Recently, new studies address concerns on asymmetric network externalities (e.g., Am-
brus and Argenziano (2009) [3]) and imperfect competition environments9 (e.g., White and
Weyl (2010) [119]). Incomplete information between platforms and agents and its relation-
ship with agents expectations (myopic or forward looking) is also a relevant matter under the
scrutiny of researchers (e.g., Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004) [55], Yehezkel and Halaburda
(2012) [123], Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013) [67] and Hagiu and Halaburda (2013) [65]).
Gabzsewicz and Wauthy (2004) [55] model duopoly competition between two platforms
where the network effects are captured within a vertical differentiation framework. Under
single-homing there exists an interior equilibrium where networks exhibit asymmetric sizes
and both firms enjoy positive profits. When all agents are allowed to patronize the two
platforms, they show that in equilibrium multi-homing takes place on one side of the market
only.
Yehezkel and Halaburda (2012) [123] and Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013) [67] find that
9Kreps and Wilson (1982) [77] is a seminal contribution to an introduction on the literature
embracing such environments.
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under a competitive environment the incumbent dominates the market by setting the welfare-
maximizing quantity when the difference in the degree of asymmetric information between
buyers and sellers is suffi ciently high. However and since a market failure may arise with
asymmetric information, the authors state that multihoming solves this issue.
Hagiu and Halaburda (2013) [65] also perform an extensive study on the effect of differ-
ent levels of information on two-sided platform profit, both under monopoly and duopoly
competition to show that platforms "with more market power (monopoly) prefer facing more
informed users". However, platforms with less market power get higher profits when users
are less informed. They point out that the reason behind is "that price information leads
user expectations to be more responsive and therefore amplifies the effect of price reductions".
The analysis of regulatory regimes in two-sided markets is also gaining importance (e.g.,
Evans (2003) [46], Wright (2004) [121], Rysman (2009) [98] and Valverde, Chakravorti and
Fernandez (2009) [110]).
Evans (2003) [46] confirms that the antitrust analysis of two-sided markets should heed
the economic principles that govern pricing and investment decisions. To shed some light
on the impact of regulations on consumers, business and government, Wright (2004) [121]
considers eight basic fallacies that can arise from using conventional wisdom from one-sided
markets in two-sided market settings and discusses how these fallacies may be reconciled by
proper use of a two-sided market analysis, based on empirical evidence.
Rysman (2009) [98] clarifies the understanding towards two-sided markets and alerts
about the relevance of the literature on policy implications for pricing analysis. Valverde,
Chakravorti and Fernandez (2009) [110] evaluate the impact of government intervention
in these markets. Using confidential bank-level data to study the impact of government-
encouraged fee reductions for payment card services, find that consumer and merchant wel-
fare improved when the interchange fees and transfers among banks are reduced.
Besides theoretical developments, the empirical literature on two-sided markets has been
focused on the estimation of the platforms’market power (e.g., Argentesi and Filistrucchi
(2007) [6] and Song (2011) [107]), on the prediction of the effects of platforms’mergers (e.g.,
Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) [24], Filistrucchi, Klein and Michielsen (2012) [51] and
Jeziorski (2012) [71]), on the analysis of the pricing structure (e.g., Kaiser and Wright (2006)
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[72]), and forecasting platforms’demand (e.g., Lee (2011) [81]).
The literature also covers other traditional Industrial Organization topics such as entry
(e.g., Zhu and Iansiti (2012) [124], Dewenter and Roesch (2012) [34]) and market dynamics
(e.g., Vogelsang (2010) [115]).
Zhu and Iansiti (2012) [124] find that in the video games industry the entrant’s success
depends on the strength of the indirect inter-group externalities and on consumer’s discount
factor for future applications. Dewenter and Roesch (2012) [34] study the same matter to
confirm that if the indirect network effects are small, the conventional results of market entry
are applied, although weakened. However, for suffi ciently strong inter-group externalities, a
tipping structure can be optimal.
Vogelsang (2010) [115] presents a dynamic view of a two-sided market using Dixit’s
approach of entry deterrence to find that the platform has to solve the trade-off between the
height of registration fees and marketing efforts in time: the platform optimally faces losses
during the first years. Thus, points out that in social networks the leader does not exploit
monopolistic profits at the beginning of its life cycle.
Despite the outstanding contributions already made available by the theoretical and em-
pirical findings on two-sided markets, the fact is that this field is far from being exhausted
and very challenging questions remain open. For example, one of the most recent develop-
ments in this literature arises from the recent controversy on Facebook survival (Cannarella
and Spechler (2014) [23]).
In parallel, the recent ascent of the theory of two-sided markets has also stimulated
the development of certain applied fields (namely, industries characterized by the presence
of inter-group externalities), which benefit from the analytical frameworks developed within
this theory. We highlight the recent advances on media economics (e.g., Anderson and Coate
(2005) [5], Wilbur (2008) [120], Kaiser and Song (2009) [73], Dewenter, Haucap and Wenzel
(2011) [33], Kind and Stähler (2011) [75], Yao and Mela (2011) [116], Albuquerque et al.
(2012) [2], Reisinger (2012) [92] and Dietl, Lang, and Lin (2013) [37]), on telecommunications
(e.g., Brito, Pereira and Vareda (2010) [18], Samanta, Woods and Ghanbari (2010) [99], Brito,
Pereira and Vareda (2011) [19], Genakos and Valletti (2011) [60], Genakos and Valletti (2012)
[61], Gans (2012) [59]), on financial markets (e.g., Rochet and Wright (2010) [96], Wang
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(2010) [117], Bourreau and Verdier (2010) [16] and Verdier (2011) [114]), on healthcare
issues (e.g., Bardey and Rochet (2010) [11]) and on sport events (e.g., Dietl et al. (2012)
[36]), among others. Even considered an independent literature, the matching theory also
adopts some features of two-sided markets (e.g., Kojima and Pathak (2009) [76], Halaburda
(2010) [66] and Ackermann et al. (2011) [1].
Thus, the theory of two-sided markets is an emerging field under the scrutiny of re-
searchers. To standardize the relevant features of the field, we now provide a quantitative
analysis of the twelve-year history of this research line.
2.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
We propose a categorization of a large dataset on the literature gathered from Scopus from
2002 to the end of 2013. Our analysis is an effort to uncover the research paths that brought
two sided-markets into the microeconomics mainstream and so it is important to understand
in which years more articles were released, who were the most relevant authors on the matter
and which continent is leading the research.
All this information is relevant if someone intends to lead a future investigation on this
field. We account for the relative frequency of articles published each year and we establish a
comparison with the overall released articles in the field of Industrial Organization. Then, we
also analyze the territory supremacy where two-sided markets authors are affi liated. Finally,
we also present which economic journals support this line of research.
2.3.1 Methodology
We perform an analysis10 of the field recurring to a database extracted from Scopus. The
database was constructed using one search keyword: "two-sided markets". The search pro-
10Our focus relies only on the quantitative analysis of the field. Thus, we neglect any qualitative
theoretical categorization of articles, which we intend to develop as a future research. To obtain a
discussion on this topic check and follow Nelson and Winter (2009) [86] as well as the contributions
of Yadav (2010) [122] and Silva and Teixeira (2011) [106], among others.
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cedure covers the keyword "two-sided markets" in several dimensions: the title, the abstract
and the keywords.
Although we recognize the limitations behind bibliometric exercises concerning the choice
of the search keywords11, we consider that the selected keyword is able to capture the core
of the contributions under scrutiny. Since we want to focus only on research contributions,
we neglect articles corresponding to comments, rejoinders, books, corrigendas or similar.
2.3.2 Scopus
Scopus is considered today one of the best tools for bibliometric exercises and evaluations of
scientific production (Pato and Teixeira (2013) [90]) because it has the advantage to perform
an immediate numerical analysis. Scopus also encompasses more modern sources (Chappin
and Ligtvoet (2014) [25]), however, Scopus purportedly has a more European focus (Chappin
and Ligtvoet (2014) [25]).
On a first (data treatment) stage, we use the export function to obtain all the relevant
articles into an csv file. We combine the resulting csv files and generate a file with all
authors’name, the title of each article, the year of publication, title of the journal, continent
prominence and source.
In a second (qualitative) stage, in order to identify and evaluate the quality of the
journals where two-sided markets articles are being published, we study the impact factor
of the relevant international journals, often considered a proxy for the journals’ scientific
quality (Vieira and Teixeira (2010) [113])12.
In a third (quantitative) stage, we perform the quantitative analysis, based on simple
and exploratory statistics. We complete the search in the Scopus bibliographic database
on the 15th. of December, 2013. From the first stage procedure resulted a database of 371
published articles, involving 241 authors.
11See Santos and Teixeira (2009) [102] for a brief discussion on this topic. Also note that Scopus
only allows for the extraction of scientific articles.
12The full information on this topic can be found on the journals’web site, in Scopus and in the
Web of Knowledge.
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2.3.3 The evolution of the research
Analyzing the number of articles on two-sided markets through time, we observe an increasing
number of articles published since 2002 (cf. figure 1).
Figure 1: Number of articles published by year
We neglect articles before 2002 since there are no prominent investigations in this field
and the number of manuscripts was rather negligible. From 2002, we observe that the number
of two-sided markets articles increased gradually and, more specifically, it started to grow
faster in the period 2008-2010, stabilizing after 2011. This path may be explained by three
main causes: the widely spread concern with the antitrust cases against international credit
card networks (Visa and MasterCard) in the United States, Europe and Australia around
2000 (Roson (2005) [97]), the growth of online markets and the discussion on the regulation
of this new emergent markets. In this context, the analysis of two-sided markets and the
corresponding impact in terms of welfare is catching more and more the attention of an
increasing number of researchers.
Although the field of two-sided markets has an endless number of applications (e-commerce,
urban and public economics, mathematics, matching theory, among others), it is viewed as
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an Industrial Organization subfield13. Comparing the total number of Industrial Organiza-
tion articles and two-sided markets articles, we verify that the study of two-sided markets is
growing within the literature of Industrial Organization (although representing, on average,
around 1,5% of the research conducted in the field in the period considered). The weight
of the two-sided markets research on Industrial Organization is increasing, especially since
2008 (cf. table 2).
# of Articles 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Two-sided markets 7 12 9 17 21 24
Adjusted two-sided markets 5 8 5 9 12 13
Industrial organization 778 1043 1104 1140 1269 1075
Relative frequency (%) 0.64 0.76 0.45 0.04 0.95 1.2
# of Articles 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Two-sided markets 25 39 53 56 51 57
Adjusted two-sided markets 13 16 21 23 22 28
Industrial organization 1046 932 906 928 986 903
Relative frequency (%) 1.24 1.72 2.32 2.48 2.23 3.1
Table 2: Relative frequency of articles on two-sided markets on Industrial Organization
2.3.4 Territory supremacy
Europe and (North) America are leading continents in two-sided markets research14. Al-
though the first manuscripts appear simultaneously in Europe and (North) America, the
"spreading effect" got slightly higher expression on the European continent. Nevertheless,
13This evidence is due to the fact that in nearly 47% of the downloaded articles, we acknowledge
the existence of a positive correlation between the keyword "two-sided markets" and the associated
JEL code L (Industrial Organization). Aggregating the JEL code L with the JEL code D (Micro-
economics), the percentage increases to 80%. The item "adjusted two-sided markets articles" (cf.
table 2) corresponds to articles with JEL code L only.
14To obtain the results by continent we establish a link between the authors’affi liation and their
correspondent institution location. This implies that, for instance, if an author has a Portuguese
nationality but is affi liated to a Japanese research institution/university, it will be considered an
article produced in Asia.
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their supremacy is shared with (North) America since both together correspond to 80% of
total publications (cf. figure 2).
Figure 2: Number of articles published by continent
2.3.5 Main outlets and scientific notability
The great majority of journals that publish articles on two-sided markets are specialized
in Industrial Organization. In addition, the topic has been covered by other specialized
journals in Mathematics, Marketing and Finance. However, not only specialized journals are
interested in two-sided markets, since more general journals have also published research in
this line15.
The outlets with the highest number of articles published on two-sided markets are the
International Journal of Industrial Organization (with 16 articles), Games and Economic
Behavior (with 12 articles) and Information Economics and Policy (with 9 articles).
Concerning the journals’impact factor (IF)16, we find that the majority (around 70%)
of the articles are published in journals with an impact factor higher than 1. If the interval
15For instance, Economics Letters and European Economic Review, among others have publica-
tions in this research field.
16The impact factor of an academic journal is a measure reflecting the average number of citations
to recent articles published in the journal. Thus, it is frequently used as a proxy for the relative
quality of a journal within its field of research, with journals with higher impact factors being
considered more important than those with lower IF’s.
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is slightly relaxed, at least 85% are published in journals with an impact higher than 0.9,
meaning that a significant number of publications in the field have at least moderate im-
pact. Therefore, an increasing number of two-sided markets articles in combination with a
strong perceived scientific quality of the field, are important explanations for the increasing
prominence of two-sided markets17 (cf. table 3). Also, it turns out that the majority of the
economic journals have published at least one or two two-sided markets articles (cf. figure
3).
Figure 3: Relative frequency of publications in economic journals
17The journals considered in table 3 represent 50% of the total articles published in two-sided
markets. In table 3, the label "Similar (a)" includes Management and Accounting and the label
"Similar (b)" includes Econometrics and Finance. The impact factor values are from 2012. Source-
Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) measures contextual citation impact by weighting citations
based on the total number of citations in a subject field. It is defined as "the ratio of a journal’s
citation count per paper and the citation potential in its subject field". This is the measure we
consider to find that around 70% of two-sided markets articles are published in journals with an
IF higher than 1. SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) is a measure of scientific influence of scholarly
journals that accounts for both the number of citations received by a journal and the importance
or prestige of the journals where such citations come from.
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Table 3: International economic journals, impact factor and subject area
Journal Subject area # nr. SJR (SNIP)
International Journal of Industrial Organization Business & Similar (a) 16 1.568 (1.478)
Games and Economic Behavior Economics & Similar (b) 12 2.325 (1.742)
Information Economics and Policy Economics & Similar (b) 9 0.616 (1.409)
Economics Letters Economics & Similar (b) 8 0.807 (0.890)
Marketing Science Business & Similar (a) 8 3.552 (1.786)
Review of Network Economics Economics & Similar (b) 7 0.606 (1.282)
Journal of Banking and Finance Economics & Similar (b) 7 1.348 (1.826)
International Journal of Game Theory Decision Sciences 6 0.623 (1.079)
Journal of Competition Law and Economics Economics & Similar (b) 6 0.556 (1.239)
Journal of Management Information Systems Business & Similar (a) 5 1.598 (1.567)
Journal of Industrial Economics Business & Similar (a) 5 2.028 (1.599)
Review of Industrial Organization Business & Similar (a) 5 0.311 (0.874)
International Game Theory Review Business & Similar (a) 5 0.239 (0.515)
Management Science Business & Similar (a) 5 2.902 (2.223)
Info Social Sciences 5 0.374 (0.536)
Economics Bulletin Economics & Similar (b) 5 0.181 (0.255)
American Economic Review Economics & Similar (b) 5 6.459 (3.380)
Economic Theory Economics & Similar (b) 4 1.857 (1.364)
Xitong G. L. Y. S. System Engineering Computer Science 4 0.279 (0.802)
Competition Policy International Economics & Similar (b) 4 0.363 (0.698)
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Business & Similar (a) 4 1.496 (1.601)
Theory and Decision Arts and Humanities 4 0.685 (0.963)
Journal of Economic Theory Economics & Similar (b) 4 3.950 (1.739)
Telecommunications Policy Computer Science 3 0.711 (1.681)
European Economic Review Economics & Similar (b) 3 1.880 (1.733)
Journal of the European Economic Association Economics & Similar (b) 3 4.160 (2.287)
International Economic Review Economics & Similar (b) 3 3.541 (2.000)
Mathematics of Operations Research Computer Science 3 1.846 (1.629)
American Economic Journal Microeconomics Economics & Similar (b) 3 3.798 (1.683)
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2.3.6 Main contributors
We now identify the most relevant authors within the field (cf. table 4)18. Most of the Top-10
prominent authors belong to universities from Europe and (North) America. These authors
have a remarkable number of publications indexed in Scopus, a large number of citations
and a high h-index19, which reflects their scientific notability.
Ranking (author) Affi liation
# 2SM articles
(Citations)
[h index]
# total articles
(Citations)
[h index]
1 (J. C. Rochet) Universität Zurich 5 (555) [4] 66 (2565) [20]
2 (J. Tirole) Toulouse School of Economics 3 (538) [3] 128 (9115) [40]
3 (M. Armstrong) University of Oxford 2 (335) [2] 40 (1380) [16]
4 (M. Van Alstyne) MIT Center for Digital Business 4 (314) [4] 28 (931) [10]
5 (J. Wright) National University of Singapore 8 (226) [7] 34 (751) [15]
6 (N. Economides) New York University 2 (116) [2] 29 (1124) [10]
7 (U. Kaiser) Inst. for Study of Labor, Bönn 3 (65) [3] 23 (400) [9]
8 (M. Peitz) Universität Mannheim 3 (43) [3] 53 (398) [11]
9 (B. Jullien) Toulouse School of Economics 3 (23) [3] 36 (846) [12]
10 (A. Hagiu) Harvard Business School 2 (22) [2] 11 (140) [6]
Table 4: Main contributors in two-sided markets
Taking into consideration three criteria: (i) the number of two-sided markets articles
developed, (ii) the number of articles citations and (iii) the h-index of each author, the
18To complete an authors’ranking, we consider only the authors focused on IO literature, which
is the scope of the thesis. Thus, we do not consider authors whose scopes of publication belong
to independent literatures (e.g., F. Kojima in matching theory, among others). The quantitative
approach reflects the application of standard bibliometric techniques.
19The h-index is an index that attempts to measure both the productivity of the published work
of a research. The index is based on the set of the scientist’s most cited papers and the number
of citations that they have received in other publications. It is importance to mention that the
author with more articles in this research field does not coincide with the one with more citations
on articles of two-sided markets. Thus, the author prominence depends not only on the number of
publications but also their closed relation with citations and the correspondent h-index.
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ranking shows that the top-3 prominent authors are Jean Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole and
Mark Armstrong.
Finally, the majority of researchers (90% according to Scopus) have developed one or
two articles (cf. figure 4).
Figure 4: Number of articles published by author
In order to summarize, we remark the findings in the following conclusion.
Conclusion 1. (Stylized Facts on Two-Sided Markets)
(i) Two-sided markets published articles are increasing since 2002 ;
(ii) Most of two-sided markets articles are developed in Europe and (North) America;
(iii) There exists a high level of receptivity by international economic journals towards
two-sided markets;
(iv) The prominent authors in two-sided markets are Jean Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole
and Mark Armstrong;
(v) From the universe of two-sided markets researchers, the majority elaborates one or
two manuscripts;
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2.4 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we define and characterize the field of two-sided markets. We provide a
literature review and we cover the recent developments on the field under scrutiny. We also
propose a methodology to quantify the research on two-sided markets.
We conclude that two-sided markets published articles are increasing since 2002, the
majority of two-sided markets articles have been published after 2008 and most of two-sided
markets articles are developed in Europe and (north) America. We observe the existence
of high levels of receptivity by international economic journals on two-sided markets and
the prominent authors in two-sided markets are Jean Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole and Mark
Armstrong.
This analysis is preliminary. We leave a relevant improvement for future research: the
qualitative categorization of the articles in order to understand, for instance, if the major-
ity of the articles embrace price (or quantity) competition, if the majority of manuscripts
adopt singlehoming (or partial/total) multihoming agents, which fraction of articles conducts
empirical validation and which fraction of articles are theoretical models and so on.
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3.0 NESTING VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL DIFFERENTIATION IN
TWO-SIDED MARKETS
Abstract. We develop a model that is a synthesis of the two-sided markets duopoly model
of Armstrong (2006) [9] with the nested vertical and horizontal differentiation model of
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57], which consists of a linear city with different consumer
densities on the left and on the right side of the city. In equilibrium, the high-quality
platform sells at a higher price and captures a greater market share than the low-quality
platform, despite the indifferent consumer being closer to the high-quality platform. The
difference between market shares is lower than socially optimal, because of the inter-group
externality and because the high-quality platform sells at a higher price. We conclude that
a perturbation that introduces a negligible difference between the consumer density on the
left and on the right side of the city may disrupt the existence of equilibrium in the model of
Armstrong (2006) [9]. Finally, we show that inter-group externalities make it easier to deter
an inferior-quality entrant and make it easier for a superior-quality entrant to conquer the
market.
Keywords: Two-sided markets, Horizontal differentiation, Vertical differentiation.
JEL Classification Numbers: D42, D43, L13.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
A two-sided market is a market where firms are platforms that allow two distinct groups of
consumers to interact in order to engage in an activity that would not be possible without a
platform. Examples in the literature include clubs, social networks and dating sites (men and
women), online trading sites (buyers and sellers), newspapers (consumers and advertisers),
video games (software developers and end users), yellow pages and credit cards (consumers
and merchants), and others.
For example, in the clubs market, we can conceive that men and women constitute the two
sides of the market. A given man chooses a certain club (platform) taking into consideration,
among other aspects: the inter-group externality (number of women attending each of the
clubs), the type of music (rock or latin), the environment (air conditioned, cleanliness),
the access price and the travel time. There are, evidently, elements of both vertical and
horizontal differentiation involved.
We study price competition between two platforms that sell horizontally and vertically
differentiated products (whose quality is perfectly observed by both sides of the market) by
developing a model that synthesizes the two-sided market model of Armstrong (2006) [9]
and the product differentiation model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57].1
In the model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57], the competing platforms are located
at opposite extremes of a linear city. Consumers, who are distributed along the city, face
linear transportation costs to travel to the platform of their choice. The difference with
respect to the standard model of horizontal differentiation (Hotelling (1929) [68]) is the
fact that consumer density is different on the left side and on the right side of the city.
This asymmetry of consumer density introduces vertical differentiation in the model.2 To
1In most of the literature, competition with differentiated products is studied alternatively us-
ing models of horizontal or vertical differentiation. However, there are some contributions where
horizontal and vertical differentiation are simultaneously considered, as Neven and Thisse (1990)
[87], Economides (1989) [39], Irmen and Thisse (1998) [69], Daughety and Reinganum (2007) [29],
Argenziano (2008) [7], Levin, Peck and Ye (2009) [82], Griva and Vettas (2011) [63], Gabszewicz
and Wauthy (2012) [57] and Amir, Gabszewicz and Resende (2013) [4].
2Gabszewicz and Wauthy [57] define the natural market of a firm as the group of consumers
who, at equal prices, prefer the variant offered by this firm relatively to the variant offered by its
competitor. In the light of this, they generalize the model of Hotelling [68] to allow for natural
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this environment, the two-sided market elements of the model of Armstrong (2006) [9] are
added. There are two groups of consumers, which have the same distribution along the city
and have the same benefit of interacting with agents of the other group.3
Considering weak network effects, we provide necessary and suffi cient conditions for
existence and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium and explain how prices, market shares
and profits depend on the strength of inter-group externalities and on the degree of vertical
differentiation. The equilibrium is unique and characterized by the fact that the high-quality
platform charges a higher price and has a greater market share than the low-quality platform,
although the indifferent consumer is located on the right side of the city centre.
The effect of the inter-group externality on prices is the same as in the model of Arm-
strong (2006) [9]: prices decrease in a way that exactly reflects the benefit of attracting
agents on one side to agents on the other side. A stronger inter-group externality increases
the market share of the high-quality platform, which is the more populated one, but not
suffi ciently to offset the negative impact of lower prices on its profit.
Vertical differentiation as defined by Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57] implies that
the low-quality platform competes more fiercely, leading to lower prices at both platforms.
In spite of facing a more fierce competition, the high-quality platform sees its market share
increase. However, its profit decreases unless the inter-group externality is suffi ciently strong.
We also study the existence of tipping equilibria, only to confirm that the more compli-
cated consumer distribution of the model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57] does not
interfere with the conditions for existence nor with the characteristics of tipping equilibria,
which are exactly as in the model of Armstrong (2006) [9].
Considering the problem of a benevolent planner that allocates consumers to platforms
in order to promote social welfare effi ciency, we find that it is more effi cient to have two
active platforms than only one (under the assumption of weak network effects). Moreover,
markets of different sizes. In their own words: “In the symmetric linear model with firms located at the
extremities of the unit interval, natural markets are defined by the
[
0, 12
]
and
[
1
2 , 1
]
intervals, respectively.
In order to allow for natural markets with different sizes, we then assume that the density differs from one
interval to the other. Notice that in this model, a vertical configuration appears as a limiting case where the
density of one of the intervals tends to zero while the density of the other tends to 1 .”
3Armstrong [9] does not restrict inter-group externalities to be symmetric in this sense.
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we show that, in the market equilibrium, there are too few consumers on the high-quality
platform. This is due to the inter-group externality (which is not taken into account by
individual agents) and reinforced by the fact that the low-quality platform charges lower
prices.4
Finally, we investigate two particular cases of possible entry as in Gabszewicz andWauthy
(2012) [57]. Our conclusions are that, in the presence of cross-network externalities, the
deterrence of an inferior-quality entrant is easier and the conquest of the market by a superior-
quality entrant can be achieved with a higher limit price.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a description of the model. Section
3.2.1 provides the corresponding analysis. Section 3.2.2 studies and defines the region where
the (interior) equilibrium exists as well the tipping region and Section 3.3 presents the socially
optimal outcome promoted by a benevolent planner. Finally, Section 3.4 covers entry and
Section 3.5 concludes. The appendix contains the proofs of most propositions.
3.2 THE MODEL
Consider a two-sided market with two platforms, A and B, that are horizontally and verti-
cally differentiated. The platforms are exogenously located at opposite extremes of a linear
city: platform A is located at x = 0 while platform B is located at x = 1. There are no
production costs.
There is a continuum of consumers on each of the two sides of the market, 1 and 2.
Consumers inelastically demand one unit of the service that is provided by the platform.
We follow Armstrong (2006) [9] in considering linear inter-group externalities and Serfes and
Zacharias (2012) [104] in assuming symmetry between the two sides of the market.
Horizontal differentiation is captured by transportation costs that are linear in distance,
as in the model of Hotelling (1929) [68].
For technical convenience, the transportation cost parameter is set to 1, following Neven
4This is also the conclusion of Argenziano [7].
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and Thisse (1990) [87] and Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57], among others.
As in Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57], vertical differentiation is captured by the fact
that there are more consumers on the right half of the city than on the left half. On each side
of the market, the density of consumers is µ at any x ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
and 1− µ at any x ∈
(
1
2
, 1
]
.
Without loss of generality, we assume that µ ≤ 1
2
. Pure horizontal differentiation corre-
sponds to the particular case in which µ = 1
2
, while pure vertical differentiation corresponds
to µ = 0.
The two platforms, A and B, simultaneously choose their access prices, pA and pB, which
apply to both sides of the market (price discrimination between sides is not allowed).
The utility of an agent of side j that is located at x ∈ [0, 1] and chooses platform
i ∈ {A,B} is given by:
uAj (x) = V + αD
A
k − pA − x, (3.1)
uBj (x) = V + αD
B
k − pB − (1− x), (3.2)
where V is the stand-alone benefit, α measures the strength of the inter-group externality
and Dik is the number of consumers of side k 6= j that join platform i.
Notice that, at equal prices and platform sizes, all consumers in [0, 1
2
) prefer to buy from
platform A while all consumers in (1
2
, 1] prefer to buy from platform B. Since the density of
consumers is greater at the right side of the line, this means that the majority of consumers
prefers platform B. However, of course, agents also take into account the prices charged by
the platforms and the platform choice by the agents of the other side.
The timing of the game is the following: in the first stage, platforms simultaneously
set access prices for both sides. In the second stage, agents simultaneously choose which
platform to join and their payoffs are determined.
3.2.1 Demand and profit functions
We assume that agents have rational expectations relatively to the platform choices of the
other agents. This implies that all consumers to the left of the indifferent consumer choose
platform A, while all consumers to the right choose platform B.
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The hypothesis that platforms cannot price discriminate between the two-sides implies
that the indifferent consumers of the two sides have the same location, i.e., that x̃1 = x̃2,
allowing us to drop the subscripts and use the simpler notation pA, pB, x̃, DA and DB.
A consumer that is indifferent between platform A and B must be located at:5
x̃ =
1
2
[
1 + α(DA −DB)− (pA − pB)
]
. (3.3)
If x̃ < 0, all consumers choose platform B; while if x̃ > 1, everyone chooses platform A.
Writing the demand for platform A from each consumer side as a function of the location of
the indifferent consumer, we obtain:
DA(x̃) =

1
2
, if x̃ ≥ 1;
(x̃− 1
2
)(1− µ) + µ
2
, if 1
2
≤ x̃ ≤ 1;
x̃µ, if 0 ≤ x̃ ≤ 1
2
;
0, if x̃ ≤ 0.
The following assumption, maintained throughout the paper except in Section 3.2.4, implies
that the slope of the demand function is negative.
Assumption 3.1 (Weak inter-group externality) The inter-group externality is rela-
tively weak: α < 1
1−µ .
As a function of prices, the demand for platform A is given by (see Appendix 3.6.1):
DA(pA, pB) =

1
2
, if pA ≤ pB + α
2
− 1;
2(1−µ)(pB−pA)+2µ−α(1−µ)
4[1−α(1−µ)] , if p
B + α
2
− 1 ≤ pA ≤ pB − α
2
(1− 2µ);
2µ(pB−pA)+µ(2−α)
4(1−αµ) , if p
B − α
2
(1− 2µ) ≤ pA ≤ pB − α
2
+ 1;
0, if pA ≥ pB − α
2
+ 1.
(3.4)
Since total demand is inelastic, the demand for platform B from each consumer side
is DB(pA, pB) = 1
2
− DA(pA, pB). The profit of each platform, i ∈ {A,B}, is given by
πi(pA, pB) = 2piDi(pA, pB).
5We sometimes refer to x̃ as the indifferent consumer with some abuse of language. More
rigorously, it is the location (that may be outside the unit interval) where a consumer would be
indifferent between the two platforms.
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The demand and profit functions of platforms A and B are defined in four pieces, each
corresponding to a different region where the indifferent consumer is located. A problematic
characteristic of the function DA(·, pB) is the fact that its slope decreases from the second
to the third subdomain in (3.4).6
This is illustrated in Figure 5(a), where it is assumed that α = 0.3, µ = 0.1 and pB =
2−µ
3(1−µ) −
α
2
(which, as we will see, is the equilibrium value of pB for these values of the
parameters α and µ). The profit function of platform A, πA(·, pB), is obtained by multiplying
the demand function by 2pA. As illustrated in figure 6(a), it may have two local maxima.
Figure 5(b) illustrates the behavior of the demand of platform B, given the price set by
platform A (again, we consider α = 0.3, µ = 0.1 and the equilibrium value of pA). Since
DB(pA, ·) is concave, the profit function πB(pA, ·) is also concave (cf. figure 6(b)).
Figure 5(a) - DA (y-axis) as a function
of pA (x-axis)
Figure 5(b) - DB (y-axis) as a function
of pB (x-axis)
6This kink in the demand curve has appeared, for example, in the two-sided markets model of
Resende (2010) [93], in models with “market inertia”or “switching costs”(Scotchmer, 1986 [103];
Farrell and Shapiro, 1986 [48]) and in a model with a particular kind of multihoming (Brandão et
al., 2013 [17]).
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Figure 6(a) - πA (y-axis) as a function
of pA (x-axis)
Figure 6(b) - πB (y-axis) as a function
of pB (x-axis)
3.2.2 Interior equilibrium
We start by presenting the benchmark case of pure horizontal differentiation (µ = 1
2
), which
corresponds to the model of Armstrong (2006) [9] in the particular case of symmetric inter-
group externalities.
Proposition 2. (Pure horizontal differentiation)
If µ = 1
2
, there exists an interior equilibrium. It is such that:
pA∗ = pB∗ = 1− α
2
,
 x̃ = 12DA∗ = DB∗ = 1
4
,
πA∗ = πB∗ =
1
2
− α
4
.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.2.
In the presence of vertical differentiation, if the inter-group externality is not too strong,
there exists an interior equilibrium with the indifferent consumer located on the right side
of the city (x̃ > 1
2
).
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Proposition 3. (Horizontal and vertical differentiation)
If µ < 1
2
, there exists an interior equilibrium if and only if α ≤ 4−µ
6(1−µ) −
√
12µ+µ2
6(1−µ) . It is
such that:  pA∗ =
1+µ
3(1−µ) −
α
2
pB∗ = 2−µ
3(1−µ) −
α
2
, DA∗ =
2(1+µ)−3α(1−µ)
12[1−α(1−µ)]
DB∗ = 2(2−µ)−3α(1−µ)
12[1−α(1−µ)] , πA∗ =
[2(1+µ)−3α(1−µ)]2
36(1−µ)[1−α(1−µ)] ,
πB∗ = [2(2−µ)−3α(1−µ)]
2
36(1−µ)[1−α(1−µ)] .
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.2.
In the presence of vertical differentiation, the high-quality platform sets a higher price
(pB∗ > pA∗) and captures a greater market share (DB∗ > DA∗) than the low-quality platform.
Therefore, it also has higher profits (πB∗ > πA∗).
We remark that, for the above equilibrium prices, the demand is unique, in the sense
that there is no other equilibria of the game in which consumers, for given prices, choose
which platform to join (see Appendix 3.6.3).
Observe that, when µ → 1
2
, the equilibrium variables converge to their values in the
equilibrium with pure horizontal differentiation.
In the case of pure vertical differentiation (µ = 0), which is the other extreme case, we
obtain: pA∗ = 1
3
− α
2
and pB∗ = 2
3
− α
2
; DA∗ = 2−3α
12(1−α) andD
B∗ = 4−3α
12(1−α) ; π
A∗ = 1
9(1−α)−
α(4−3α)
12(1−α)
and πB∗ = 1
4(1−α) −
α(8−3α)
12(1−α) .
As a corollary, we conclude that a perturbation that introduces a negligible difference
between the consumer density on the left and on the right side of the city may disrupt the
existence of equilibrium in the model of Armstrong (2006) [9].
Corollary 4. (No equilibrium)
If µ < 1
2
and α > 4−µ
6(1−µ) −
√
12µ+µ2
6(1−µ) , there exists no interior equilibrium.
Proof. This result follows from Proposition 3 and Lemmas 7 and 8 in Appendix 3.6.2.
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3.2.3 Comparative statics
We now discuss the impact of the degree of vertical differentiation and of the strength of the
inter-group externality on equilibrium prices, market shares and profits. All calculations are
presented in Appendix 3.6.4.
As the degree of vertical differentiation increases (µ becomes lower)7, both prices de-
crease, with the price of the low-quality platform decreasing faster (∂p
A∗
∂µ
> ∂p
B∗
∂µ
> 0).
Despite selling at an increasing discount relatively to the high-quality platform, the low-
quality platform loses market share (∂D
A∗
∂µ
> 0), and, therefore, also loses profits (∂π
A∗
∂µ
> 0).
Since the market share of the high-quality platform increases, the impact of vertical differ-
entiation on its profit is not obvious. We find that the profit of the high-quality platform
decreases if and only if the inter-group externality is weak (∂π
B∗
∂µ
> 0 ⇔ α < 2µ
1−µ). It may
be surprising that the profit of the high-quality platform may decrease when the degree of
vertical differentiation increases. It follows from the fact that the price of the high-quality
platform goes down as µ decreases due to an intensification of price competition.8
Prices decrease as the inter-group externality becomes stronger (∂p
A∗
∂α
= ∂p
B∗
∂α
= −1
2
),
because attracting consumers on one side generates gains on the other side. More precisely,
both prices are adjusted downwards by α
2
, which corresponds to the marginal benefit on
the other side that results from attracting an additional agent on one side. The difference
between the two prices does not depend on the strength of the inter-group externality. It is
natural, therefore, that market shares diverge as the strength of the inter-group externality
increases (∂D
A∗
∂α
< 0).
Without inter-group externalities (α = 0), we recover the setting of Gabszewicz and
Wauthy (2012) [57] and, of course, their equilibrium prices (pA∗ = 1+µ
3(1−µ) and p
B∗ = 2−µ
3(1−µ)).
As the strength of the inter-group externality increases, the profit of platformA decreases,
since price and market share strictly decrease. The profit of platformB also decreases, despite
the increase in its market share.
7Recall that µ ∈
[
0, 12
]
is the consumer density on the left side of the city, while 1-µ is the consumer
density on the right side of the city. Therefore, the lower is µ, the greater is the asymmetry between
the sizes of the firms’natural markets.
8This effect is already present in Gabszewicz and Wauthy [57].
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3.2.4 Tipping equilibria
Since the utility of accessing a platform is an increasing function of the platforms’member-
ship, platform growth tends to be self-reinforcing and, therefore, one platform may capture
the whole market (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 [74]). We conclude that vertical differentiation
of the type that we are considering does not interfere with the condition for existence of
tipping equilibria.
Proposition 5. (Tipping equilibrium)
There exist tipping equilibria with x̃ = 0 and x̃ = 1 if and only if α > 2.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.2.
3.3 SOCIAL OPTIMUM
Suppose that a benevolent planner can allocate consumers to the two platforms. Some
questions arise. It is socially optimal to place all consumers in the high-quality platform, so
that inter-group externalities are maximized? Or is it preferable to split consumers between
the two platforms, to save on transportation costs?
Social welfare is given by:
W =

2
∫ x̃
0
[
V + αDA − x
]
µdx+ 2
∫ 1
2
x̃
[
V + αDB − (1− x)
]
µdx
+2
∫ 1
1
2
[
V + αDB − (1− x)
]
(1− µ)dx, if x̃ ≤ 1
2
;
2
∫ 1
2
0
(V + αDA − x)µdx+ 2
∫ x̃
1
2
(V + αDA − x)(1− µ)dx
+2
∫ 1
x̃
(V + αDB − (1− x))(1− µ)dx, if x̃ > 1
2
.
Conditionally on x̃ ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
, social welfare as a function of x̃ is given by:
W (x̃) = V − 1
4
+
α
2
− µ
2
+ x̃2 [−2µ(1− 2αµ)] + x̃ [2µ(1− α)] . (3.5)
If α < 1, the maximum in
[
0, 1
2
]
is attained at:
x̃FB =
1− α
2 (1− 2αµ) . (3.6)
This constrained maximizer is, in fact, the global maximizer.
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Proposition 6. (Social optimum versus market equilibrium)
Let α < 1. In the socially optimal outcome, both platforms operate in the market, with
the high-quality platform capturing a greater market share than in the market equilibrium.
For α > 1, the high-quality platform captures the whole market.
Proof. See Appendix 3.6.5.
Comparing the socially optimal outcome with the market equilibrium outcome, we con-
clude that there are too many consumers on the low-quality platform at the market equilib-
rium.
3.4 ENTRY
The extension of the model to a triopoly is particularly relevant if we consider the possibility
of entry by a third firm. In line with Gabszewicz and Wauthy [57], we study entry by an
inferior-quality platform and entry by a superior-quality platform. We aim at understanding
whether inter-group externalities make it easier or harder for the incumbents to deter the
entry of an inferior-quality platform and for a superior-quality platform to capture the whole
market.
3.4.1 Deterrence of an inferior-quality entrant
Suppose that a third platform, C, has the possibility of entering the market, becoming
positioned at a distance L from the center of the city (i.e., from x = 1
2
), in a direction that
is orthogonal to the linear city.
Any L > 1
2
implies that no consumer would choose platform C if all platforms charged
the same prices and had the same number of customers on the other side of the market.
As in Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57], suppose that platforms A and B are charging
the pre-entry equilibrium prices established by Proposition 3. Can platform C attract any
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consumers by charging pC = 0, given that DC = 0?9
It can if and only if it can attract the consumer located at x = 1
2
:
V − L ≥ V + αDA∗ − pA∗ − 1
2
⇔ L ≤ pA∗ − αDA∗ + 1
2
⇔ L ≤ 1 + µ
3(1− µ) +
1
2
− α
2
− α2(1 + µ)− 3α(1− µ)
12 [1− α(1− µ)] .
When α = 0, we recover the result of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57]. The presence of
inter-group externalities diminishes the critical value of L for which entry is deterred, i.e., it
helps platforms A and B to deter the entrance of platform C.
3.4.2 Market capture by a superior-quality entrant
Now suppose that the potential entrant offers a service of superior quality, in the sense that
its stand-alone value is V̂ > V .
Assuming that V̂ > V +L+ 1
2
implies that all consumers would choose platform C if all
platforms charged the same prices and had the same number of customers on the other side
of the market.
Can platform C capture the whole market, even with platforms A and B charging a null
price? The answer is positive if and only if:
V̂ +
α
2
− L− 1
2
≥ V ⇔ L ≤ V̂ − V + α
2
− 1
2
.
If the above condition is satisfied, prices pA∗ = pB∗ = 0 and pC∗ = V̂ − V + α
2
− 1
2
− L,
together with demand DA∗ = DB∗ = 0 and DC∗ = 1
2
, constitute a triopoly equilibrium
(unless platform C prefers to charge a higher price in spite of losing some demand).
Notice that the presence of inter-group externalities makes it easier for the superior
quality entrant to capture the whole market.
9Notice that we are considering that the status quo is the equilibrium of the baseline model, i.e.,
that consumers are already in the incumbent platforms. The entrant faces, therefore, an additional
diffi culty in attracting consumers. Coordination is, in this sense, assumed to be adverse to the
entrant.
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS
We have studied competition between two horizontally and vertically differentiated platforms
in a two-sided market, using a model that captures those of Armstrong (2006) [9] and
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57] as particular cases for pure horizontal differentiation
and no inter-group externalities, respectively.
In spite of the technical diffi culties that are intrinsic to the model of Gabszewicz and
Wauthy (2012) [57], we have been able to fully characterize the existence and uniqueness
properties of equilibrium under the assumption that the inter-group externality is relatively
weak. One important aspect of our existence results is that a perturbation of the model of
Armstrong (2006) [9] that introduces a small jump in the consumer density at the center of
the city disrupts the existence of equilibrium.
The equilibrium properties essentially combine the features of the two-sided market model
of Armstrong (2006) [9], in particular, the fact that prices are lower due to the benefit on
the other side that results from increased membership on one side, with those of the nested
horizontal and vertical differentiation model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57], where
the low-quality firm becomes a more fierce competitor due to the decrease of the average
consumer density coupled with the increase of the marginal consumer density.
Comparing the socially optimal outcome with the market equilibrium, we concluded that
a benevolent planner would prefer to increase the market share of the high-quality platform.
This was also the conclusion of Argenziano (2008) [7] in her study of a duopoly with product
differentiation and network effects.
Finally, comparing our results with those of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57] we
concluded that inter-group externalities facilitate the deterrence of an inferior-quality entrant
and the capture of the whole market by a superior-quality entrant.
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3.6 APPENDIX
3.6.1 Demand
The four consumer utilities assuming the existence of platforms i ∈ {A,B} and sides j ∈
{1, 2}, k ∈ {2, 1} and α = α1 = α2 and µ = µ1 = µ2 are:
uA1 (x1) = V + αD
A
2 − pA1 − x1;
uB1 (x1) = V + αD
B
2 − pB1 − (1− x1);
uA2 (x2) = V + αD
A
1 − pA2 − x2;
uB2 (x2) = V + αD
B
1 − pB2 − (1− x2).
The indifferent consumer on both sides of the market follows by setting: uA1 (x1) = u
B
1 (x1)
and uA2 (x2) = u
B
2 (x2). Straightforward calculations imply: x̃1 = 12 +
α(DA2 −DB2 )−(pA1 −pB1 )
2
x̃2 =
1
2
+
α(DA1 −DB1 )−(pA2 −pB2 )
2
.
3.6.1.1 Assuming that the indifferent consumers are on the right: demands for
x̃i ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
, i ∈ {1, 2}, are defined by: DAi (x̃i) =
µ
2
+ (x̃i − 12)(1− µ);
DBi (x̃i) = (1− x̃i)(1− µ).
Substituting the expressions for x̃1 and x̃2, we obtain:
DA1 =
µ
2
+ 1−µ
2
[
α(DA2 −DB2 )− (pA1 − pB1 )
]
;
DA2 =
µ
2
+ 1−µ
2
[
α(DA1 −DB1 )− (pA2 − pB2 )
]
;
DB1 =
1−µ
2
[
1− α(DA2 −DB2 ) + (pA1 − pB1 )
]
;
DB2 =
1−µ
2
[
1− α(DA1 −DB1 ) + (pA2 − pB2 )
]
.
Solving this linear system for pA = pA1 = p
A
2 and p
B = pB1 = p
B
2 , we obtain: DA(pA, pB) =
(1−µ)(pB−pA)
2[1−α(1−µ)] +
2µ−α(1−µ)
4[1−α(1−µ)] ;
DB(pA, pB) = (1−µ)(p
A−pB)
2[1−α(1−µ)] +
(2−α)(1−µ)
4[1−α(1−µ)] .
(3.7)
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3.6.1.2 Assuming that the indifferent consumers are on the left: demands for
x̃i ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
, i ∈ {1, 2}, are defined by: DAi (x̃i) = x̃iµ;DBi (x̃i) = (12 − x1)µ+ 12(1− µ).
Once we substitute the respective demands by x̃1 and x̃2, we obtain:
DA1 =
µ
2
+ µ
2
[
α(DA2 −DB2 )− (pA1 − pB1 )
]
;
DA2 =
µ
2
+ µ
2
[
α(DA1 −DB1 )− (pA2 − pB2 )
]
;
DB1 =
1−µ
2
− µ
2
[
α(DA2 −DB2 )− (pA1 − pB1
]
;
DB2 =
1−µ
2
− µ
2
[
α(DA1 −DB1 )− (pA2 − pB2
]
.
Solving this linear system for pA = pA1 = p
A
2 and p
B = pB1 = p
B
2 , we obtain: DA(pA, pB) =
2µ(pB−pA)
4(1−αµ) +
(2−α)µ
4(1−αµ) ;
DB(pA, pB) = 2µ(p
A−pB)
4(1−αµ) +
2−2µ−αµ
4(1−αµ) .
(3.8)
3.6.2 Equilibrium prices, demand and profits
Proof of Proposition 2
In the particular case of µ = 1
2
, demand and profits have the same analytical expression
on the left and on the right side of the city. Thus, there is no longer a kink in the demand
function.
From (3.7), the first-order conditions for profit maximization are:
∂πA
∂pA
= 0
∂πB
∂pB
= 0
⇔

2
(
1 + α
2
)
pA −
(
1 + α
2
)
pB =
(
1− α
2
) (
1 + α
2
)
2
(
1 + α
2
)
pB −
(
1 + α
2
)
pA =
(
1− α
2
) (
1 + α
2
)
⇔ pA = pB = 1− α
2
.
The equilibrium prices satisfy the second-order condition, because:
∂2πA
∂pA2
=
−1
2
1− α2
4
,
which is strictly negative under Assumption 3.1. 
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Lemma 7.
There exists no equilibrium with x̃ ∈
(
0, 1
2
)
.
Proof. We will use the first-order conditions to find a single candidate equilibrium with the
indifferent consumer located at the left of the city center, and, then, we will show that the
candidate equilibrium cannot be an actual equilibrium
We will use the superscript “+”to denote the values of prices, demands and profits in
that candidate equilibrium.
(i) First-order conditions for profit-maximization
Considering the demand functions for x̃i ∈
(
0, 1
2
)
, i ∈ {1, 2}, which are given by (3.8), the
first-order conditions for profit maximization yield:
∂πA
∂pA1
= 0
∂πA
∂pA2
= 0
∂πB
∂pB1
= 0
∂πB
∂pB2
= 0
⇔

4µpA1 + 4αµ
2pA2 − 2µpB1 − 2αµ2pB2 = −α2µ2 + 2αµ2 − αµ+ 2µ;
4αµ2pA1 + 4µp
A
2 − 2αµ2pB1 − 2µpB2 = −α2µ2 + 2αµ2 − αµ+ 2µ;
−2µpA1 − 2αµ2pA2 + 4µpB1 + 4αµ2pB2 = −α2µ2 − 2αµ2 + αµ− 2µ+ 2;
−2αµ2pA1 − 2µpA2 + 4αµ2pB1 + 4µpB2 = −α2µ2 − 2αµ2 + αµ− 2µ+ 2.
Solving this system of equations, we obtain the following equilibrium prices: pA+ =
1+µ
3µ
− α
2
,
pB+ = 2−µ
3µ
− α
2
.
(3.9)
The corresponding market shares are obtained by substituting (3.9) into (3.4): DA+ =
2(1+µ)−3αµ
12(1−αµ) ,
DB+ = 2(2−µ)−3αµ
12(1−αµ) .
(3.10)
Profits are obtained from (3.9) and (3.10): πA+ =
[2(1+µ)−3αµ]2
36µ(1−αµ) ,
πB+ = [2(2−µ)−3αµ]
2
36µ(1−αµ) .
(3.11)
(ii) Interiority of the indifferent consumer
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The indifferent consumer is located at:
x̃+ =
1
2
− α(1− 2µ)
12(1− αµ) +
1− 2µ
6µ
. (3.12)
It must be on the left half of the city, otherwise the candidate equilibrium cannot be an
actual equilibrium. This requires that the inter-group externality is relatively strong:
x̃+ <
1
2
⇔ α(1− 2µ)
12(1− αµ) >
1− 2µ
6µ
⇔ αµ > 2− 2αµ ⇔ α > 2
3µ
. (3.13)
The indifferent consumer must also be located inside the city. This requires that the inter-
group externality is relatively weak:
x̃+ > 0 ⇔ 1 + µ
µ
>
α(1− 2µ)
2(1− αµ)
⇔ 2(1 + µ− αµ− αµ2) > αµ− 2αµ2
⇔ 2 + 2µ > 3αµ
⇔ α < 2(1 + µ)
3µ
. (3.14)
This is always true under Assumption 3.1. Combining (3.13) with Assumption 3.1, we obtain
α ∈
(
2
3µ
, 1
1−µ
)
, which is non-empty if and only if µ > 0.4.
(iii) Global profit-maximization
Even if the local second-order conditions are satisfied, since the profit function of platform
A is not globally quasi-concave, we must check that the local maximum determined before
(candidate equilibrium price pA+) is a global maximum (given pB+).
For this to be true, it is necessary that:
πA
(
pA+, pB+
)
≥ πA
(
pA, pB+
)
, ∀pA. (3.15)
A possible deviation is to pAR, which is the local maximum of πA
(
·, pB+
)
in the branch that
leads to x̃ ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
. From (3.4), in this branch, the profit function is given by:
πA
(
pA, pB+
)
= 2pA 1−µ
2[1−α(1−µ)]
(
pB+ − pA + µ
1−µ −
α
2
)
. (3.16)
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In this branch, the first-order condition for profit maximization yields:
∂πA(pA,pB+)
∂pA
= 0
⇔ 1−µ
2[1−α(1−µ)]
(
pB+ − pAR + µ
1−µ −
α
2
)
= pAR 1−µ
2[1−α(1−µ)]
⇔ 2pAR = pB+ + µ
1−µ −
α
2
.
Replacing in expression (3.16), we obtain:
πA
(
pAR, pB+
)
= 1−µ
4[1−α(1−µ)]
(
pB+ + µ
1−µ −
α
2
)2
.
Using (3.9), we find:
πA
(
pAR, pB+
)
=
[2−3µ+4µ2−3µα(1−µ)]
2
36µ2(1−µ)[1−α(1−µ)] .
The equilibrium profit is not lower than this deviation profit if and only if:
[2(1+µ)−3αµ]2
36µ(1−αµ) ≥
[2−3µ+4µ2−3µα(1−µ)]
2
36µ2(1−µ)[1−α(1−µ)]
⇔ − 9(1− µ)µ2α2 + 3µ
(
4− 2µ+ µ2
)
α− 4− 5µ2 ≥ 0.
The roots of this quadratic expression in α are:
αc =
1
2µ (1− µ) +
1− µ
6µ
∓
√
−8 + 16µ+ µ2
6 (1− µ) .
For µ < 8 − 6
√
2 ≈ 0.485, the roots are complex, which means that the inequality never
holds. For µ ≥ 8− 6
√
2, the inequality holds for α between the two real roots. In that case,
a necessary condition for (3.15) to hold is:
α ≥ 1
2µ (1− µ) +
1− µ
6µ
−
√
−8 + 16µ+ µ2
6 (1− µ) .
However, the above condition is incompatible with condition (3.14):
1
2µ (1− µ) +
1− µ
6µ
−
√
−8 + 16µ+ µ2
6 (1− µ) <
2(1 + µ)
3µ
⇔ 3 + 1− 2µ+ µ2 − µ
√
−8 + 16µ+ µ2 − 4(1− µ2) < 0
⇔ − 2 + 5µ <
√
−8 + 16µ+ µ2.
Since µ > 0.4, this condition is equivalent to: 2µ2 − 3µ+ 1 < 0 ⇔ µ > 1
2
.
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But this deviation profit is only attainable if pAR induces an indifferent consumer x̃ ∈(
1
2
, 1
)
. This is the case if and only if:
 pAR > pB+ + α2 − 1pAR < pB+ − α
2
+ αµ
⇔
 α <
(2−µ)(4µ−1)
3µ(1−µ)
α < 2+µ
3µ(1−µ) .
The second condition is not restrictive. We can exclude, therefore, the existence of an
equilibrium when α < (2−µ)(4µ−1)
3µ(1−µ) .
When, α > max
{
(2−µ)(4µ−1)
3µ(1−µ) ,
2
3µ
}
, the most profitable deviation is to choose the price,
pA1, that induces x̃ = 1. From (3.4), pA1 = pB+ + α
2
− 1 = 2−4µ
3µ
. The corresponding profit is
πA1 = 2−4µ
3µ
.
A necessary condition for profit maximization when α > max
{
(2−µ)(4µ−1)
3µ(1−µ) ,
2
3µ
}
is:
[2(1 + µ)− 3αµ]2
36µ(1− αµ) ≥
2− 4µ
3µ
⇔ [2(1 + µ)− 3αµ]2 ≥ 24(1− 2µ)(1− αµ)
⇔ 9µ2α2 + (12µ− 60µ2)α + 4µ2 + 56µ− 20 ≥ 0.
Combining this condition with Assumption 3.1, we obtain:
α ∈
(
max
{
(2− µ)(4µ− 1)
3µ(1− µ) ,
2
3µ
}
,
10µ− 2
√
6(1− 2µ)− 2
3µ
]
,
which is empty.
Lemma 8.
If µ < 1
2
, there exists no equilibrium with x̃ = 1
2
.
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Proof. The strategy of the proof is to show that x̃ = 1
2
is not compatible with profit-
maximization by platform A.
From (3.3), an equilibrium with x̃ = 1
2
would have to be such that:
1
2
=
1
2
[
1 + α(DA −DB)− (pA − pB)
]
⇔ α
(
µ
2
− 1− µ
2
)
− pA + pB = 0
⇔ pB = pA + α
(
1− 2µ
2
)
.
From (3.4), if x̃ ≥ 1
2
, the profit of platform A is given by:
πA
∣∣
x̃≥ 1
2
= 2pA
2(1− µ)(pB − pA) + 2µ− α(1− µ)
4 [1− α(1− µ)] ,
therefore, the derivative with respect to pA is:
∂πA
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
x̃≥ 1
2
=
4(1− µ)(pB − pA) + 4µ− 2α(1− µ)− 4pA(1− µ)
4 [1− α(1− µ)] .
For the profit-maximizing price, pA, to imply x̃ = 1
2
, it is necessary that the derivative above
is non-negative, i.e., that:
4(1− µ)(pB − 2pA) + 4µ− 2α(1− µ) ≥ 0
⇔ 4(1− µ)
[
α
(
1− 2µ
2
)
− pA
]
+ 4µ− 2α(1− µ) ≥ 0
⇔ −4αµ(1− µ)− 4(1− µ)pA + 4µ ≥ 0
⇔ pA ≤ µ
1− µ [1− α(1− µ)] . (3.17)
From (3.4), if x̃ ≤ 1
2
, the profit of platform A is given by:
πA
∣∣
x̃≤ 1
2
= 2pA
2µ(pB − pA) + µ(2− α)
4 (1− αµ) ,
therefore, the derivative with respect to pA is:
∂πA
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
x̃≤ 1
2
=
4µ(pB − pA) + 2µ (2− α)− 4µpA
4 (1− αµ) .
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This derivative must be non-positive for the profit-maximizing price, pA, to imply x̃ = 1
2
.
This occurs if and only if:
4(pB − 2pA) + 2 (2− α) ≤ 0
⇔ 4
[
α
(
1− 2µ
2
)
− pA
]
+ 4− 2α ≤ 0
⇔ 2α (1− 2µ)− 4pA + 4− 2α ≤ 0
⇔ pA ≥ 1− αµ. (3.18)
But notice that (3.18) is incompatible with (3.17), because:
1− αµ ≤ µ
1− µ [1− α(1− µ)]
⇔ 1− αµ ≤ µ
1− µ − αµ
⇔ 1− µ ≤ µ,
which is only true for µ = 1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemmas 7 and 8, we know that an interior equilibrium must be such that x̃ ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
.
(i) First-order conditions for profit-maximization
Considering the demand functions restricted to x̃ ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
, which are given by (3.7), the
first-order conditions for profit maximization are: ∂π
A
∂pA
= 0
∂πB
∂pB
= 0.
Solving this system of equations, we obtain the equilibrium prices from Proposition 3.
(ii) Local second-order conditions for profit-maximization
To check that the equilibrium prices satisfy the local second-order condition, calculate:
|H1| =
∂2πA
∂pA1
2 =
−1 + µ
1− α2(1− µ)2 .
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For the local second-order condition to be satisfied, it is necessary that:
|H1| < 0 ⇔ α <
1
1− µ,
which is Assumption 3.1.
Computing the second-order cross partial derivatives we obtain:
∂2πA
∂pA1 ∂p
A
2
=
∂2πA
∂pA2 ∂p
A
1
=
−α(1− µ)2
1− α2(1− µ)2 .
Given symmetry:
∂2πA
∂pA1
2 =
∂2πA
∂pA1
2 .
Therefore:
|H2| =
(
∂2πA
∂pA1
2
)2
−
(
∂2πA
∂pA1 ∂p
A
2
)2
=
(1− µ)2 − α2(1− µ)4
[1− α2(1− µ)2]2
.
The local second-order condition is satisfied if:
|H2| > 0 ⇔ 1− α2(1− µ)2 > 0 ⇔ α <
1
1− µ,
which is Assumption 3.1.
(iii) Interiority of the indifferent consumer
The indifferent consumer is located at:
x̃∗ =
1
2
− α(1− 2µ)
12 [1− α(1− µ)] +
1− 2µ
6(1− µ) .
We must have x̃∗ ≥ 1
2
(otherwise, this would not be an equilibrium):
x̃∗ ≥ 1
2
⇔ 1
1− µ ≥
α
2 [1− α(1− µ)] ⇔ α ≤
2
3(1− µ) . (3.19)
We also check that x̃∗ ≤ 1 (otherwise platform A would benefit from slightly increasing its
price):
x̃∗ ≤ 1 ⇔ −2 + µ
6(1− µ) ≤
α(1− 2µ)
12 [1− α(1− µ)] ,
which is obviously true.
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(iv) Global profit-maximization
Since the profit function of platform A is not globally quasi-concave, we must check that
(given pB∗), the local maximizer of its profit function, pA∗, is a global maximum. For this to
be true, it is necessary that:
πA
(
pA∗, pB∗
)
≥ πA
(
pA, pB∗
)
, ∀pA. (3.20)
Denote by pAL the local maximum of πA
(
·, pB∗
)
in the branch that leads to x̃ ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
. From
(3.4), in this branch, the profit function is given by:
πA
(
pA, pB∗
)
= 2pA
[
µ
2(1−αµ)
(
pB∗ − pA + 1− α
2
)]
. (3.21)
The first-order condition for profit maximization in this branch yields:
∂πA(pA,pB∗)
∂pA
= 0
⇔ µ
2(1−αµ)
(
pB∗ − pAL + 1− α
2
)
= pAL µ
2(1−αµ)
⇔ 2pAL = pB∗ + 1− α
2
.
From the equilibrium price pB∗ of Proposition 3, we obtain:
pAL = 5−4µ
6(1−µ) −
α
2
.
This price is in the domain that leads to x̃ ∈
(
0, 1
2
)
if and only if: pAL < pB∗ − α2 + 1pAL > pB∗ − α
2
+ αµ
⇔ α < 5− 4µ
3(1− µ) ,
which holds under condition (3.19).
Substituting pAL in expression (3.21), we obtain:
πA
(
pAL, pB∗
)
= µ
(1−αµ)
[
5−4µ
6(1−µ) −
α
2
]2
. (3.22)
Comparing this deviation profit with the equilibrium profit from Proposition 3, we conclude
that the equilibrium condition (3.20) holds if and only if:
[2(1 + µ)− 3α(1− µ)]2
36(1− µ) [1− α(1− µ)] ≥
µ
(1− αµ)
[
5− 4µ
6(1− µ) −
α
2
]2
.
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This condition is equivalent to non-negativity of the following polynomial:
9(1− µ)2α2 − 3(1− µ)(4− µ)α + 4− 5µ ≥ 0.
The roots of the polynomial are:
αc =
4− µ
6 (1− µ) ±
√
12µ+ µ2
6 (1− µ) .
The equilibrium condition holds for α lower than the inferior root and for α greater than the
superior root. However, while any α lower than the inferior root satisfies condition (3.19),
any α greater than the superior root violates condition (3.19).
We conclude, therefore, that (3.20) is satisfied if and only if:
α ≤ 4− µ
6 (1− µ) −
√
12µ+ µ2
6 (1− µ) .

Proof of Proposition 5
An equilibrium with tipping in favor of platform B requires that pA = 0 and x̃ = 0. From
the expression for the indifferent consumer (3.3), we obtain:
0 = 1− α
2
+ pB ⇔ pB = α
2
− 1.
Analogously, tipping in favor of platform A requires: pB = 0 and x̃ = 1. This implies, from
(3.3):
2 = 1 +
α
2
− pA ⇔ pA = α
2
− 1.
If α ≤ 2, prices are null, which implies that a small unilateral increase is profitable. 
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3.6.3 Demand uniqueness at the interior equilibrium
Here, we investigate the existence of multiple possible demands for given prices, i.e., the
existence of multiple equilibria in game in which consumers, for given prices, choose which
platform to join.
Platform A can capture all demand if and only if it can attract the consumer that is
located at x = 1:
uA(1) ≥ uB(1) ⇔ V + α
2
− pA − 1 ≥ V + 0− pB − 0 ⇔ pB − pA ≥ 1− α
2
.
Similarly, platform B can capture all demand if and only if it can attract the consumer that
is located at x = 0:
uB(0) ≥ uA(0) ⇔ pA − pB ≥ 1− α
2
.
For the interior equilibrium prices, we have:
pB∗ − pA∗ = 1− 2µ
3(1− µ) .
The interior equilibrium demand is unique if and only if:
1− 2µ
3(1− µ) < 1−
α
2
⇔ α < 2(2− µ)
3(1− µ) ,
which is always satisfied. 
3.6.4 Characterization of the interior equilibrium
3.6.4.1 Impact of α on market shares (∂D
A∗
∂α
< 0). To verify that ∂D
A∗
∂α
< 0, calculate:
∂DA∗
∂α
=
−3(1− µ)12 [1− α(1− µ)] + 12(1− µ) [2(1 + µ)− 3α(1− µ)]
144 [1− α(1− µ)]2
,
and notice that ∂D
A∗
∂α
< 0 if and only if:
36 [1− α(1− µ)] > 12 [2(1 + µ)− 3α(1− µ)] ⇔ µ < 1
2
.
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3.6.4.2 Impact of µ on profits (∂π
B∗
∂µ
). From πB∗ of Proposition (3), we can calculate:
∂πB∗
∂µ
=
[4− 2µ− 3α(1− µ)] [2µ− α(1− µ)]
36 [1− α(1− µ)]2 (1− µ)2
.
Therefore:
∂πB∗
∂µ
> 0 ⇔ [4− 2µ− 3α(1− µ)] [2µ− α(1− µ)] > 0
⇔ 3(1− µ)2α2 − 4(1− µ2)α + 8µ− 4µ2 > 0
The roots of this second-degree polynomial in α are:
r1 =
2µ
1− µ and r2 =
4− 2µ
3(1− µ) .
Since the value of the second root is outside the domain of existence of equilibrium, we
conclude that: 
∂πB∗
∂µ
> 0, if α ∈
(
0, 2µ
1−µ
)
∂πB∗
∂µ
< 0, if α ∈
(
2µ
1−µ ,
4−µ
6(1−µ) −
√
12µ+µ2
6(1−µ) .
)
.
3.6.4.3 Impact of α on profits (∂π
B∗
∂α
< 0). From πB∗ of Proposition (3), we can
calculate:
∂πB∗
∂α
=
− [4− 2µ− 3α(1− µ)] [2(1 + µ)− 3α(1− µ)]
36 [1− α(1− µ)]2
.
Therefore:
∂πB∗
∂α
> 0 ⇔ [4− 2µ− 3α(1− µ)] [2(1 + µ)− 3α(1− µ)] < 0.
Since α ≤ 2
3(1−µ) , the second parcel is surely positive. Thus:
∂πB∗
∂α
> 0 ⇔ 4− 2µ− 3α(1− µ) < 0 ⇔ α > 4− 2µ
3(1− µ) ,
which is always false.
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3.6.5 Social welfare maximization
If x̃ ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
, social welfare is given by:
W (x̃) = 2
{∫ x̃
0
(
V + αDA − x
)
µdx+
∫ 1
2
x̃
[
V + αDB − (1− x)
]
µdx
+
∫ 1
1
2
[
V + αDB − (1− x)
]
(1− µ)dx
}
= V − 1
4
− µ
2
+ 2µx̃(1− x̃) + 2αµx̃(DA −DB) + αDB.
Since DA = µx̃ and DB = 1
2
− µx̃, we obtain:
W (x̃) = V − 1
4
+
α
2
− µ
2
+ x̃2 [−2µ(1− 2αµ)] + x̃ [2µ(1− α)] .
If α < 1, this is a concave function, with maximum at:
x̃FB =
1− α
2 (1− 2αµ) .
With x̃ = x̃FB, welfare is given by:
W FB = V − 1
4
+
α
2
− µ
2
+
µ(1− α)2
2(1− 2αµ) .
Now let us check that welfare cannot be greater for some x̃ ∈
(
1
2
, 1
]
. At x̃ = 1, welfare is
lower than at x̃ = 0, because total transportation costs are higher. Therefore, we only need
to check the possible interior maximum.
With x̃ ∈
(
1
2
, 1
]
, welfare is given by:
W (x̃) = 2
{∫ 1
2
0
(V + αDA − x)µdx+
∫ x̃
1
2
(V + αDA − x)(1− µ)dx
+
∫ 1
x̃
(V + αDB − (1− x))(1− µ)dx
}
.
Replacing DA = µ
2
+ (x̃− 1
2
)(1− µ) and DB = (1− x̃)(1− µ), and simplyfying, we obtain:
W (x̃) = V − 3
4
+
µ
2
+
5α
2
− 6αµ+ 4αµ2 − 2x̃2[1− 2α(1− µ)](1− µ)
+ 2x̃(1− µ)[1− α(3− 4µ)].
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For α < 1
2(1−µ) , this is a concave function, with maximum at:
x̃+ =
1− α(3− 4µ)
2− 4α(1− µ) .
This potential maximizer is inside the domain if and only if:
α(3− 4µ) ≤ 2α(1− µ) ⇔ 3− 4µ ≤ 2− 2µ ⇔ 1 ≤ 2µ,
which is false. The constrained maximum is not interior, therefore, it is lower than the
constrained maximum at x̃ ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
.
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4.0 ENDOGENOUS QUALITY AND GROUP DISCRIMINATION IN
TWO-SIDED MARKETS
Abstract. We consider a model of vertical and horizontal differentiation in two-sided mar-
kets. We find that, as the degree of vertical differentiation increases, the equilibrium prices,
market shares and profits of the low-quality (high-quality) platform decrease (increase). We
introduce a two-stage game where platforms first choose their quality levels and then com-
pete in prices. We fully characterize the asymmetric equilibrium where the high-quality
platform charges a higher price and conquers the majority of the market. We also propose
an extension where only the high-quality platform chooses its investment level on quality and
the quality of the high-quality platform is different between the two sides of the market. We
find that divide and conquer strategies arise in equilibrium because the low-quality platform
charges a price below its marginal cost in the side where the high-quality platform has a
lower cost of quality provision.
Keywords: Two-sided Markets, Horizontal differentiation, Vertical differentiation, Tipping, Group
Discrimination.
JEL Classification Numbers: D42, D43, L10.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Usually, researchers use the Hotelling line to perform a duopoly price competition analysis in
two-sided markets, in which under pure horizontal differentiation, at the same price level, a
fraction of consumers of a side j travels to a platform located at one extreme of the segment
and the remaining fraction of consumers travels to the opposite platform. However, in the
case of pure vertical differentiation, the platforms have different qualities. Thus, at the same
price level, all side j consumers prefer one platform relatively to the other.
Vertical differentiation is discussed since the canonical contribution of Mussa and Rosen
(1978) [85], among others. Economides (1989) [39] allows for quality variations in a duopoly
of locationally differentiated products à la Hotelling (1929) [68] and shows that in a sequential
game of variety choice and subsequent quality and price choice there exists only maximal
variety differentiation equilibria in pure strategies. In addition, he also finds that maximal
variety differentiation is the perfect pure strategies equilibrium of a sequential game of variety
choice followed by quality choice and later by price choice. However, in both games there
is minimal quality differentiation at equilibrium. Thus, the author emphasizes the so called
"Min-Max" differentiation principle.
The integration of simultaneous horizontal and vertical differentiation in two-sided mar-
kets is a recent matter in two-sided markets.
Viecens (2006) [111] constructs a model of platform price competition where, first plat-
forms endogenously decide the quality of their ‘access service’and second, each group exhibits
preferences not only about the number of agents in the opposite group, but also about their
type or quality. She examines the set of conditions under which, in spite of the inter-group
externalities, more than one platform survives in equilibrium since it shows that when quality
is endogenously determined by the choices of agents these platforms could be asymmetric1.
Lin, Li and Whinston (2011) [70] examine a platform’s optimal pricing strategy while
considering seller-side innovation decisions and price competition. They find that the plat-
1We intend to perform a similar analysis as an extension of our benchmark model but in a setting
à la Armstrong (2006) [9], where the platforms are horizontally placed at the end extremes of the
unit line, for exogenous reasons and then, platforms decisions are simultaneously made: firstly, (i)
quality, and secondly (ii) prices, in line with Sanjo (2007) [100] and Sanjo (2009) [101].
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form’s optimal strategy may be to charge or subsidize buyers depending on the degree of
variation in the buyers’willingness-to-pay for quality. They also find that when all sellers in-
novate, there exists a parameterization under which a higher seller-side access fee stimulates
innovation.
Njoroge et al. (2009) [88] and Njoroge et al. (2010) [89], focusing on online markets,
study duopoly competition between two interconnected Internet Service Providers (ISP)
that compete in quality and prices for both Content Providers (CP) and consumers. In this
work, platforms first choose quality levels from a bounded interval and in the subsequent
stages compete in prices for both CP’s and consumers. They show that a Sub-game Perfect
Equilibrium for the whole game exists and characterize all the equilibrium choices of the
quality game, in the sense that the equilibria involve either maximal differentiation or partial
differentiation.
Regarding platforms’quality, Ponce (2012) [91] studies the consequences of the transition
from an "investor-pays" model to an "issuer-pays" model on the quality standard of credit
ratings chosen by the agency. He finds that such a transition is likely to generate a degra-
dation of quality, which may fall below the socially effi cient level. Gabszewicz and Wauthy
(2014) [58] model platform competition in a market where products are also characterized by
inter-group externalities. Consumers differ in their externalities valuation. With exogenous
symmetry between both sides of the market, they show that platform competition induces
a vertical differentiation structure that allows for the co-existence of asymmetric platforms
in equilibrium.
Our manuscript explores the possibility of tipping in the presence of quality asymmetries.
Gold (2010) [62] analyzes this issue but in a context of cost asymmetries and finds that the
magnitude of the effects of inter-platform cost differences on equilibriummembership depends
on how the asymmetric costs are borne: in regimes with high network effects, differences in
the platforms’costs of serving customers have only limited impact, while the impact of cost
differences for the market sides are less clear. Real world examples of tipping are plentiful2.
With the influence of inter-group externalities, one member of a particular side announcing
which platform will join could induce standardization in the market.
2See Gold (2010) [62] for examples where tipping occurs in markets with network effects.
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We also analyze group discrimination in the following way: the two sides of the market
differ on the perception of the degree of vertical differentiation between the platforms. To
the best of our knowledge, no prior manuscript studies this issue. However, there exists real
world evidence of this feature. Consider the console industry and the smartphone industry.
One side of the market is composed by the end-users. The other side is composed by software
developers. It is realist to say that the perceived quality gap between the active platforms
on the market (for instance, Playstation and X-Box in the consoles industry and the I-Phone
and Samsung Galaxy in the smartphone industry, respectively) is distinct between the two
sides of the market. Software developers are essentially worried with the performance of the
operating systems (IOS in the I-Phone and Android in the Samsung Galaxy). End-users
may be worried with the same topic. However, end-users may value extra issues such as the
screen size, the cell phone design, the camera resolution and so on, which are not generally
on the scope of developers. By the same argument, developers prefer an easier technical
language in order to be able to program more complex applications. Nonetheless, it might
be the case that end-users dislike the final product of the platform.
This manuscript is relevant to the literature of two-sided markets. As a motivating
example, consider the case of newspapers. The sides of the market are composed by readers
and advertisers, respectively. Also assume that all the readers are "ad-lovers" such that the
cross network effect is positive between the two sides of the market. There exist two types
of intermediary newspapers: a low-quality newspaper whose content is free for readers (free
newspapers) (and, thus, the access price charged by this low-quality newspaper to readers is
below or equal to its marginal cost) and a high-quality newspaper whose content is not free
for readers (non-free newspapers) (and, thus, the access price charged by the high-quality
newspaper to readers is above or equal to its marginal cost). Both platforms charge positive
access prices to advertisers. For simplicity, assume that only the high-quality newspaper
invests in quality provision on advertisers (side 1) and on readers (side 2). Thus, for the
low-quality newspaper it is too costly to provide quality on both sides of the market.
In a two-sided market, a divide and conquer strategy emerges when a certain side is
subsidized and to the opposite side is charged a positive price (Caillaud and Jullien (2003)
[21]). The reason exposed in the literature for such strategy to appear in equilibrium relies
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on the fact that the inter-group externality is stronger in one of the sides of the market. The
side that is subsidized is the side with the stronger inter-group externality (Caillaud and
Jullien (2003) [21]).
Our manuscript assumes the same level of the inter-group externality between both sides
of the market. However, we obtain a divide and conquer strategy conducted only by the
low-quality newspaper in equilibrium. Such strategy emerges because we consider that the
sides of the market have a different perception of the quality provision of the high-quality
newspaper instead of considering an asymmetric strength on the inter-group externality
between the two sides of the market.
In our example, this implies that we consider that it is more costly to the high-quality
platform to provide quality to advertisers (side 1) relatively to readers (side 2). Then, the
low-quality newspaper reacts subsidizing the readers’ side (side 2), the side where is less
costly for the high-quality newspaper to provide quality and, by the network effect, this side
will attract advertisers (the opposite side 1) to the low-quality newspaper. Our argument
tries to explain how an intermediary counterbalances its lower quality, by adopting a divide
and conquer strategy where the side that is subsidized is the one where it is less costly for
the high-quality rival to provide quality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model and the correspondent
subsections fully characterize the interior equilibrium, tipping and welfare analysis. Section
4.3 determines the social optimum outcome. Section 4.4 provides the analysis with a pre-
investment stage and section 4.5 generalizes the initial model allowing the stand-alone values
to be different between the two sides of the market. Finally, section 4.4 concludes. All details
on proofs and lemmas are relegated to Appendix.
4.2 THE MODEL
We consider a two-sided market with two platforms, A and B, which are horizontally and
vertically differentiated. Both platforms are exogenously located at the extremes of a linear
city: platform A is located at x = 0 while platform B is located at x = 1.
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We normalize marginal costs to zero3. There is a continuum of singlehoming consumers
on each of the two sides, 1 and 2, that inelastically demand one unit of the service provided by
the platform. We follow Armstrong (2006) [9] in considering linear inter-group externalities
and Serfes and Zacharias (2012) [104] in assuming symmetry between the two sides of the
market.
Horizontal differentiation is captured by linear transportation costs (Hotelling (1929)
[68]). For technical convenience, the transportation cost parameter is the same for both
sides of the market, t (Serfes and Zacharias (2012) [104]).
Vertical differentiation is captured by the fact that consumers value platforms differently:
platform B by the amount V B and platform A by the amount V A.4 We assume that platform
B is the high-quality platform: V B ≥ V A. To simplify the notation assume V B − V A ≡ q.
The utility of an agent of side j, j ∈ {1, 2} that is located at xj ∈ [0, 1] and chooses
platform i ∈ {A,B} is given by:
uAj (xj) = V
A + αDAk − pAj − txj; (4.1)
uBj (xj) = V
B + αDBk − pBj − t(1− xj), (4.2)
where α measures the strength of the inter-group externality, k is the other side (k = 2 if
j = 1 and k = 1 if j = 2), Dik is the number of consumers of side k that join platform i
and pij is the access price charged by platform i to consumers of side j. This constitutes our
benchmark case, in which there is no group discrimination (on the perceived quality of the
platforms) between the two sides of the market.
The timing of the game is the following: in the first stage, platforms simultaneously
set access prices for both sides. In the second stage, agents simultaneously choose which
platform to join and their respective payoffs are determined. The game is solved by backward
induction.
Throughout the manuscript, we assume that the degree of product differentiation is
suffi ciently high relatively to the intensity of the inter-group externality for the model to be
well behaved.
3The results would be qualitatively the same if, instead, we assumed the same constant marginal
costs on both platforms.
4Both V A and V B are suffi ciently high so that the market is totally covered.
62
Assumption 4.1 (Weak inter-group externality) The inter-group externality is rela-
tively weak: α < t.
4.2.1 Demand and profits as a function of prices
We assume that the pure singlehoming agents have rational expectations relatively to the
platform choices of the other agents. This implies that all consumers to the left of the
indifferent consumer choose platform A and all consumers to the right choose platform B.
Thus, the demand for platform A from each consumer side as a function of the location
of the indifferent consumer is given by:
DAj (x̃j) =

1 x̃j ≥ 1;
x̃j 0 ≤ x̃j ≤ 1;
0 x̃j ≤ 0.
A consumer that is indifferent between platform A and B and correctly anticipates the
behavior of the agents in the other side of the market must be located at:
x̃j =
1
2
+
α(pBk − pAk ) + t(pBj − pAj )
2(t− α)(t+ α) −
q
2(t− α) . (4.3)
As a function of prices, the demand for platform A is given by:
DAj (p
A
j , p
B
j ) =

1, tpAj + αp
A
k ≤ tpBj + αpBk − (t+ α) (q + t− α) ;
1
2
+
α(pBk −pAk )+t(pBj −pAj )
2(t−α)(t+α) −
q
2(t−α) , tp
B
j + αp
B
k − (t+ α) (q + t− α)
≤ tpAj + αpAk ≤
tpBj + αp
B
k − (t+ α) (q − t+ α) ;
0, tpAj + αp
A
k ≥ tpBj + αpBk − (t+ α) (q − t+ α) .
Since total demand is inelastic, the demand for platform B from each consumer side is
DBj (p
A
j , p
B
j ) = 1−DAj (pAj , pBj ).
The profit of each platform i ∈ {A,B}, is given by πi(pAj , pBj ) =
2∑
j=1
pijD
i
j(p
A
j , p
B
j ).
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4.2.2 Interior equilibrium
Firstly, we ensure that both platforms charge positive prices in equilibrium and then we fully
characterize the unique interior equilibrium.
Assumption 4.2 (Positive prices and market shares) The inter-group externality is
suffi ciently weak: α < t− q
3
.
Proposition 9. (Equilibrium without discrimination)
For α ∈
[
0, t− q
3
)
, the interior equilibrium prices are given by:
 pA∗j = t− α−
q
3
;
pB∗j = t− α + q3 .
(4.4)
The interior equilibrium market shares are given by:
 DA∗j = 12 −
q
6(t−α) ;
DB∗j =
1
2
+ q
6(t−α) .
(4.5)
The platforms’equilibrium profits are given by:
 πA∗ =
[3(t−α)−q]2
9(t−α) ;
πB∗ = [3(t−α)+q]
2
9(t−α) .
(4.6)
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.
From Proposition 9, we conclude that the high-quality platform charges the higher equi-
librium price. It will always conquer the majority of the agents on the market since DB∗j ≥ 12 ,
∀ q > 0 and, thus, gets higher profits.
The equilibrium outcomes are similar to those in Griva and Vettas (2011) [63], although
their model is focused on simple network effects. Thus, we find that a two-sided market
model coincides with a simple network effects model when we consider the same inter-group
externality and transportation cost on both sides of the market.
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4.2.3 Comparative statics
Comparative statics provide the impacts of the degree of vertical differentiation and of the
inter-group externality on each of the equilibrium outcomes. As the degree of vertical differ-
entiation (q) increases, the equilibrium price of the high-quality quality platform increases
while the equilibrium price of the low-quality platform decreases. Both prices vary in oppo-
site ways but with the same magnitude:
∂pA∗
∂q
< 0 <
∂pB∗
∂q
and
∂pB∗
∂q
=
∣∣∣∣∂pA∗∂q
∣∣∣∣ .
We also remark that as the quality gap between platforms increases, the equilibrium market
share of the high-quality platform increases while the equilibrium market share of the low-
quality platform decreases. Thus, as the degree of vertical differentiation increases the low-
quality platform loses market share (∂D
A∗
∂q
< 0), and, therefore, also loses profits (∂π
A∗
∂q
< 0).
However, since the market share of the high-quality platform increases (∂D
B∗
∂q
> 0), the
high-quality platform will get more profits (∂π
B∗
∂q
> 0).
Prices decrease as the inter-group externality becomes stronger (∂p
A∗
∂α
= ∂p
B∗
∂α
= −1).
Market shares diverge as the strength of the inter-group externality increases (∂D
A∗
∂α
< 0 <
∂DB∗
∂α
). Thus, as the strength of the inter-group externality increases, the profit of platform A
decreases, which is in line with Armstrong (2006) [9]. In the case of the high-quality platform
B, the negative price effect dominates the positive demand effect since ∂π
B∗
∂α
= −1 + q2
9(t−α)2 ,
which is strictly negative under Assumption 4.2.
Lemma 10. (Impact of vertical differentiation)
As the degree of vertical differentiation increases:
(i) the equilibrium prices and market shares of the low-quality (high-quality) platform
decrease (increase);
(ii) the equilibrium profit of the low-quality (high-quality) platform decreases (increases).
Proof. The proof follows directly from the explanation above.
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4.2.4 Welfare analysis
The consumer surplus of each side equals:
CSj =
x̃j∫
0
uAj dx+
1∫
x̃j
uBj dx.
which is equivalent to:
V B − x̃q + αDB − αx̃(DB −DA)− pB + x̃(pB − pA)− t
2
+ tx̃(1− x̃).
In equilibrium, the consumer surplus on each side of the market is given by:
CS∗j =
q + 2V A + 3α
2
+
tq2
36(t− α)2 −
5
4
t. (4.7)
Lemma 11. (Vertical differentiation and consumer surplus)
As the degree of vertical differentiation decreases (increasing V A while keeping V B con-
stant), the consumer surplus increases if:
q <
9(t− α)2
t
. (4.8)
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.2.
Total welfare is obtained in a similar way but without taking into consideration the access
prices. Total welfare is given by:
W ∗ = q + 2V A + α− t
2
+
q2
18(t− α)2 [t+ 4 (t− α)] . (4.9)
Lemma 12. (Vertical differentiation and welfare)
As the degree of vertical differentiation decreases (increasing V A while keeping V B con-
stant), the total welfare increases if:
q <
9 (t− α)2
5t− 4α . (4.10)
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.2.
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4.2.5 Tipping
This section investigates tipping. Tipping corresponds to a case where one of the platforms
conquers the whole market.
Lemma 13. (Characterization of tipping)
(i) Tipping in favor of the high-quality platform B may occur for α > t − q. In this
case, the high-quality platform charges an access price on each side of the market equal to
pB(T )∗ = α − (t − q), the market share on both sides of the market is DB(T )∗1 = D
B(T )∗
2 = 1
and earns a total profit πB(T )∗ = 2α− 2(t− q).
(ii) Tipping in favor of the low-quality platform A cannot occur for α < t.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.3.
Lemma 13 shows that the low-quality platform A only captures the whole market for a
suffi ciently higher level of the inter-group externality relatively to the high-quality platform
B.
However, is worth noting that even for α > t − q, the high-quality platform not always
monopolizes the market. Indeed, the high-quality platform has incentive to monopolize if
and only if
πB(T )∗ ≥ πB(Interior)∗.
Proposition 14. (Tipping equilibrium)
Tipping in favor of the high-quality platform is a market equilibrium for α > t− q
3
.
Proof. see Appendix 4.8.3.
At the lower bound where the high-quality platform either tips the market or both
platforms stay active in the market (α = t− q
3
or, alternatively, q = 3(t−α)) the price charged
by the high-quality platform is pB(T )∗ = 2(t−α) and the profit is equal to πB(T )∗ = 4(t−α).
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Notice that the argument exposed for the high-quality platform does not hold for the
low-quality platform because the interior equilibrium region
(
α ≤ t− q
3
)
and the tipping
region that favors the low-quality platform (α > t+ q) are mutually exclusive.
4.3 SOCIAL OPTIMUM
In this section, we consider a benevolent planner that is assumed to be able to choose the
position of the indifferent consumer in order to maximize social welfare. Conditionally on
x̃ ∈ [0, 1], social welfare as a function of x̃ is given by:
W (x̃) = V B − x̃q + αDB − αx̃
(
DB −DA
)
− t
2
+ tx̃(1− x̃). (4.11)
The maximum in [0, 1] is attained at:
x̃FB =
1
2
− q
2t− 4α, (4.12)
conditionally on α < t−q
2
.
Proposition 15. (Social optimum versus market equilibrium)
(i) Let α < t−q
2
. In the socially optimal outcome, both platforms operate in the market, but
with the high-quality platform capturing a higher market share than in the market equilibrium.
(ii) Let t−q
2
≤ α < t. In the socially optimal outcome, the high-quality platform captures
the whole market.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.4.
Comparing the socially optimal outcome with the market equilibrium outcome, we con-
clude that the regulator aims to concentrate more consumers on the high-quality platform
in comparison with the market equilibrium.
This is due to a bad internalization of the network effects by the intermediaries and also
because the strategic competition in prices leads the platform with the highest expected
quality to be the most expensive, which confirms Argenziano (2008) [7].
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4.4 ENDOGENOUS QUALITY
To develop our analysis, we now introduce an investment stage, where the platforms have
the possibility of endogenously determining their qualities. Each platform i has to invest
I(V i) to obtain a quality level V i. We assume that I(V i) = 1
2
βiV
i2 , following Economides
(1989) [39], among others.
The parameter βi measures the cost of quality provision of platform i. To keep platform
B as the high-quality platform consider βA > βB > 0. Since βi is a measurement of the cost
of quality provision, the low-quality platform must put an extra-effort to produce the same
quality level relatively to the high-quality platform.
Thus, caeteris paribus, in the first stage platforms choose their quality level, V i ≥ 0.
The second stage remains unchanged. In the simultaneous non-cooperative stage of quality
investment, we reach the following result.
Proposition 16. (Equilibrium with no discrimination and endogenous quality)
If βB >
4
9(t−α) , the unique subgame perfect pure-strategy equilibrium is such that the
qualities, the prices, the market shares and the platforms’profits are given, respectively, by:
V B∗ − V A∗ = 6(t− α) (βA − βB)
βB [9(t− α)βA − 2 ]− 2βA
; (4.13)
 pA∗ =
βA(t−α)[9(t−α)βB−4 ]
βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA
;
pB∗ = βB(t−α)[9(t−α)βA−4 ]
βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA
;
(4.14)
 DA∗j = 12 −
βA−βB
βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA
;
DB∗j =
1
2
+ βA−βB
βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA
;
(4.15)
 πA∗ =
βA[9(t−α)βB−4 ]2[9(t−α)βA−2 ]
9{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA }2
;
πB∗ = βB [9(t−α)βA−4 ]
2[9(t−α)βB−2 ]
9{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA }2
.
(4.16)
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.5.
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Since the low-quality platform spends an extra cost relatively to the high-quality platform
to achieve the same quality level (βA > βB) , in equilibrium, quality, prices, market shares
and profits are higher for the high-quality platform.
As the cost of quality provision of the high-quality platform increases, the degree of
vertical differentiation between platforms is reduced. Then, the low-quality platform has
incentives to increase its price and the high-quality platform to reduce it. The market shares
tend to diverge with the low-quality platform gaining extra-consumers, since the quality gap
is smaller. As a result, as βB increases, we get a higher profit for the low-quality platform
and a lower profit for the high-quality platform.
On the other hand, when the quality effort of the low-quality platform increases, the de-
gree of vertical differentiation between platforms increases. Then, the high-quality platform
has incentives to increase its price and the low-quality platform to reduce its price. The
market shares tend to diverge with the high-quality platform now gaining extra-consumers
since the quality gap is larger, from which follows a higher profit for the high-quality platform
and a lower profit for the low-quality platform.
Tipping in favor of the high-quality platform occurs for βB <
4
9(t−α) . Thus, when the cost
of quality provision of the high-quality platform is suffi ciently low, competition vanishes.
Lemma 17. (Impacts of the cost of quality production)
The equilibrium prices, equilibrium market shares and equilibrium profit of platform i ∈
{A,B} increase (decrease) as:
( i) βi decreases (increases);
( ii) βl increases (decreases),
with ( l = B if i = A and l = A if i = B).
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.5.
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4.5 GROUP DISCRIMINATION
For simplicity, let V B1 − V A1 ≡ q1 and V B2 − V A2 ≡ q2. Suppose w.l.o.g. that q1 > q2 > 0. The
platforms’quality can, now, be different between the two sides of the market 5.
In this case, a consumer that is indifferent between platform A and B must be located
at:
x̃j =
1
2
+
α(pBk − pAk ) + t(pBj − pAj )
2(t− α)(t+ α) −
αqk + tqj
2(t− α)(t+ α) . (4.17)
As a function of prices, the demand for platform A is given by:
DAj (p
A
j , p
B
j ) =

1, tpAj + αp
A
k ≤ −(t+ α)(t− α) + tpBj + αpBk − αqk − tqj;
1
2
+
α(pBk −pAk )+t(pBj −pAj )
2(t−α)(t+α) −
αqk+tqj
2(t−α)(t+α) , −(t+ α)(t− α) + tpBj + αpBk − αqk − tqj
≤ tpAj + αpAk ≤
(t+ α)(t− α) + tpBj + αpBk − αqk − tqj;
0, tpAj + αp
A
k ≥ (t+ α)(t− α) + tpBj + αpBk − αqk − tqj.
4.5.1 Interior equilibrium
Focusing on the interior equilibrium, we ensure that both platforms are active on the market.
Assumption 4.3 (Weak network effects with discrimination) The inter-group exter-
nality is relatively weak: αq2 + tq1 < 3(t− α)(t+ α).
Below we fully characterize the unique interior equilibrium.
Proposition 18. (Equilibrium with discrimination)
The interior equilibrium prices are given by: pA∗1 = t− α−
q1
3
; pA∗2 = t− α− q23 ;
pB∗1 = t− α + q13 ; p
B∗
2 = t− α + q23 .
(4.18)
5All calculations are presented in Appendix 4.8.6.
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The equilibrium market shares are given by: DA∗1 = 12 −
αq2+tq1
6(t−α)(t+α) ; D
A∗
2 =
1
2
− αq1+tq2
6(t−α)(t+α) ;
DB∗1 =
1
2
+ αq2+tq1
6(t−α)(t+α) ; D
B∗
2 =
1
2
+ αq1+tq2
6(t−α)(t+α) .
(4.19)
and the platforms’equilibrium profit are given by: πA∗ =
18t3−18t2α−6t2q1−6t2q2−18tα2+tq21+tq22+18α3+6α2q1+6α2q2+2αq1q2
18(t2−α2)
πB∗ =
18t3−18t2α+6t2q1+6t2q2−18tα2+tq21+tq22+18α3−6α2q1−6α2q2+2αq1q2
18(t2−α2)
(4.20)
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.6.
The novelty of this section emerges from expressions (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20). Note
that if q1 = q2 ≡ q we obtain the same equilibrium outcomes of the non-discriminatory
regime. However, now platforms price discriminate between the two sides based on the
distinct perceived degree of vertical differentiation by the platforms’members. Indeed, if
q1 ≥ q2, then pA∗1 ≤ pA∗2 and pB∗1 ≥ pB∗2 .
In light of (4.18), we obtain that platform 2 may use a divide and conquer strategy-
Under Assumption 4.3, this is the case if
q1 > 3 (t− α) .
This means that we may have a divide and conquer strategy conducted by the low-quality
platform in equilibrium. The high-quality platform is relatively more effi cient on side 1 for
q1 > q2. Thus, the low-quality platform needs to decrease the price charged to side 1 in order
to conquer an extra market share.
By providing a subsidy to the side where the high-quality platform has a greater quality
advantage, the low-quality platform conquers additional valuable (side 1) agents of the high-
quality platform and, by the presence of network effects it also attracts consumers from the
opposite side. Thus, the adoption of such strategy counterbalances the negative effect of
being the active platform whose quality is lower.
As the degree of vertical differentiation (qj) increases, the equilibrium price of the high-
quality platform increases while the equilibrium price of the low quality platform decreases
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in the corresponding side of the market. Both prices vary in opposite ways but with the
same magnitude:
∂pA∗j
∂qj
< 0 <
∂pB∗j
∂qj
and
∂pB∗j
∂qj
=
∣∣∣∣∣∂pA∗j∂qj
∣∣∣∣∣ .
On each side of the market, as the degree of vertical differentiation increases, the equi-
librium market share of the high-quality platform increases while the equilibrium market
share of the low-quality platform decreases. With the incorporation of discrimination on the
perceived quality between the two sides of the market, for q1 ≥ q2, the equilibrium market
share of the high-quality platform on side 1 is higher than the equilibrium market share of
the high-quality platform on side 2 (because t > α6).
As the quality gaps between platforms (qj) increase, the correspondent equilibrium profit
πB∗
(
πA∗
)
increases (decreases) since ∂π
A∗
∂qj
< 0 and ∂π
B∗
∂qj
> 0 under Assumption 4.3 (see
Appendix 4.8.6).
4.5.2 Impacts of discrimination
To better understand the consequences of the introduction of a discriminatory regime, sup-
pose q1 = q + ε and q2 = q − ε, with q1 ≥ 0, q2 ≥ 0 and ε ∈ [0, q].
Notice that q1 − q2 = 2ε, which can be interpreted as the asymmetry on the degree of
quality between the two sides of the market.
In this case, the degree of vertical differentiation between the platforms is higher for side
1. Thus, although both sides consider platform B as the high-quality platform, side 1 assigns
a higher quality advantage to platform B relatively to platform A in comparison with side
2.
If ε = 0 we fall in the benchmark case where q1 = q2 ≡ q.
Proposition 19. (Impacts of discrimination)
As the asymmetry of the quality gap between the sides increases (↑ ε):
(i) the equilibrium price of side 1 decreases in the low-quality platform and increases in
the high-quality platform
(
↓ pA∗1 , ↑ pB∗1
)
and opposite occurs for the equilibrium price of side
6The same argument stands for platform A but with an opposite effect relatively to the degree
of vertical differentiation.
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2
(
↑ pA∗2 , ↓ pB∗2
)
;
(ii) the equilibrium market share of side 1 decreases on the low-quality platform and
increases on the high-quality platform
(
↓ DA∗1 , ↑ DB∗1
)
and the equilibrium market share
of side 2 decreases on the high-quality platform and increases on the low-quality platform(
↓ DB∗2 , ↑ DA∗2
)
;
(iii) the equilibrium profits of both platforms increase
(
↑ πA∗, ↑ πB∗
)
.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.6.
Proposition 19 establishes that in equilibrium a greater quality gap of qualities between
the two sides of the market sides is profit enhancing for both platforms.
4.6 GROUP DISCRIMINATION AND ENDOGENOUS QUALITY
Assume that the platforms’quality can be different between the two sides of the market.
Also, for simplicity, let q1 ≡ V B1 − V A1 and q2 ≡ V B2 − V A2 . Consider now an investment
stage, where only the quality of the high-quality platform is endogenously determined on
both sides of the market. Then, assume that βAj = +∞ such that the low-quality platform
does not invest in quality, implying that V Aj = 0, j = 1, 2.
Then, platform B has to invest I
(
V Bj
)
to obtain a quality level V Bj . We assume that
I
(
V Bj
)
= 1
2
βBj V
B2 . The parameter βBj measures the cost of quality provision of the high-
quality platform on side j, j = 1, 2.
If the cost of quality provision parameters are suffi ciently high, platform B will always
choose quality levels that satisfy Assumption 4.3. Then, using (4.20), and also considering
the cost of quality implies the following maximization problem for the platform B:
max
V B1 ,V
B
2
18t3−18t2α+6t2V B1 +6t2V B2 −18tα2+t(V B1 )
2
+t(V B2 )
2
+18α3−6α2V B1 −6α2V B2 +2αV B1 V B2
18(t2−α2) −
2∑
j=1
βBj (V Bj )
2
2
.
(4.21)
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The first order conditions imply:
∂πB∗
∂V B1
= 0⇔ 6t
2+2tV B1 −6α2+2αV B2
18(t2−α2) − β
B
1 V
B
1 = 0; (4.22)
∂πB∗
∂V B2
= 0⇔ 6t
2+2tV B2 −6α2+2αV B1
18(t2−α2) − β
B
2 V
B
2 = 0. (4.23)
Solving the system (4.22)-(4.23), we obtain the equilibrium qualities of platform B on both
sides of the market:
V B∗1 =
3(t−α)[9βB2 (t+α)−1]
9[9βB1 βB2 (t−α)(t+α)−(βB1 +βB2 )t]+1
; (4.24)
V B∗2 =
3(t−α)[9βB1 (t+α)−1]
9[9βB1 βB2 (t−α)(t+α)−(βB1 +βB2 )t]+1
. (4.25)
Solving the above expressions for βB1 and β
B
2 , we obtain:
β1 =
tq1 + αq2 + 3 (t
2 − α2)
9q1 (t2 − α2)
, (4.26)
β2 =
tq2 + αq1 + 3 (t
2 − α2)
9q2 (t2 − α2)
. (4.27)
This means that working with q1 and q2 instead of β
B
1 and β
B
2 merely corresponds to changing
variables. In particular, the previous results obtained for q1 > q2 remain valid if we impose
βB1 < β
B
2 .
75
4.7 CONCLUSIONS
In this manuscript, we investigate the simultaneous incorporation of vertical and horizontal
differentiation in two-sided markets. We prove that as the degree of vertical differentiation
increases the equilibrium prices, market shares and profits of the low-quality (high-quality)
platform decrease (increase).
As an extension, we allow platforms to previously choose their quality level by introducing
a two-stage game where platforms first choose their quality levels and then compete on prices.
We conclude that with pure singlehoming consumers, the platform that gets higher profits
is the one whose investment in quality is higher.
Finally, we propose a generalized version of our benchmark model in order to allow for
asymmetries between the two sides of the market. We conclude that this situation is profit
enhancing for both platforms.
Moreover, divide and conquer strategies appear in equilibrium when we consider that
only the high-quality platform invests in quality. Indeed, the low-quality platform may
charge a negative access price on the side where the high-quality platform has a lower cost of
quality production. By providing a subsidy to this side, the low-quality platform conquers
additional agents of this side, which allows it to attract more consumers from the opposite
side.
In our future research, we would like to incorporate (partial) multihoming and the role
of incomplete information between sides. The incorporation of endogenous locations with
quadratic marginal costs relatively to distance in a model with three stages (in stage one
platforms would decide locations, on stage two platforms would decide quality levels and
stage three would correspond to pricing decision) is another possible extension.
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4.8 APPENDIX
4.8.1 Demand and profits
Proof of Proposition 9
Indifferent consumer and demand functions
The four consumer utilities assuming the existence of platforms i ∈ {A,B} and sides j ∈
{1, 2} are given by: 
uA1 (x
A
1 ) = V
A + αDA2 − pA1 − txA1 ;
uB1 (x
A
1 ) = V
B + αDB2 − pB1 − t(1− xA1 );
uA2 (x
A
2 ) = V
A + αDA1 − pA2 − txA2 ;
uB2 (x
A
2 ) = V
B + αDB1 − pB2 − t(1− xA2 ).
The indifferent consumer on both sides of the market follows by setting:
uA1 (x1) = u
B
1 (x1)⇔ V A + αDA2 − pA1 − txA1 = V B + αDB2 − pB1 − t(1− xA1 )
⇔ xA1 = 12 +
V A−V B+α(2DA2 −1)−(pA1 −pB1 )
2t
,
and also:
uA2 (x2) = u
B
2 (x2)⇔ V A + αDA1 − pA2 − txA2 = V B + αDB1 − pB2 − t(1− xA2 )
⇔ xA2 = 12 +
V A−V B+α(2DA1 −1)−(pA2 −pB2 )
2t
.
The demands as a function of prices and platforms’qualities are given by:
DA1 =
1
2
+
V A−V B+α(2DA2 −1)−(pA1 −pB1 )
2t
⇔ DA1 = 12 +
V A−V B+α
{
2
[
1
2
+
(V A−V B)+α(2DA1 −1)−(pA2 −pB2 )
2t
]
−1
}
−(pA1 −pB1 )
2t
,
from which follows:
DA1
(
pij
)
=
1
2
+
α
(
pB2 − pA2
)
+ t
(
pB1 − pA1
)
2 (t− α) (t+ α) +
V A − V B
2 (t− α) .
By symmetry, we obtain:
DA2
(
pij
)
= 1
2
+
α(pB1 −pA1 )+t(pB2 −pA2 )
2(t−α)(t+α) +
V A−V B
2(t−α) .
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Since total inelastic demand equals 1, it follows that:
DBj
(
pij
)
= 1−DAj
(
pij
)
.
Reaction functions
The profit functions are given by: πA(P ) = pA1DA1 (P ) + pA2DA2 (P );πB(P ) = pB1 DB1 (P ) + pB2 DB2 (P ),
where P ≡
(
pA1 , p
A
2 , p
B
1 , p
A
2
)
Then, the reaction functions are given by:
∂πA
∂pA1
= 0
∂πA
∂pA2
= 0
∂πB
∂pB1
= 0
∂πB
∂pB2
= 0
⇔

−2tpA1 − 2αpA2 + tpB1 + αpB2 = − (t2 − α2)− (V A − V B)(t+ α);
−2αpA1 − 2tpA2 + αpB1 + tpB2 = − (t2 − α2)− (V A − V B)(t+ α);
tpA1 + αp
A
2 − 2tpB1 − 2αpB2 = − (t2 − α2)− (V B − V A)(t+ α);
αpA1 + tp
A
2 − 2αpB1 − 2tpB2 = − (t2 − α2)− (V B − V A)(t+ α).
From the solution of this system of equations yields the corresponding equilibrium prices
from expression (4.4), the equilibrium market shares of expression (4.5) and the equilibrium
profits of expression (4.6).
Global profit maximization (Assumption 4.1)
The second order conditions require:
|H1| = ∂
2πA
∂pA
2
1
= −2t
2(t2−α2) = −
t
(t−α)(t+α) < 0.
Computing the second order cross-partial derivative we obtain:
∂2πA
∂pA1 ∂p
A
2
= −2α
2(t2−α2) = −
α
(t−α)(t+α) .
Also note that:
∂2πA
∂pA
2
2
= − t
(t−α)(t+α)
To accomplish global profit maximization is required:
|H2| > 0⇔ t
2
[(t−α)(t+α)]2 >
α2
[(t−α)(t+α)]2 ⇔ t > α.
which holds under Assumption 4.1.
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Positive prices and market shares (Assumption 4.2)
We now check that x∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting (4.4) and (4.5) into (4.3) yields:
x∗ =
1
2
− q
6(t− α) . (4.28)
Observe that x∗ < 1 because q ≥ 0.
The accomplishment of x∗ > 0 requires:
1
2
− V
B − V A
6(t− α) > 0⇔ V
B − V A < 3(t− α)⇔ q < 3(t− α),
which coincides with Assumption 4.2. 
4.8.2 Welfare analysis
Proof of Lemma 11
We start by computing the consumer surplus, which is given by:
CS =
x̃∫
0
uAdx+
1∫
x̃
uBdx.
Computing we obtain:
⇔ CS =
(
V A [x]x̃0 + αD
A [x]x̃0 − pA [x]
x̃
0 − t
[
x2
2
]x̃
0
)
+(
V B [x]1x̃ + αD
B [x]1x̃ − pB [x]
1
x̃ − t [x]
1
x̃ + t
[
x2
2
]1
x̃
)
⇔ CS = V Ax̃+ αDAx̃− pAx̃− t x̃2
2
+ V B (1− x̃) +
αDB (1− x̃)− pB (1− x̃)− t (1− x̃) + t
(
1
2
− x̃2
2
)
Rearranging, it follows:
CS = V B − x̃(V B − V A) + αDB − αx̃(DB −DA)− pB + x̃(pB − pA)− t
2
+ tx̃(1− x̃) (4.29)
79
Substituting expressions (4.4) and (4.5) in expression (4.29) and taking into account that
q ≡ V B − V A yields:
CS∗ = V B −
[
1
2
− q
6(t−α)
]
q + α
[
1
2
+ q
6(t−α)
]
−
α
[
1
2
− q
6(t−α)
]{[
1
2
+ q
6(t−α)
]
−
[
1
2
− q
6(t−α)
]}
−(
q
3
+ t− α
)
+
[
1
2
− q
6(t−α)
] [(
q
3
+ t− α
)
−
(
− q
3
+ t− α
)]
− t
2
+ t
[
1
2
− q
6(t−α)
]{
1−
[
1
2
− q
6(t−α)
]}
⇔ CS∗ = V B − q
2
+ q
2
6(t−α) +
α
2
+ αq
6(t−α) − α
[
q
6(t−α) −
q2
18(t−α)2
]
−
q
3
− t+ α + q
3
− q2
9(t−α) −
t
2
+ t
[
1
4
− q2
36(t−α)2
]
Rearranging we obtain:
⇔ CS∗ = V B
2
+ V
A
2
+
3
2
α− 5
4
t+ q
2
18(t−α) −
q2
36(t−α)2 (t− 2α)
⇔ CS∗ = V B+V A+3α
2
− 5
4
t+ q
2
36(t−α)2 t,
which coincides with expression (4.7) since q = V B − V A.
Differentiating the consumer surplus relatively to V B and V A we get:
∂CS∗
∂V A
=
1
2
− t
18(t− α)2 q ≷ 0; (4.30)
∂CS∗
∂V B
=
1
2
+
t
18(t− α)2 q > 0. (4.31)
Expression (4.30) is positive if and only if:
q < 9(t−α)
2
t
, (4.32)
which is exactly expression (4.8). Then, Lemma 11 is straightforward. 
Proof of Lemma 12
The total welfare equals:
W =
x̃∫
0
uAdx+
1∫
x̃
uBdx,
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it follows that:
⇔ W =
(
V A [x]x̃0 + αD
A [x]x̃0 − t
[
x2
2
]x̃
0
)
+
(
V B [x]1x̃ + αD
B [x]1x̃ − t [x]
1
x̃ + t
[
x2
2
]1
x̃
)
⇔ W = V Ax̃+ αDAx̃− t x̃
2
2
+ V B (1− x̃) + αDB (1− x̃)− t (1− x̃) + t
(
1
2
− x̃
2
2
)
⇔ W = V Ax̃+ αDAx̃− t x̃
2
2
+ V B (1− x̃) + αDB (1− x̃)− t (1− x̃) + t
(
1
2
− x̃
2
2
)
,
from which results:
W = V B − x̃(V B − V A) + αDB − αx̃(DB −DA)− t
2
+ tx̃(1− x̃). (4.33)
Substituting expressions (4.4) and (4.5) in expression (4.33) yields:
W ∗ = V B −
[
1
2
− V B−V A
6(t−α)
]
(V B − V A) + α
[
1
2
+ V
B−V A
6(t−α)
]
−
α
[
1
2
− V B−V A
6(t−α)
]{[
1
2
+ V
B−V A
6(t−α)
]
−
[
1
2
− V B−V A
6(t−α)
]}
−
t
2
+ t
[
1
2
− V B−V A
6(t−α)
]{
1−
[
1
2
− V B−V A
6(t−α)
]}
⇔ W ∗ = V B − 1
2
(V B − V A) + (V
B−V A)
2
6(t−α) +
α
2
+
α(V B−V A)
6(t−α) −
α
[
V B−V A
6(t−α) −
(V B−V A)
2
18(t−α)2
]
− t
2
+ t
[
1
4
− (V
B−V A)
2
36(t−α)2
]
⇔ W ∗ = V B+V A
2
+ 1
2
α− 1
4
t+
(V B−V A)
2
36(t−α)2 (2α− t+ 6t− 6α)
resulting:
W ∗ = V
B+V A+α
2
− 1
4
t+ (V
B−V A)2
36(t−α)2 (5t− 4α).
Multiplying by 2 (the number of sides of the market), we obtain expression (4.9) since
q = V B − V A.7
Differentiating the total welfare relatively to V B and V A we obtain:
∂W
∂V A
= 1− t+ 4(t− α)
9(t− α)2 q ≷ 0; (4.34)
7Alternatively, we could compute W ∗ = 2CS∗j + πA∗ + πB∗ to obtain a similar result.
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∂W
∂V B
= 1 +
t+ 4(t− α)
9(t− α)2 q > 0. (4.35)
Expression (4.34) is positive if and only if:
q < 9(t−α)
2
t+4(t−α) , (4.36)
which is exactly expression (4.10). Then, Lemma 12 is straightforward. 
4.8.3 Tipping
Proof of Lemma 13
Tipping in favor of the high-quality platform B
Tipping in favor of the high-quality platform corresponds to a market situation where: x̃1 = x̃2 = 0;pA∗1 = pA∗2 = 0. (4.37)
Substituting (4.37) into (4.3) on both sides of the market yields the following system of two
linear equations:
pB1 =
q(t+ α)
t
− (t− α)(t+ α)
t
− α
t
pB2 ; (4.38)
pB2 =
q(t+ α)
t
− (t− α)(t+ α)
t
− α
t
pB1 . (4.39)
Solving (4.38) and (4.39) simultaneously, results the tipping prices:
p
B(T )∗
1 = p
B(T )∗
2 = α− (t− q).
Thus, the equilibrium profit of platform B under tipping equals:
πB(T )∗ = 2α− 2(t− q).
Tipping in favor of the low-quality platform A
Tipping in favor of the low-quality platform corresponds to a market situation where: x̃1 = x̃2 = 1;pB∗1 = pB∗2 = 0. (4.40)
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Substituting (4.40) into (4.3) on both sides of the market yields the following system of two
linear equations:
pA1 = −
q(t+ α)
t
− (t− α)(t+ α)
t
− α
t
pA2 ; (4.41)
pA2 = −
q(t+ α)
t
− (t− α)(t+ α)
t
− α
t
pA1 . (4.42)
Solving (4.41) and (4.42) simultaneously, results the candidate tipping prices:
p
A(T )∗
1 = p
A(T )∗
2 = α− (t+ q).
Since these prices are negative, tipping in favor of platform A cannot occur.
Proof of Proposition 14
The tipping profit of the high-quality platform is higher than the profit under competition
if and only if:
πB(T )∗ ≥ πB(Interior)∗ ⇔ 2α− 2(t− q) ≥ [3(t−α)+q]
2
9(t−α) .
This condition is equivalent to non-negativity of the following polynomial:
−27α2 + (54t− 12q)α + (12qt− q2 − 27t2) ≥ 0 (4.43)
The roots of the polynomial are given by:
αC1 = t−
q
3
∩ αC2 = t−
q
9
.
By Assumption 4.2, the interior equilibrium profit πB(Interior)∗ only holds for α < t− q
3
. By
the sign of (4.43) follows that for all α < t − q
3
yields πB(T )∗ < πB(Interior)∗ and, therefore,
the tipping profit πB(T )∗ is preferable only for α > t− q
3
. 
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4.8.4 Social optimum
Proof of Proposition 15
From (4.33), the exact value of the total welfare as a function of x̃ is given by:
W ∗ = V B − x̃(V B − V A) + αDB − αx̃(DB −DA)− t
2
+ tx̃(1− x̃)⇔
W ∗ = V B − x̃(V B − V A) + α(1− x̃)− αx̃(1− 2x̃)− t
2
+ tx̃(1− x̃).
Differentiating (4.33) relatively to x̃ yields expression (4.12).
(i) Then, we determine the maximizer:
∂W (x̃)
∂x̃
= 0 ⇔ −
(
V B − V A
)
− 2α + 4αx̃+ t− 2tx̃ = 0
⇔ x̃FB = 1
2
− (V
B−V A)
2
(
1
t−2α
)
,
which is expression (4.12) since q = V B − V A.
(ii) The second order condition is given by:
∂2W (x̃)
∂x̃2
= 4α− 2t,
which is negative if α < t
2
and, thus, expression (4.12) is a global maximizer if and only if:
α <
t
2
. (4.44)
(iii) Then, we check whether 0 ≤ x̃FB ≤ 1
2
. First:
x̃FB ≤ 1
2
⇔ V
B − V A
2
(
1
t− 2α
)
≥ 0.
Then:
x̃FB ≥ 0⇔ V B − V A ≤ t− 2α.
(iv) Finally, we check whether x̃FB < x̃∗. We know from (4.28) that:
x̃∗ =
1
2
− V
B − V A
6(t− α) .
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Thus, x̃FB < x̃∗ implies:
1
2
− V B−V A
2
(
1
t−2α
)
< 1
2
− V B−V A
6(t−α) ⇔ −
V B−V A
2
(
1
t−2α
)
< −V B−V A
6(t−α)
⇔
(
V A − V B
)
(3t− 3α) < (V A − V B) (t− 2α)
⇔ (V A − V B)(2t− α) < 0
⇔ −q(2t− α) < 0
which always holds under expression (4.44). Thus, it follows:
0 ≤ x̃FB < x̃∗ ≤ 1
2
.
(v) For t
2
< α < t, x̃FB is not a global maximizer. In this case, the social optimum is
attained at one of the two extremes of the linear city: x̃FB = 0 or x̃FB = 1. Thus, the
regulator intends to concentrate all the agents of the market in the platform whose quality
is higher: platform B. 
4.8.5 Endogenous quality
The last stage remains unchanged from which it follows that expressions (4.4) and (4.5) are
second stage equilibrium outcomes.
Proof of Proposition 16
Interior equilibrium qualities
Each platform, i ∈ {A,B}, invests in quality and solves the following maximization problem:
max
V i
πi∗ ⇔ max
V i
[3(t−α)+V i−V −i]
2
9(t−α) −
1
2
βiV
i2 . (4.45)
The first-order conditions of the maximization problems are:
∂πB∗
∂V B
= 0 ⇔ V B = 6(t−α)−2V
A
9(t−α)βB−2
; (4.46)
∂πA∗
∂V A
= 0 ⇔ V A = 6(t−α)−2V
B
9(t−α)βA−2
. (4.47)
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Solving the system (4.46)-(4.47), we obtain the equilibrium qualities:
V B∗ =
2
3
{
9(t−α)βA−4
βB [9(1−α)βA−2]−2βA
}
; (4.48)
V A∗ =
2
3
{
9(t−α)βB−4
βB [9(1−α)βA−2]−2βA
}
. (4.49)
Subtracting (4.49) from (4.48) yields the following quality difference between the platforms:
q∗ ≡ V B∗(βB, βA)− V A∗(βB, βA) =
6(t−α)(βA−βB)
βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA
,
which is exactly expression (4.13).
We now show that the denominator of (4.13) is positive. It is given by:
βB [9(1− α)βA − 2]− 2βA.
Since βA >
2
9(t−α) , it is increasing in βB. Replacing βB by its lower bound,
4
9(t−α) , we obtain
a suffi cient condition for the denominator to be positive:
4
9(t− α) [9(1− α)βA − 2]− 2βA > 0 ⇔ 2βA −
8
9(t− α) > 0,
which is always true under the hypothesis of the Proposition.
The numerators of (4.48) and (4.49) are also positive, because we are working under the
assumption that βA ≥ βB > 49(t−α) . This allows us to conclude that V
B∗ ≥ V A∗ > 0.
We must also verify that Assumption 4.2 is satisfied in equilibrium:
q∗ ≤ 3(t− α).
From expression (4.13), Assumption 4.2 is verified if and only if:
6(t−α)(βA−βB)
βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA
≤ 3(t− α) ⇔ βB > 49(t−α) , (4.50)
which is always true under the hypothesis of the Proposition.
Interior equilibrium prices, market shares and profits
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Substituting (4.13) in expressions (4.4), (4.5) and (4.45), we obtain:

pA∗ = βA
{
(t−α)[9(t−α)βB−4]
βB [9(t−α)βA−2]−2βA
}
; pB∗ = βB
{
(t−α)[9(t−α)βA−4]
βB [9(t−α)βA−2]−2βA
}
;
DA∗j =
1
2
− βA−βB
βB [9(t−α)βA−2]−2βA
; DB∗j =
1
2
+ βA−βB
βB [9(t−α)βA−2]−2βA
;
πA∗ = βA[9(t−α)βB−4]
2[9(t−α)βA−2]
9{βB [9(t−α)βA−2]−2βA}2
; πB∗ = βB [9(t−α)βA−4]
2[9(t−α)βB−2]
9{βB [9(t−α)βA−2]−2βA}2
.
which correspond to expressions (4.14), (4.15) and (4.16), respectively.
The second derivatives with respect to qualities are given by:
 ∂
2πB∗
∂V B2
= 2−9(t−α)βB
9(t−α) ;
∂2πA∗
∂V A2
= 2−9(t−α)βA
9(t−α) .
Since βA ≥ βB > 49(t−α) , the second-derivatives are strictly negative, which means that the
second-order conditions are satisfied.
Market shares in the unit segment
Finally, we verify that DA∗ ≥ 0 (and DB∗ ≤ 1):
DA∗ ≥ 0 ⇔ βA − βB
βB [9(t− α)βA − 2]− 2βA
≤ 1
2
⇔ 2βA − 2βB ≤ βB [9(t− α)βA − 2]− 2βA
⇔ βB ≥
4
9(t− α) ,
which is true. 
Proof of Lemma 17
Differentiating expressions (4.14), (4.15) and (4.16) with respect to βB and βA. implies the
results and respective impacts described in the table below.
Note also that: ∂p
B∗
∂βA
=
∣∣∣∂pA∗∂βA ∣∣∣ ; ∂pA∗∂βB = ∣∣∣∂pB∗∂βB ∣∣∣ and ∂DB∗j∂βA = ∣∣∣∂DA∗j∂βA ∣∣∣ ; ∂DA∗j∂βB = ∣∣∣∂DB∗j∂βB ∣∣∣ .
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Platform A Platform B
∂q∗
∂βA
= 6(t−α)βB [9(1−α)βB−4 ]{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}2
(> 0) ∂q
∗
∂βB
= − 6(t−α)βA[9(1−α)βB−4 ]{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}2 (< 0)
∂pA∗
∂βA
= − 2βB(t−α)[9(1−α)βB−4 ]{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}2 (< 0)
∂pB∗
∂βB
= − 2βA(t−α)[9(1−α)βA−4 ]{βB(9(t−α)βA−2 )−2βA}2 (< 0)
∂pA∗
∂βB
= 2βA(t−α)[9(1−α)βA−4 ]{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}2
(> 0) ∂p
B∗
∂βA
= 2βB(t−α)[9(1−α)βB−4 ]{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}2
(> 0)
∂DA∗j
∂βA
= − βB [9(1−α)βB−4 ]{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}2 (< 0)
∂DB∗j
∂βB
= − βA[9(1−α)βA−4 ]{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}2 (< 0)
∂DA∗j
∂βB
= βA[9(1−α)βA−4 ]{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}2
(> 0)
∂DB∗j
∂βA
= βB [9(1−α)βB−4 ]{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}2
(> 0)
∂πA∗
∂βA
= −2[9(1−α)βB−4 ]
2{2βA+βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]}
9{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}3
∂πB∗
∂βB
= −2[9(1−α)βA−4 ]
2{2βA+βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]}
9{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}3
∂πA∗
∂βB
= 4βA[9(1−α)βB−4 ][9(1−α)βA−4 ][9(1−α)βA−2 ]
9{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}3
∂πB∗
∂βA
= 4βB [9(1−α)βB−4 ][9(1−α)βA−4 ][9(1−α)βB−2 ]
9{βB [9(t−α)βA−2 ]−2βA}3
4.8.6 Group discrimination
Proof of Proposition 18
Indifferent consumer and demand functions
The four consumer utilities corresponding to platforms i ∈ {A,B} and sides j ∈ {1, 2} are:

uA1 (x) = V
A
1 + αD
A
2 − pA1 − tx;
uB1 (x) = V
B
1 + αD
B
2 − pB1 − t(1− x);
uA2 (x) = V
A
2 + αD
A
1 − pA2 − tx;
uB2 (x) = V
B
2 + αD
B
1 − pB2 − t(1− x).
The indifferent consumer on both sides of the market follows by setting:
uA1 (x̃1) = u
B
1 (x̃1)⇔ V A1 + αDA2 − pA1 − tx̃1 = V B1 + αDB2 − pB1 − t(1− x̃1)
⇔ x̃1 = 12 +
V A1 −V B1 +α(2DA2 −1)−pA1 +pB1
2t
,
and also:
uA2 (x̃2) = u
B
2 (x̃2)⇔ V A2 + αDA1 − pA2 − tx̃2 = V B2 + αDB1 − pB2 − t(1− x̃2)
⇔ x̃2 = 12 +
V A2 −V B2 +α(2DA1 −1)−pA2 +pB2
2t
.
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The demands as a function of prices and platforms’qualities are given by:
DA1 =
1
2
+
V A1 − V B1 + α
(
2DA2 − 1
)
− pA1 + pB1
2t
=
1
2
+
V A1 − V B1 + α
{
2
[
1
2
+
V A2 −V B2 +α(2DA1 −1)−pA2 +pB2
2t
]
− 1
}
− pA1 + pB1
2t
⇔ DA1 =
1
2
+
α
(
pB2 − pA2
)
+ t
(
pB1 − pA1
)
2 (t− α) (t+ α) +
α
(
V A2 − V B2
)
+ t
(
V A1 − V B1
)
2 (t− α) (t+ α) .
By symmetry, we obtain:
DA2 =
1
2
+
α
(
pB1 − pA1
)
+ t
(
pB2 − pA2
)
2 (t− α) (t+ α) +
α
(
V A1 − V B1
)
+ t
(
V A2 − V B2
)
2 (t− α) (t+ α) .
Since total demand equals 1:
DBj = 1−DAj .
Reaction functions
The profit functions are given by: πA(P ) = pA1DA1 (P ) + pA2DA2 (P );πB(P ) = pB1 DB1 (P ) + pB2 DB2 (P ),
Each platform i chooses pi1 and p
i
2. The first-order conditions are given by:
∂πA
∂pA1
= 0
∂πA
∂pA2
= 0
∂πB
∂pB1
= 0
∂πB
∂pB2
= 0
⇔

−2tpA1 − 2αpA2 + tpB1 + αpB2 = − (t2 − α2)− α
(
V A2 − V B2
)
− t
(
V A1 − V B1
)
;
−2αpA1 − 2tpA2 + αpB1 + tpB2 = − (t2 − α2)− α
(
V A1 − V B1
)
− t
(
V A2 − V B2
)
;
tpA1 + αp
A
2 − 2tpB1 − 2αpB2 = − (t2 − α2) + α
(
V A2 − V B2
)
+ t
(
V A1 − V B1
)
;
αpA1 + tp
A
2 − 2αpB1 − 2tpB2 = − (t2 − α2) + α
(
V A1 − V B1
)
+ t
(
V A2 − V B2
)
.
The solution of this system of equations yields the equilibrium prices (4.18), market shares
(4.19) and profits (4.20).
Second-order conditions (Assumption 4.1)
The second-order conditions require:
|H1| = ∂
2πA
∂pA
2
1
= −2t
2(t2−α2) = −
t
(t−α)(t+α) < 0,
which is true.
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Computing the second-order cross partial derivative, we obtain:
∂2πA
∂pA1 ∂p
A
2
= −2α
2(t2−α2) = −
2α
2(t−α)(t+α) .
Note also that:
∂2πA
∂pA
2
2
= − t
(t−α)(t+α) .
Finally, global profit maximization requires that:
|H2| > 0⇔ t
2
[(t−α)(t+α)]2 >
α2
[(t−α)(t+α)]2 ⇔ t > α,
which is also true.
Positive prices and market shares (Assumption 4.3)
We, now, check x∗j ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting (4.18) and (4.19) into (4.17) we obtain:
x∗j =
1
2
−
α
(
V Bk − V Ak
)
+ t
(
V Bj − V Aj
)
6(t− α)(t+ α) .
(i) For x∗j > 0, it is required that:
1
2
− α(V
B
k −V Ak )+t(V Bj −V Aj )
6(t−α)(t+α) > 0 ⇔
α(V Bk −V Ak )+t(V Bj −V Aj )
(t−α)(t+α) < 3.
With qk ≡ V Bk − V Ak and qj ≡ V Bj − V Aj , the above condition is:
αqk + tqj < 3(t− α)(t+ α).
Considering both sides of the market:
αq2 + tq1 < 3(t− α)(t+ α); (4.51)
αq1 + tq2 < 3(t− α)(t+ α). (4.52)
Since q1 > q2 and t > α:
αq2 + tq1 > αq1 + tq2, (4.53)
which implies that the binding condition is (4.51).
(ii) Similarly, for x∗j < 1:
1
2
− α(V
B
k −V Ak )+t(V Bj −V Aj )
6(t−α)(t+α) < 1 ⇔
α(V Bk −V Ak )+t(V Bj −V Aj )
(t−α)(t+α) > −3.
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Since qk ≡
(
V Bk − V Ak
)
and qj ≡
(
V Bj − V Aj
)
, the condition is:
αqk + tqj > −3(t− α)(t+ α).
It is satisfied because q1 > q2 > 0. 
Impacts of qj on equilibrium profits
∂πA∗
∂q1
= −1
3
+ αq2+tq1
9(t−α)(t+α) ;
∂πA∗
∂q2
= −1
3
+ αq1+tq2
9(t−α)(t+α) ;
∂πB∗
∂q1
= 1
3
+ αq2+tq1
9(t−α)(t+α) ;
∂πB∗
∂q2
= 1
3
+ αq1+tq2
9(t−α)(t+α) .
Then it follows:
(i) ∂π
A∗
∂q1
< 0 if and only if:
αq2 + tq1 < 3(t− α)(t+ α).
(ii) ∂π
A∗
∂q2
< 0 if and only if:
αq1 + tq2 < 3(t− α)(t+ α).
(iii) ∂π
B∗
∂q1
> 0 if and only if
αq2 + tq1 > −3(t− α)(t+ α).
(iv) ∂π
B∗
∂q2
> 0 if and only if
αq1 + tq2 > −3(t− α)(t+ α).
Given Assumption 4.2 and since q1 > q2 > 0, all the conditions are satisfied. 
Proof of Proposition 19
Suppose that q1 = q + ε and q2 = q − ε, with q1 ≥ 0, q2 ≥ 0 and ε ∈ [0, q]. Replacing in
expressions (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20), we obtain the following equilibrium prices:
 pA∗1 = t− α−
q+ε
3
; pA∗2 = t− α− q−ε3 ;
pB∗1 = t− α + q+ε3 ; p
B∗
2 = t− α + q−ε3 .
(4.54)
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The equilibrium market shares are given by: DA∗1 = 12 −
α(q−ε)+t(q+ε)
6(t−α)(t+α) ; D
A∗
2 =
1
2
− α(q+ε)+t(q−ε)
6(t−α)(t+α) ;
DB∗1 =
1
2
+ α(q−ε)+t(q+ε)
6(t−α)(t+α) ; D
B∗
2 =
1
2
+ α(q+ε)+t(q−ε)
6(t−α)(t+α) ,
(4.55)
and the platforms’equilibrium profit are:
πA∗ = 18t
3−18t2α−6t2(q+ε)−6t2(q−ε)−18tα2+t(q+ε)2+t(q−ε)2+18α3+6α2(q+ε)+6α2(q−ε)+2α(q+ε)(q−ε)
18(t2−α2) ;
πB∗ = 18t
3−18t2α+6t2(q+ε)+6t2(q−ε)−18tα2+t(q+ε)2+t(q−ε)2+18α3−6α2(q+ε)−6α2(q−ε)+2α(q+ε)(q−ε)
18(t2−α2) .
(4.56)
Differentiating expressions (4.54), (4.55) and (4.56) with respect to ε gives us the respective
impacts of an increase of the asymmetry of the perceived quality between the two sides. It
follows that: 
∂pA∗1
∂ε
= −1
3
;
∂pA∗2
∂ε
= 1
3
;
∂pB∗1
∂ε
= 1
3
;
∂pB∗2
∂ε
= −1
3
.
(4.57)
The impacts on equilibrium market shares are given by:
∂DA∗1
∂ε
= − 1
6(t+α)
;
∂DA∗2
∂ε
= 1
6(t+α)
;
∂DB∗1
∂ε
= 1
6(t+α)
;
∂DB∗2
∂ε
= − 1
6(t+α)
,
(4.58)
and on the platforms’equilibrium profits are given by:
∂πA∗
∂ε
=
∂πB∗
∂ε
=
2ε
9 (t+ α)
. (4.59)
The payoff functions are convex relatively to q1−q2, and this is the mathematical explanation
behind the fact that a higher asymmetry of the quality gap across the sides of the market is
profit enhancing for the active platforms. 
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5.0 PRICE COMPETITION BETWEEN VERTI-ZONTALLY
DIFFERENTIATED PLATFORMS
Abstract. We study a two-sided market duopoly in which the differentiated platforms
compete in prices. Platforms are differentiated both vertically and horizontally (verti-zontal
differentiation). We develop a model that is a synthesis of the two-sided market model
of Armstrong (2006) [9] with Neven and Thisse (1990) [87], who study price competition
between vertically and horizontally differentiated firms. Considering a symmetric baseline
model, in which price discrimination between sides cannot take place, we find that equi-
librium outcomes depend on the strength of the inter-group network effects vis-à-vis the
magnitude of the intrinsic quality differences between the platforms. Moreover we find that,
under horizontal dominance, the profit of the low-quality platform may decrease (or increase)
as the quality of the better product improves. This result contrasts with the seminal con-
tribution of Shaked and Sutton (1982) [105]. We also conclude that, whatever the type of
dominance, the intensity of the network effect has the same impact on equilibrium prices
and profits and the profit of both platforms is decreasing with the intensity of the network
effect, which confirms Armstrong (2006) [9].
Keywords: Two-sided markets, Horizontal differentiation, Vertical differentiation.
JEL Classification Numbers: D42, D43, L13.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
In two-sided markets, firms (platforms) are intermediaries between two categories of agents,
such that at least one category of agents generates inter-group network effects over the other
group of agents in the market. Accordingly, in these markets, the value of participating
in a certain platform (for a certain category of agents) depends not only on its intrinsic
characteristics but also on the number of agents (of a different category) participating in the
same platform.
Examples of two-sided platforms include: (i) media outlets, which allow for the interac-
tion between advertisers and readers; (ii) clubs, which allow for the interaction between men
and women; (iii) e-commerce platforms, which allow for the interaction between buyers and
sellers, and so on.
In the context of the examples above, real life reveals situations in which platforms are
simultaneously vertically and horizontally differentiated 1. In the case of clubs, we observe
that they are horizontally differentiated (including the type of music they play or their
environment) as well as vertically differentiated (quality of the air, quality of the food,
parking space). Similarly, in the case of e-commerce platforms, they often differ along
horizontal dimensions (such as their aesthetics, the type of products they sell) as well as
vertical dimensions (like their usability, delivery times and advertising intensity).
In this paper, we aim at investigating the nature of price competition between platforms
that are both horizontally and vertically differentiated. Using the terminology proposed by
Di Comite, Thisse and Vandenbussche (2011) [35], in the context of monopolistic competi-
tion, we may say that our objective is to analyze price competition between verti-zontally
differentiated platforms.
Following the seminal works of Rochet and Tirole (2003) [94] and Armstrong (2006)
[9], a vast literature has analyzed the strategic aspects of competition between two-sided
platforms. In particular, following Armstrong (2006) [9], a considerable number of works
has been devoted to the analysis of strategic interaction between horizontally differentiated
1See Gabszewicz and Resende (2012) [56] for further details concerning horizontal and vertical
differentiation in the press industry.
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platforms (see, for example, Zacharias and Serfes (2012) [104] and Amir, Gabszewicz and
Resende (2013) [4]).
In this paper, we combine two strands of literature: the literature on price competition
under horizontal and vertical differentiation and the literature on two-sided markets.
Concerning the first line of literature, Economides (1989) [39] and Neven and Thisse
(1990) [87] both analyze a two-dimensional vertical and horizontal differentiation model in
which firms compete on quality, variety and price. Economides (1989) [39] assumes that
the variety (horizontal) choice takes place before the quality (vertical) choice. Considering
that marginal costs are increasing in quality levels, he concludes that in equilibrium, we
observe maximum variety differentiation and minimum quality differentiation. Neven and
Thisse (1990) [87] consider a three-stage game, in which firms first choose their quality,
afterwards their location, competing in prices at the end of the game. Normalizing marginal
costs to zero, the authors find an equilibrium that exhibits maximum differentiation on
one dimension and minimum differentiation on the other. The maximally differentiated
dimension can either be the quality or variety dimension. More recently, other authors have
addressed the issue of price competition in conventional markets with horizontal or/and
vertical differentiation (see, for example, Levin, Peck and Ye (2009) [82], Gabsewicz and
Resende (2012) [56], Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2014) [58]). The present paper contributes
to this literature by investigating how the nature of price competition between verti-zontally
differentiated firms can be affected by inter-group network effects.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on two-sided markets. Most of the literature
on this field has focused on the waterbed effects and tipping prevention (see for example,
Rochet and Tirole (2003) [94] and Armstrong (2006) [9]). A considerable literature has also
addressed the issue of price competition between horizontally differentiated platforms (see
for example, Zacharias and Serfes (2012) [104] and Amir, Gabszewicz and Resende (2013)
[4]). Using the Hotelling framework proposed by Armstrong (2006) [9], these works have
studied pricing competition between horizontally differentiated platforms. When agents are
allowed to participate in only one platform, these papers (including Armstrong (2006) [9])
show that the existence of inter-group network effects often intensifies price competition
between platforms.
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To the best of our knowledge, Amir, Gabszewicz and Resende (2013) [4] is the first paper
that simultaneously combines horizontal and vertical differentiation in two-sided markets.
However, the authors do not analyze price competition between the two-sided platforms. We
contribute to this literature by analyzing how the impact of inter-group network effects on
equilibrium outcomes depends on the interplay of vertical and horizontal differentiation.
In our model, we bring together the verti-zontal differentiation set-up developed by Neven
and Thisse (1990) [87] and the two-sided market framework proposed by Armstrong (2006)
[9]. Our motivation is to understand if the standard results of two-sided markets are disrupt
with the introduction of the concepts of horizontal dominance and vertical dominance that
emerge from Neven and Thisse (1990) [87].
Platforms are assumed to be both horizontally and vertically differentiated. On the
horizontal dimension, we consider a Hotelling framework in line with the two previous pa-
pers. Following Armstrong (2006) [9], we consider that firms are exogenously located at
the extremes of the Hotelling line. As in Neven and Thisse (1990) [87] platforms are also
vertically differentiated and consumers have heterogeneous willingness to pay for quality. In
addition, we allow for inter-group network effects, with the objective of studying how they
affect pricing strategies of verti-zontally differentiated firms.
In the baseline model, we do not allow for price discrimination between sides (as an
illustrative example, the reader may consider of a club where men and women pay the same
entry fee, or a e-commerce platform, where sellers and buyers are required to pay the same
access fee in order to participate in the platform). The paper proposes a two-stage game with
the following structure. In the first stage, platforms set their access prices and afterwards
consumers decide which platform they are willing to join.
Our equilibrium analysis shows that the high-quality platform sets a higher access price,
serves a larger market share and earns a higher profit than the low-quality platform, in line
with standard vertical differentiation literature (see, for example, Tirole (2003) [109]). We
show that equilibrium outcomes depend on the strength of the inter-group network effects
vis-à-vis the magnitude of the intrinsic quality differences between the platforms. Traditional
literature that combines simultaneously horizontal and vertical differentiation argues that
revenues of both firms increase as the quality of the better product improves (see Shaked
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and Sutton, 1982 [105]).
Our finding establishes that this argument may be disrupted under horizontal dominance.
We find that, under pure horizontal dominance, the profit of the low-quality platform de-
creases as the quality of the better product improves. This result contrasts with the seminal
contribution on vertical differentiation of Shaked and Sutton (1982) [105]. In addiction,
whatever the type of dominance, we find that the intensity of the network effect has the
same impact on equilibrium prices and profits and the profit of both platforms is decreasing
with the intensity of the network effect, which confirms Armstrong (2006) [9].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section 5.2 we present the
model. Section 5.3 analyzes the model and section 5.4 characterizes the equilibrium out-
comes. Section 5.5 performs a comparative statics. Finally section 5.6 concludes. The proofs
of the Propositions and Lemmas are relegated to the Appendix.
5.2 THE MODEL
Consider a two-sided market with two platforms, i ∈ {A,B} , and two sides, j ∈ {1, 2}. The
platforms operate with zero marginal costs2 and they are both horizontally and vertically
differentiated. As in Neven and Thisse (1990) [87], we assume that the platforms differ in
two characteristics: (i) their location on the Hotelling line (horizontal differentiation), and
(ii) their intrinsic quality (vertical differentiation).
In particular, platform A is located at the left extreme of the Hotelling line
(
xA = 0
)
,
whereas platform B is located at the right extreme
(
xB = 1
)
. The intrinsic quality of plat-
form A is denoted by qA, whereas the intrinsic quality of platform B is qB, with qB > qA.
Then, platform A is the low-quality platform while platform B is the high-quality platform.
In each side of the market, there is a unit mass of heterogeneous consumers. They differ
on their location, x, as well as on their quality valuation, y. Accordingly, in side j, each
consumer is identified by the pair (x, y) . As in Neven in Thisse (1990) [87], we assume
2Our results would remain unchanged under constant and symmetric marginal costs. A similar
assumption has been adopted by Neven and Thisse (1990) [87], among others.
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that in each side of the market consumers are uniformly distributed over the unit square
[0, 1]× [0, 1] and we normalize their transportation costs to 1.
We depart from Neven and Thisse (1990) [87] by introducing the possibility of positive
inter-group externalities. As in Serfes and Zacarias (2012) [104], we assume that the intensity
of inter-group externalities is the same on both sides of the market, being measured by the
parameter α ≥ 0.
In the market side j ∈ {1, 2}, a consumer type (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] obtains the following
utility from participating in platform A:
uAj (x, y) = v + yq
A + αDAk − pA − x,
where v ∈ R+ is suffi ciently high for the market to be covered in equilibrium, DAk is the
demand of platform A on the other side (k 6= j) and pA is the access price charged by
platform A, which applies to both sides of the market (price discrimination between sides is
not allowed).3
Analogously, when participating in platform B, a side-j consumer of type (x, y) obtains
the following utility:
uBj (x, y) = v + yq
B + αDBk − pB − (1− x) ,
where DBk is the demand of platform B on the other side (k 6= j) and pB is the access price
charged by platform B to both sides of the market.
In order to study equilibrium outcomes when platforms are simultaneously horizontally
and vertically differentiated, we consider a game where platforms simultaneously set access
prices for both sides and consumers in each side simultaneously decide which platform to
join.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the inter-group externality is relatively weak in
order to avoid market tipping.
Assumption 5.1 (Weak inter-group externality) The inter-group externality is rela-
tively weak: α < 1.
3If price discrimination was allowed, we would expect the symmetry of the model to induce no
discrimination in equilibrium.
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5.3 DEMAND AND PROFITS
In side j, the consumer type (x̃j (y) , y) for whom
uAj (x̃j (y) , y) = u
B
j (x̃j (y) , y)
is indifferent between participating in platform A or platform B. Solving the previous equa-
tion for x̃j (y) , we obtain that, for a given y, the indifferent consumer in side j is located
at:
x̃j (y) =
1
2
+ p
B−pA
2
+
α(DAk −DBk )
2
− q
2
y, (5.1)
where q represents the quality gap, i.e. q ≡ qB − qA.
Taking into consideration that the market is fully covered, DBk = 1 − DAk and that
consumers formulate rational expectations about the demand on the other side of the market,
with DAk =
1∫
0
x̃k (y) dy for x̃ (yj) ∈ [0, 1] ,4 equation (5.1) can be re-written as follows:
x̃j (y) =
1
2
+
pB − pA
2
+
α(2DAk − 1)
2
− q
2
y, (5.2)
or equivalently:
ỹj (x) =
1
q
+
pB − pA
q
+
α(2DAk − 1)
q
− 2
q
x. (5.3)
The previous equations show that for a given vector of prices
(
pA, pB
)
the position of the
indifferent consumer ỹj evolves linearly and negatively with x, as
∂ỹj(x)
∂x
= −2
q
< 0.
Consider two types of consumers: (x, y) and (x́, ý) , with x́ < x, meaning that the second
consumer is located closer to firm A. The two consumers can only be both indifferent between
participating in platform A and B if the second consumer has a higher willingness to pay
for quality than the first one i.e. ý > y.
Note that, if, for a given x, we have ỹj (x) ∈ [0, 1], for such x, side j consumers located at
yj ∈ [0, ỹj(x)] participate in platform A, whereas those located at yj ∈ (ỹj(x), 1] participate
in platform B. In other words, consumers above the line (5.3) participate in platform B,
whereas those below that line prefer to participate in platform A. If we have ỹ (xj) < 0, ∀
4This formulation means that an agent of a side j (j = 1, 2) can interact with an agent of an
opposite side k (k = 1 when j = 2 or k = 2 when j = 1), for any given variety x and quality y within
the square [0, 1]× [0, 1] .
99
x ∈ [0, 1] , resp. ỹ (xj) > 1, ∀ x ∈ [0, 1] , then, all consumers in side j buy from platform B,
resp. platform A.
The figure 7 below illustrates the choice of consumers between the two platforms for
different pairs of prices
(
pA, pB
)
.
Figure 7: Consumers’choice between platforms under vertical dominance [variety x - horizontal
axis; quality y - vertical axis; ms - standing for market share]
Considering the position of the indifferent consumer line, it is now possible to obtain the
analytical expressions of the demands of platform A and platform B, in side j, as a function
of firms´ access prices, pA and pB.
As in Neven in Thisse (1990) [87], in order to obtain these analytical expressions we first
need to distinguish two cases according to the relative importance that consumers attach to
vertical differentiation vis-à-vis horizontal differentiation.
Definition 20. (Horizontal Dominance versus Vertical Dominance)
(i) Horizontal dominance corresponds to an environment where the intrinsic quality gap
between the platforms, q, is relatively low, in particular, q < 2.
(ii) Instead, when the intrinsic quality gap is suffi ciently large, q > 2, vertical dominance
prevails.
Proof. As in Neven and Thisse (1990) [87], horizontal (resp. vertical) dominance arises
when
∣∣∣∂ỹ(x)∂x ∣∣∣ > (<)1, or equivalently, q < (>)2.
In order to better understand the intuition and the need for the distinction pointed out
in Definition 20, consider the two cases of figure 8.
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For the values of the parameters considered in figure 8(b), we have
∣∣∣∂ỹ(x)∂x ∣∣∣ < 1, or equiv-
alently q > 2. As in this case, the intrinsic quality gap between the two firms is relatively
large, Neven and Thisse (1990) [87] introduce the concept of vertical dominance to denote
the domain of parameters for which
∣∣∣∂ỹ(x)∂x ∣∣∣ < 1.
However, when q < 2, or equivalently,
∣∣∣∂ỹ(x)∂x ∣∣∣ > 1, the intrinsic quality gap between the
firms is relatively low and horizontal dominance prevails. In that case, for the same price
vector
(
pA, pB
)
we would obtain a different demand configuration as illustrated in the figure
8(a).
Figure 8: Horizontal (a) versus vertical dominance (b)
In light of this, for each side of the market j, we now define the analytical expressions of
the platforms’demands as a function of their access prices
(
pA, pB
)
, under horizontal and
vertical dominance5.
We denote byDi|V Dj
(
pA, pB
)
the demand of platform i in side j, under vertical dominance,
with:
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
0 if pA − pB > 1− α;
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
2α2
if −(1 + α) + 2α
q
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α;
1
q−2α
(
pB − pA − α
)
if 1 + α− q − 2α
q
≤ pA − pB ≤ −(1 + α) + 2α
q
;
−q+α(1+α−pB+pA+q)+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
2α2
if −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < 1 + α− q − 2α
q
;
1 if pA − pB < −q − (1− α),
(5.4)
5See Appendix A for further details on the computation of the analytical expression of the
demand functions of each platform, under horizontal and vertical dominance.
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and DB|V Dj
(
pA, pB
)
= 1 − DA|V Dj
(
pA, pB
)
. Analogously, we denote by Di|HDj
(
pA, pB
)
, the
demand of platform i in side j, under horizontal dominance, with:
D
A|HD
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
0 if pA − pB > 1− α
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
2α2
if 1− α− q + qα
2
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α
1
2
(
1 + p
B−pA
1−α −
q
2(1−α)
)
if −(1− α)− qα
2
≤ pA − pB ≤ 1− α− q + qα
2
−q+α(1+α−pB+pA+q)+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
2α2
if −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < −(1− α)− qα
2
1 if pA − pB < −q − (1− α)
.
(5.5)
and DB|HDj
(
pA, pB
)
= 1 − DA|HDj
(
pA, pB
)
. The demand functions DA|V Dj
(
pA, pB
)
and
D
A|HD
j
(
pA, pB
)
must be decreasing and continuous functions of the platforms’own prices.
However, they are not globally concave 6. In the particular case of vertical dominance, the
demand is linear for price vectors
(
pA, pB
)
such that:
1 + α− q − 2α
q
≤ pA − pB ≤ −(1 + α) + 2α
q
.
When −(1 + α) + 2α
q
< pA − pB ≤ 1 − α, the demand DA|V Dj
(
pA, pB
)
is strictly convex in
pA. Analogously, when:
−q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < 1 + α− q − 2α
q
,
the demand DB|V Dj
(
pA, pB
)
is strictly convex in pB. In the particular case of horizontal
dominance, the demand is linear for price vectors
(
pA, pB
)
such that:
−(1− α)− qα
2
≤ pA − pB ≤ 1− α− q + qα
2
.
When 1 − α − q + qα
2
≤ pA − pB < 1 − α, the demand DA|HDj
(
pA, pB
)
is strictly convex in
pA. Analogously, when:
−q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < −(1− α)− qα
2
,
6The formal proof of these properties is straightforward, given the analytical expressions of
demands (5.4) and (5.5) .
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the demand DB|HDj
(
pA, pB
)
is strictly convex in pB. Given the demands faced by each
platform in each sided of the market, it is now possible to obtain the profit of the two
platforms as follows:
πi(pA, pB) = piDi1(p
A, pB) + piDi2(p
A, pB),
where Dij(p
A, pB) = D
i|V D
j
(
pA, pB
)
, in the case of vertical dominance, and Dij(p
A, pB) =
D
i|HD
j
(
pA, pB
)
, in the case of horizontal dominance. Note that the equations (5.4) and (5.5)
imply symmetric demands in the two sides of the market:
Di1(p
A, pB) = Di2(p
A, pB) = Di(pA, pB),
thus, the platforms’profit can be computed as follows:
πi(pA, pB) = 2piDi(pA, pB), i ∈ {A,B} .
Since the demand functionsDi(pA, pB) are not globally concave, it is necessary to study under
which conditions the profit of each platform is quasi-concave with respect to its access price.
Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) [22] for the case of product differentiation in multiple dimensions
and, in particular, Neven and Thisse (1990) [87] for the case of product differentiation in two
dimensions, provide suffi cient conditions for the existence of a quasi-concave payoff function
of the active firms in the market. Without network externalities, our manuscript reduces to
a model which satisfies the assumptions in Neven and Thisse (1990) [87]. Since our model
incorporates network effects, that are present for any given level of quality and variety, we
analyse quasi-concavity of the profit functions.
Lemma 21. (Quasi-concavity of the profit function)
For any pair combination (α, q), the profit functions of platforms A and B are quasi-
concave in pA and pB both under vertical and horizontal dominance, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix B.
103
Given Lemma 21, the first order conditions of the platforms’maximization problem
intersect at least once which guarantees that the first order conditions associated with the
profit maximization problem are suffi cient to characterize firms’ optimal pricing choices.
We also examined the shape of the profit functions for a grid of values of the relevant
parameters. Figures 9(a) and 9(b) illustrate a possible configuration of the demand function
of low-quality platform A and figures 10(a) and 10(b) present a possible configuration of the
profit function of the low-quality platform A, for different levels of the inter-group externality
under horizontal and vertical dominance, respectively.
Figure 9(a) - DA (y-axis) as a function
of pA (x-axis)
Figure 9(b) - DB (y-axis) as a function
of pB (x-axis)
Figure 10(a) - πA (y-axis) as a
function of pA (x-axis)
Figure 10(b) - πB (y-axis) as a
function of pB (x-axis)
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The above figures illustrate that the payoff functions are quasi-concave on its prices
domain.
5.4 ANALYSIS
Given that platforms take decisions on access prices anticipating consumers behavior, the
problem of platform i writes as follows:
max
pi
2piDi(pA, pB),
with i = A,B and Di(pA, pB) = DA|V D
(
pA, pB
)
in the case of vertical dominance, and
Di(pA, pB) = DA|HD
(
pA, pB
)
in the case of horizontal dominance.
Then, in line with Neven and Thisse (1990) [87], we should determine the equilibrium
prices as a function of the product characteristics. This leads us to distinguish between six
types of equilibrium candidates, namely three under vertical dominance and three under
horizontal dominance. By other words, for each kind of dominance, we have the following
types of equilibrium:
(i) case/subgame 1 - the equilibrium occurs on the linear segments of DA and DB;
(ii) case/subgame 2 - the equilibrium occurs in the strictly convex segment of DA and
in the strictly concave segment of DB;
(iii) case/subgame 3 - the equilibrium occurs in the strictly concave segment of DA and
in the strictly convex segment of DB.
We start by studying the price stage equilibrium for the linear segment of the demand
of platforms A and B, verifying Assumption 5.1.
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5.4.1 Pure horizontal dominance equilibrium
We first describe the region where the equilibrium candidate under horizontal dominance
exists, corresponding to an equilibrium occurring under the circumstances described at figure
8(a) and, then, we fully characterize the correspondent equilibrium candidate.
Proposition 22. (Equilibrium under pure horizontal dominance)
Let q ≤ 6(1−α)
4−3α . The equilibrium outcomes are described as follows:
pA
∗
= 1− α− q
6
, pB
∗
= 1− α + q
6
;
DA
∗
= 1
2
[
1− q
6(1−α)
]
, DB
∗
= 1
2
[
1 + q
6(1−α)
]
;
πA
∗
= 1
36
[q−6(1−α)]2
1−α , π
B∗ = 1
36
[q+6(1−α)]2
1−α .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Comparing pA
∗
and pB
∗
, it can be checked that for any (α, q) that verifies the condition of
Proposition 22 we obtain pB
∗
> pA
∗
, meaning that the access fee quoted by the high-quality
platform is always higher than the access fee charged by the low-quality platform.
In horizontal dominance, equilibrium prices are affected by the intensity of inter-group
network effects.
It is also worth noting that the high-quality platform always has a higher market share
than the low-quality platform, for any (α, q) that verifies the condition of Proposition 22.
Since the former platform also charges a higher price than the latter platform, we always
have πB
∗
> πA
∗
.
5.4.2 Pure vertical dominance equilibrium
We first describe the region where the equilibrium candidate under vertical dominance exists,
corresponding to an equilibrium occurring under the circumstances described at figure 8(b).
Then, we fully characterize the correspondent equilibrium candidate.
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Proposition 23. (Equilibrium under pure vertical dominance)
Let q ≥ 3
2
α+ 1
2
√
3
√
3α2 − 2α + 3+ 3
2
. The equilibrium outcomes are described as follows:

pA
∗
= q
3
− α, pB∗ = 2q
3
− α;
DA
∗
= q−3α
3(q−2α) , D
B∗ = 2q−3α
3(q−2α) ;
πA
∗
= 2(q−3α)
2
9(q−2α) , π
B∗ = 2(2q−3α)
2
9(q−2α) .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Comparing pA
∗
and pB
∗
, it can be easily checked that for any (α, q) , we always obtain
pB
∗
> pA
∗
, meaning that the access fee quoted by the high-quality platform is always higher
than the access fee charged by the low-quality platform. In vertical dominance, equilibrium
prices are affected by the intensity of inter-group network effects. It is also worth noting that
the high-quality platform always has a higher market share than the low-quality platform,
for any (α, q) . Since the former also charges a higher price than the latter, we always have
πB
∗
> πA
∗
.
5.4.3 Verti-zontal equilibrium
After characterizing the equilibrium candidates on the linear segments of the demands of
platforms A and B (case 1 ), we verify the other interior equilibrium candidates from case
2, for each type of dominance, corresponding to the circumstances described in figure 7(b).7.
Figure 11 shows the price domain conditions under which pure vertical dominance occurs
(corresponding to the blue region, characterized in Proposition 23) and under which pure
horizontal dominance takes place (corresponding to the yellow region, characterized in Propo-
sition 22), where each equilibrium candidate is an effective equilibrium. The green region
corresponds to the verti-zontal equilibrium candidate, yielding a market share configuration
as the one described in figure 9(b).
7As Neven and Thisse (1990) [87] point out, since platform A is the low-quality platform, a
situation described as in figure 9(d) never arises at the equilibrium. This implies, in our manuscript,
that under horizontal dominance for −(1−α)−q ≤ pA−pB < (1−α)−q and under vertical dominance
for −q− (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < 1 + α− q− 2αq , there is no price equilibrium since the prices solving the
first order conditions are incompatible with the corresponding price domain condition.
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Figure 11 - Parameter regions corresponding to pure horizontal dominance (yellow), intermediate
quality gap (green) and pure vertical dominance (blue)
For such values, the equilibrium occurs in the strictly convex segment of DA and in the
strictly concave segment of DB. The profit of platform A and platform B are given by:
πA =
pA
[
q − α(1− α + pB − pA)−
√
q [q − 2α(1− α + pB − pA) ]
]
α2
,
πB = 2pB
1−
[
q − α(1− α + pB − pA)−
√
q [q − 2α(1− α + pB − pA) ]
]
2α2
 .
Given the quasi-concavity of the profit function, an equilibrium price candidate is always an
equilibrium as long as the price domain condition is verified. Under horizontal dominance,
the equilibrium is verified for:
1− α− q + qα
2
< pA∗ − pB∗ ≤ 1− α,
and under vertical dominance, the equilibrium is verified for:
−(1 + α) + 2α
q
< pA∗ − pB∗ ≤ 1− α.
We are not able to analytically solve the model for this "verti-zontal" equilibrium candidate8.
However, the theorem of Debreu, Glicksberg and Fan (1952) allows us to conclude that
an equilibrium exists for this case (see, for example, pp. 34, of Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991
[52]).
8See Appendix C for details on the best reply functions of both platforms.
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Theorem 24. (Debreu, Glicksberg and Fan (1952)) Consider a strategic-form game:
(i) whose strategy spaces Si are nonempty compact convex subsets of an Eucledian space. If
the payoff functions are (ii) continuous and (iii) quasi-concave in si, there exists a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium.9
Lemma 21 guarantees that the payoff functions are quasi-concave and, thus, the previous
theorem can be applied.
5.5 COMPARATIVE STATICS
In this section we analyze how the magnitude of the quality gap q, and the intensity of the
inter-group externality α, affect equilibrium outcomes.
5.5.1 Impact of the quality gap
Regarding the impact of the quality gap on the equilibrium prices, we obtain that the price
of the high-quality platform always increases with the magnitude of the quality gap under
horizontal and under vertical dominance. Everything else the same, an increase in q makes
platform B relatively more attractive than platform A and, therefore, platform B is able to
increase its price for all (q, α) .
As far as concerns platform A, under horizontal dominance, an increase in q reduces its
price.
Since q is not too high (meaning that products are not very differentiated on the vertical
dimension), the low-quality firm reduces its price after an increase in q. In contrast, under
pure vertical dominance, the price of the low-quality gap also increases with q. In that
case, products are already significantly differentiated in the vertical dimension and, thus, an
increase in q makes products even more differentiated, relaxing price competition, which is
line with standard vertical differentiation literature (see, for example, Shaked and Sutton
(1982) [105]).
9Debreu (1952) [31] used a generalization of this theorem to prove that competitive equilibria
exist when consumers have quasi-convex preferences.
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Despite the fact that both prices are increasing with q, the price of the high-quality
platform always increases more than the price of its rival since ∂p
B∗
∂q
> ∂p
A∗
∂q
> 0.
Regarding the impact of the quality gap on equilibrium market shares, we obtain that
under horizontal dominance ∂D
A∗
∂q
= − 1
12(1−α) < 0, implying
∂DB
∗
∂q
> 0 (since the market is
fully covered). Following an increase in q, the high-quality platform becomes more attractive
than the low-quality platform and it is able to increase its market share, despite the fact
that the price gap pB
∗ − pA∗ is increasing with q.
However, when the quality gap is very large so that we are in the vertical dominance
case, it follows ∂D
A∗
∂q
= α
3(q−2α)2 > 0, implying
∂DB
∗
∂q
< 0. This is so, because the high-quality
platform increases its price substantially more than the low-quality platform.
Lemma 4 (pp.8) in Shaked and Sutton (1982) [105] establishes that "revenues of both
firms increase as the quality of the better product improves".
Considering the pure horizontal dominance environment and evaluating the impact of q
on the equilibrium profits of platforms A and B, follows that:
∂πA
∗
∂q
< 0;
∂πB
∗
∂q
> 0,
Then, under horizontal dominance, the revenue of the high-quality platform B increases
as the quality of the better product improves and the revenue of the low-quality platform A
decreases as the quality of the better product improves. This result is not only distinct from
Shaked and Sutton (1982) but also complements Neven and Thisse (1990) [87] since they did
not take into consideration the presence of network effects influencing simultaneously both
variety and quality.
Our results are similar to Shaked and Sutton (1982) [105] under vertical dominance.
The equilibrium profit of the low-quality platform A is always increasing with q (since the
equilibrium price and market shares are increasing with q). In the high-quality platform
B, the market shares are decreasing in q. However, the positive price effect more than
compensates its negative demand effect.
We also find that when the inter-group externality is suffi ciently high and the quality gap
is suffi ciently low but within the vertical dominance domain (a low subdomain of vertical
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dominance), the positive price effect does not compensate the negative demand effect on the
high-quality platform B.
Lemma 25. (Impact of vertical differentiation)
Under pure horizontal dominance, follows that ∂π
A∗
∂q
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
5.5.2 Impact of the intensity of the inter-group externality
In what concerns the impact of the intensity of the inter-group network effect on equilibrium
prices, we obtain that the standard results in two-sided markets hold. Whatever the type of
dominance, we get that:
∂pA
∗
∂α
=
∂pB
∗
∂α
= −1.
In line with Armstrong (2006) [9], when the inter-group network effect is suffi ciently weak
consumers benefit from lower prices due to inter-group network effects (when these effects
take place, platforms set discounts in one side of the market with the objective of enhancing
demand in opposite side of the market).
Regarding the impact of the inter-group network intensity on equilibrium market shares,
we obtain that for horizontal dominance yields ∂D
A∗
∂α
< 0 implying ∂D
B∗
∂α
> 0, since DB
∗
=
1 − DA∗. More precisely, ∂DA
∗
∂α
= − 1
12
q
(α−1)2 < 0. Hence, an increase on the intensity of
inter-group network externalities increases market concentration, favoring the high-quality
platform. When α increases, consumers value more the number of consumers (on the other
side) participating in each platform and therefore the high-quality platform B becomes more
attractive than the rival (recall that the former always has a higher market share than the
low-quality platform A).
The same conclusion applies under vertical dominance since ∂D
A∗
∂α
= − q
3(q−2α)2 < 0 and
∂DB
∗
∂α
> 0.
Regarding the impact of α on equilibrium profit, under horizontal dominance, it is easy
to see that the equilibrium profit of the low-quality platform is decreasing with α (since both
the price and the market share of the platform decrease with the intensity of the inter-group
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network effect). In the case of platform B, the two effects are moving in opposite direction
but the price effect is dominant and the profit of platform B is also decreasing with α. Thus,
it follows that ∂π
A∗
∂α
< 0 and ∂π
B∗
∂α
< 0.
For vertical dominance, the equilibrium profit of the low-quality platform is decreasing
with α (since both the price and the market share of the platform decrease with the intensity
of the inter-group network effect).
In the case of platform B, the two effects are moving in opposite direction. The dominant
effect is, like under horizontal dominance, the price effect and, thus, the profit of platform
B is also decreasing with α.
Lemma 26. (Impact of the inter-group externality)
Whatever the type of dominance:
(i) the intensity of the network effect has the same impact on equilibrium prices and
profits;
(ii) the profit of both platforms is decreasing with the intensity of the network effect.
Proof. See Appendix B in section 5.7.2.
The fact that equilibrium profits are decreasing with α is in line with Armstrong (2006)
[9] resulting from the fact that an increase in the intensity of the inter-group network effect
intensifies price competition between the two platforms.
5.6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes price competition between verti-zontally differentiated platforms. In
light of this, we extend the pure horizontal differentiation model of two-sided markets pre-
sented by Armstrong (2006) [9], also allowing for vertical differentiation between the plat-
forms.
Our verti-zontal differentiation set-up is built on a simplified version of the model pro-
posed by Neven and Thisse (1990) [87]. While the latter allows for quality choice and
endogenous location, we take these choices as exogenously given, allowing instead for the
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existence of inter-group network effects. Our equilibrium analysis shows that equilibrium
outcomes depend on the intensity of the inter-group network effects vis-à-vis the gap in the
quality of the platforms.
Considering the case in which price discrimination between sides is not allowed, we find
that regardless of the intensity of network effects, the high-quality platform always quotes a
higher price and attracts a larger fraction of consumers than the low-quality platform. The
intuition of this result is that, with a two-dimensional product differentiation, a low-quality
platform cannot be a dominant intermediary on the market.
Moreover we find that, under horizontal dominance, the profit of the low-quality platform
may decrease as the quality of the better product improves when the quality gap between
platforms is suffi ciently small. This result contrasts with Shaked and Sutton (1982) [105]
seminal contribution.
We also conclude that, whatever the type of dominance, the intensity of the network
effect has the same impact on equilibrium prices and profits on both platforms and the
profit of both platforms is decreasing with the intensity of the network effect, which confirms
Armstrong (2006) [9].
Other extensions of this model are worthwhile as well, addressing issues such as (par-
tial) multi-homing, cost asymmetries, the role of imperfect information, dynamic pricing,
endogenous locations and qualities, and so on.
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5.7 APPENDIX
5.7.1 Appendix A - Demand functions
Consider the case of vertical dominance. The configuration of demand for different price
vectors
(
pA, pB
)
is illustrated in figure 7. The figure shows that the specification of the
demand function, depends on the magnitude of the price gap pA − pB.
First, notice that from expressions (5.2) and (5.3), follow:
x̃j (0) =
1
2
+ p
B−pA
2
+
α(2DAk −1)
2
;
x̃j (1) =
1
2
+ p
B−pA
2
+
α(2DAk −1)
2
− q
2
;
ỹj (0) =
1
q
+ p
B−pA
q
+
α(2DAk −1)
q
;
ỹj (1) =
1
q
+ p
B−pA
q
+
α(2DAk −1)
q
− 2
q
.
In figure 7(a), all consumers prefer to buy from platform B. In that case, the price gap must
high enough so that ỹj (0) < 0, or equivalently, pA − pB > 1− α. For price vectors
(
pA, pB
)
such that pA − pB > 1− α, we have DA|V Dj
(
pA, pB
)
= 0.
In figure 7(b) some consumers start buying from platform A, although the ones located closer
to platform B, always prefer this firm, regardless of their willingness to pay for quality,
y ∈ [0, 1] . In that case, the price gap pA − pB must be such that 0 ≤ ỹj (0) < 1 and
ỹj (1) < 0. These inequalities impose the follow condition on the price gap in the case of
vertical dominance:
−(1− α) + 2α
q
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α, (5.6)
with q > 2 under vertical dominance. When (5.6) holds, the demand specification is given
by:
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB, DA
)
=
x̃j(0)×ỹj(0)
2
⇔
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB, DA
)
= 1
q
(
1
2
+ p
B−pA
2
+ αD
A|V D
j − α2
)2
⇔
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB, DA
)
= 1
4q
[
1 + α
(
2D
A|V D
j − 1
)
+ pB − pA
]2
.
Solving with respect to DA|V Dj yields:
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
q−α(pB−pA+(1−α) )±
√
q[q−2α(pB−pA+1−α )]
2α2
.
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For the convex segment of the demand of the low-quality platform, the specification of the
demand is given by:
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
q−α(pB−pA+(1−α) )−
√
q[q−2α(pB−pA+1−α )]
2α2
.
In figure 7(c), we observe that consumers with higher willingness to pay for quality prefer
platform B over platform A. However, there are consumers in all locations x ∈ [0, 1] partici-
pating in platform A. Accordingly, the following conditions must be verified: ỹj (0) ≤ 1 and
ỹj (1) ≥ 0, leading to the following conditions on the price gap:
1 + α− q − 2α
q
≤ pA − pB ≤ −(1− α) + 2α
q
.
In that case, the demand specification is given by:
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
ỹj(0)+ỹj(1)
2
= 1
q−2α
(
pB − pA − α
)
.
In figure 7(d), the price gap pA−pB is such that all consumers located closer to firm A, prefer
to participate in this platform, regardless of their willingness to pay for quality y ∈ [0, 1] .
Hence, ỹj (0) > 1 and 0 < ỹj (1) ≤ 1, yielding:
−q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < 1 + α− q − 2α
q
.
In that case, the demand specification can be obtained by computing:
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB, DA
)
= 1− [1−x̃j(1)]×[1−ỹj(1)]
2
⇔
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB, DA
)
= 1− 1
4q
{[
1 + pA − pB + α
(
1−DA|V Dj
)]2
− q2
}
.
Solving with respect to DA|V Dj yields:
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
α(pA−pB+1+α+q )−q±
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q )]
2α2
.
For the convex segment of the demand of the low-quality platform, the specification of the
demand is given by:
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
α(pA−pB+1+α+q )−q+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q )]
2α2
.
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Finally, in figure 7(e) all consumers prefer to participate in platform A, yielding:
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB
)
= 1.
For this to occur, we must have ỹj(1) > 1, yielding pA − pB < −q − (1− α). In light of this,
we have that the demand function DA|V Dj
(
pA, pB
)
under vertical dominance, corresponds to
a piecewise function with the following specification:
D
A|V D
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
0 if pA − pB > 1− α;
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
2α2
if −(1 + α) + 2α
q
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α;
1
q−2α
(
pB − pA − α
)
if 1 + α− q − 2α
q
≤ pA − pB ≤ −(1 + α) + 2α
q
;
−q+α(1+α−pB+pA+q)+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
2α2
if −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < 1 + α− q − 2α
q
;
1 if pA − pB < −q − (1− α).
Since each side of the market is assumed to be covered by the two firms, platform’s B demand
function is simply:
D
B|V D
j
(
pA, pB
)
= 1−DA|V Dj
(
pA, pB
)
.
The same comments apply,mutatis mutandis, when obtaining the specification of the demand
function under horizontal dominance.
In particular, the monopoly outcomes occur under exactly the same conditions. Similarly,
the convex and concave segments under horizontal dominance are exactly the same as under
vertical dominance, although, the corresponding price domain is different. Accordingly, we
have that the convex segment:
D
A|HD
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
q − α(1− α + pB − pA)−
√
q (q − 2α(1− α + pB − pA) )
2α2
,
holds for 1− α− q + qα
2
≤ pA − pB < 1− α, and the concave segment:
D
A|HD
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
−q + α(1 + α− pB + pA + q) +
√
q [q − 2α(1− α− pB + pA + q) ]
2α2
,
holds for −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < −(1− α)− qα
2
.
The situation described in figure 7(c) for the case of vertical dominance does not arise in the
case of horizontal dominance. Instead, when −(1−α)− qα
2
≤ pA− pB ≤ 1−α− q+ qα
2
, the
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configuration of demand is depicted in figure 8(a). In that case, all consumers located closer
to platform A participate in this platform (regardless of their willingness to pay for quality)
10. This is the case, when ỹj(0) > 1 and ỹj(1) < 0, yielding:
−(1− α)− qα
2
≤ pA − pB ≤ 1− α− q + qα
2
.
The expression of demand can be obtained as follows:
D
A|HD
j
(
pA, pB
)
=
x̃j(0)+x̃j(1)
2
⇔
D
A|HD
j
(
pA, pB
)
= 1
2
[
1 + p
B−pA
1−α −
q
2(1−α)
]
.
Accordingly, the demand function DA|HDj
(
pA, pB
)
under horizontal dominance, corresponds
to a piecewise function with the following specification:
D
A|HD
j
(
pA, pB
)
=

0 if pA − pB > 1− α;
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
2α2
if 1− α− q + qα
2
≤ pA − pB < 1− α;
1
2
[
1 + p
B−pA
1−α −
q
2(1−α)
]
if −(1− α)− qα
2
≤ pA − pB ≤ 1− α− q + qα
2
;
−q+α(1+α−pB+pA+q)+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
2α2
if −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < −(1− α)− qα
2
;
1 if pA − pB < −q − (1− α),
.
and DB|HDj
(
pA, pB
)
= 1−DA|HDj
(
pA, pB
)
. 
10Recall that in the case of horizontal dominance, consumers attach more importance to horizontal
differentiation vis-à-vis vertical differentiation.
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5.7.2 Appendix B - Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 21
Let us consider the profit of platform B :
πB
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pBDB(pA, pB),
withDB(pA, pB) = DB|V D
(
pA, pB
)
under vertical dominance, andDB(pA, pB) = DB|HD
(
pA, pB
)
under horizontal dominance. Recall that the demand of platform i is a continuous and non-
increasing function of pi, both under horizontal and vertical dominance.
A. proof under Horizontal Dominance for platform B
In the case of horizontal dominance we obtain that the profit function of platform B is given
by:
πB|HD
(
pA, pB
)
=

2pB, pA − pB > 1− α; (branch 5)
2pB
(
1−
[
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
]
2α2
)
, 1− α− q + qα
2
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α;
(branch 4)
2pB
{
1− 1
2
[
1 + p
B−pA
1−α −
q
2(1−α)
]}
, −(1− α)− qα
2
≤ pA − pB ≤ 1− α− q + qα
2
;
(branch 3)
2pB
{
1−
[
−q+α(1+α−pB+pA+q)+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
]
2α2
}
,
−q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB <
< −(1− α)− qα
2
; (branch 2)
0, pA − pB < −q − (1− α). (branch 1)
(i) Concave and linear segments of the profit function (branches 3-5 and 1)
Under horizontal dominance, DB|HD
(
pA, pB
)
is concave and decreasing for −(1−α)− qα
2
≤
pA − pB ≤ 1− α and it is constant for pA − pB > 1− α and pA − pB < −q − (1− α). Since
demand in those price domains is concave and non-increasing, the profit function of platform
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B is also a concave function of pB in that price domain11. Note that for the concave segment
1− α− q + qα
2
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α of the demand of platform B yields:
∂DB|HD(pA,pB)
∂pB
= −
−α+ qα√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
2α2
;
∂2DB|HD(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
= − 1
2q
1
2 [q−2α(pB−pA+1−α) ]
3
2
< 0.
The profit function of platform B is linear at branch 5 and concave at branches 3 and 4.
The first derivative of the profit function relatively to its price at branches 4 and 3 are,
respectively, given by:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
= 1− q
α2
+ 1
α
− pA
α
+ 2p
B
α
+
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α2
− p
B
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ] ;
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
= 2(1−α)+q+2p
A−4pB
2(1−α) .
Evaluating the derivatives at the kink pB = pA− (1−α) + q− qα
2
, follows that the left hand
side (thereafter, LHS) derivative (using the profit function expression of branch 4) and the
right hand side (thereafter RHS) derivative (using the profit function expression of branch
3) are given by:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA−(1−α)+q− qα2 ]
−
= 3− q − q + 2p
A
2(1− α) ;
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA−(1−α)+q− qα2 ]
+
= 3− q − q + 2p
A
2(1− α) .
In the frontier between the two concave segments of the profit function, the following in-
equality must hold:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA−(1−α)+q− qα2 ]
−
≥ ∂π
A(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA−(1−α)+q− qα2 ]
+
.
We verify that this inequality is verified, since the LHS derivative is equal to the RHS
derivative at pB = pA − (1− α) + q − qα
2
.
(ii) Convex segment of the profit function (branch 2)
11Note that since πB
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pBDB(pA, pB), follows that
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
= 2DB(pA, pB) +
2pB
∂DB(pA,pB)
∂pB
. Thus,
∂2πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
= 4
∂DB(pA,pB)
∂pB
+2pB
∂2DB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
. Since the demand is (i) decreasing
and (ii) concave at the considered segment follows that (i)
∂DB(pA,pB)
∂pB
< 0 and (ii)
∂2DB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
< 0,
respectively. Then, we obtain
∂2πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
< 0.
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By contrast, the only domain in which the profit function is not concave is:
−q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < −(1− α)− qα
2
,
where the demand function DB|HD
(
pA, pB
)
is strictly convex, with:
∂2DB|HD(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
=
1
2q
1
2 [q − 2α (pB − pA + 1− α) ]
3
2
> 0
for such values of
(
pA, pB
)
.
In that price domain, yields that the profit function is given by:
πB
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pBDB(pA, pB) = 2pB
{
1−
[
−q+α(1+α−pB+pA+q)+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
]
2α2
}
,
The derivative relatively to price is given by:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
=
q−qα−
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]−α
(
1−α−2pB+pA+ qp
B√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
)
α2
(5.7)
Alternatively, expression (5.7) can be re-written as:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
= 1 + q
α2
− 1
α
− pA
α
− q
α
+ 2p
B
α
− p
B
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
α[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ] −
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
α2
.
(5.8)
The second derivative of πB relatively to pB in the mentioned price domain is given by:
∂2πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
=
2+ q
2pBα
(q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) )
3
2
− 2q√
q(q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) )
α2
,
and the third derivative of the profit function with respect to their price is given by:
∂3πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)3
=
3q3
[
q − 2α
(
1− α− pB
2
+ pA + q
)]
[q (q − 2α(1− α− pB + pA + q) )]
5
2
.
Thus, it is straightforward that
∂3πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)3
> 0 under Assumption 5.1, so that
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
is
strictly convex in pB for the price domain −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < −(1− α)− qα
2
.
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Also considering the behavior of
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
in the neighborhood of pB = pA + (1 − α) + q,
which corresponds to the upper bound of the convex segment of the demand, plugging
pB = pA + (1− α) + q in equation (5.7), we obtain:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA+(1−α)+q]−
= −
(
−q+
√
q2
)
[q+(1+pA+q)α−α2]
qα2
= 0.
Since the LHS derivative of πB relatively to pB is null at pB =
[
pA + (1− α) + q
]−
and the
second derivative of the profit function evaluated at pB =
[
pA + (1− α) + q
]−
is given by:
∂2πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA+(1−α)+q]−
=
1− α + pA + q
q
> 0,
it follows that the profit function πB
(
pA, pB
)
reaches to a minimum at the point pB =
pA+(1−α)+q and, thus, ∂π
B(pA,pB)
∂pB
= 0 has at most one solution in the domain−q−(1−α) ≤
pA − pB < −(1− α)− qα
2
.
(iii) Sign of the derivatives at the kink between the linear and convex segment
of the demand function
Furthermore, in the neighborhood of pB = pA + 1− α + q
2
α, the lower bound of the convex
segment of the demand function, the RHS and the LHS derivatives at the kink point pB =
pA + 1− α + q
2
α of the profit function of platform B are equal.
(a) To compute the RHS derivative, we plug pB = pA + 1 − α + q
2
α in equation (5.7) to
obtain:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)
∣∣∣∣
pB=
[
pA+1−α+ q
2
α
]+ = −1 + q − 2p
A + q
2(1− α) .
(b) To compute the LHS derivative note that, for pB =
[
pA + 1− α + q
2
α
]−
, the profit of
platform B is equal to:
πB
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pB
{
1− 1
2
[
1 +
pB − pA
1− α −
q
2(1− α)
]}
.
Then, the derivative is given by:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
=
2− 2α + q − 4pB + 2pA
2(1− α) .
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Evaluating the derivative at pB = pA + 1 − α + q
2
α, we obtain the LHS derivative in the
neighborhood of pB =
[
pA + 1− α + q
2
α
]−
:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB epB=
[
pA+1−α+ q
2
α
]− = −1 + q − 2pA + q
2(1− α) .
Thus, the sign of
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
is the same on both sides of pB = pA + 1 − α + q
2
α and both
derivatives are equal:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA) epA=
[
pB+1−α+ q
2
α
]+ = ∂πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA) epA=
[
pB+1−α+ q
2
α
]−
(iv) Conclusion
Thus, combining this result with the fact that πB is concave on 1−α−q+ qα
2
≤ pA−pB ≤ 1−α,
we conclude that the profit function of platform B under horizontal dominance is quasi-
concave in the domain of pB.
B. proof under Vertical Dominance for platform B
In the case of vertical dominance we obtain that the profit function of platform B is given
by:
πB|V D
(
pA, pB
)
=
2pB, pA − pB > 1− α; (branch 5)
2pB
{
1−
[
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
]
2α2
}
, −(1 + α) + 2α
q
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α;
(branch 4)
2pB
[
1− 1
q−2α
(
pB − pA − α
)]
, 1 + α− q − 2α
q
≤ pA − pB ≤ −(1 + α) + 2α
q
; (branch 3)
2pB
{
1−
[
−q+α(1+α−pB+pA+q)+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
]
2α2
}
,
−q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB <
< 1 + α− q − 2α
q
; (branch 2)
0, pA − pB < −q − (1− α). (branch 1)
(i) Concave and linear segments of the profit function (branches 3-5 and 1)
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As explained in the case of horizontal dominance but, now, under vertical dominance,
DB|V D
(
pA, pB
)
is concave and decreasing for 1 + α − q − 2α
q
≤ pA − pB ≤ 1 − α and it
is constant for pA − pB < −q − (1 − α). Since demand in those price domains is concave
and non-increasing, the profit function of platform B is also a concave function of pB in that
price domain. Note that for the concave segment −(1 + α) + 2α
q
< pA − pB ≤ 1 − α of the
demand of platform B yields:
∂DB|VD(pA,pB)
∂pB
= −
−α+ qα√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
2α2
;
∂2DB|VD(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
= − 1
2q
1
2 [q−2α(pB−pA+1−α) ]
3
2
< 0.
The profit function of platform B is linear at branch 5 and concave at branches 3 and 4.
The first derivative of the profit function relatively to its price at branches 4 and 3 are,
respectively, given by:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
= 1− q
α2
+ 1
α
− pA
α
+ 2p
B
α
+
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α2
− p
B
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ] ; ;
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
=
2(q−α+pA−2pB )
q−2α .
Evaluating the derivatives at pB = pA + 1 + α − 2α
q
, follows that the LHS derivative (using
the profit function expression of branch 4) and the RHS derivative (using the profit function
expression of branch 3) are given by:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA+1+α− 2αq ]
−
= 3− 4
q
− 2p
A + q
q − 2α ;
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA+1+α− 2αq ]
+
= 3− 4
q
− 2p
A + q
q − 2α .
Then, under vertical dominance, the LHS derivative and the RHS derivative at pB = pA+1+
α− 2α
q
are equal. Thus, the profit function is strictly concave in the domain 1 +α− q− 2α
q
≤
pA − pB ≤ 1− α.
(ii) Convex segment of the profit function (branch 2)
By contrast, the only domain in which the profit function is not concave is:
−q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < 1 + α− q − 2α
q
,
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where the demand function DB|V D
(
pA, pB
)
is strictly convex, with:
∂2DB|VD(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
=
1
2q
1
2 [q − 2α (pB − pA + 1− α) ]
3
2
> 0
for such values of
(
pA, pB
)
.
In that price domain, yields that the profit function is given by:
πB
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pBDB(pA, pB) = 2pB
{
1−
[
−q+α(1+α−pB+pA+q)+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
]
2α2
}
,
The derivative relatively to price is given by expression (5.7). The second derivative of πB
relatively to pB in the mentioned price domain is given by:
∂2πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
=
2+ q
2pBα
[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
3
2
− 2q√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
α2
,
and the third derivative of the profit function with respect to their price is given by:
∂3πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)3
=
3q3
[
q − 2α
(
1− α− pB
2
+ pA + q
)]
{q [q − 2α(1− α− pB + pA + q) ]}
5
2
.
Thus, it is straightforward that
∂3πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)3
> 0 under Assumption 5.1 so that
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
is
strictly convex in pB for the price domain −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < 1 + α− q − 2α
q
.
Also considering the behavior of
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
in the neighborhood of pB = pA + (1 − α) + q,
which corresponds to the upper bound of the convex segment of the demand, plugging
pB = pA + (1− α) + q in equation (5.7), we obtain:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA+(1−α)+q]−
= −
(
−q+
√
q2
)
[q+(1+pA+q)α−α2]
qα2
= 0.
Since the LHS derivative of πB relatively to pB is null at pB =
[
pA + (1− α) + q
]−
and the
second derivative of the profit function evaluated at pB =
[
pA + (1− α) + q
]−
is given by:
∂2πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)2
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA+(1−α)+q]−
=
1− α + pA + q
q
> 0,
it follows that the profit function πB
(
pA, pB
)
reaches to a minimum at the point pB =
pA+(1−α)+q and, thus, ∂π
B(pA,pB)
∂pB
= 0 has at most one solution in the domain−q−(1−α) ≤
pA − pB < 1 + α− q − 2α
q
.
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(iii) Sign of the derivatives at the kink between the linear and convex segment
of the demand function
Furthermore, in the neighborhood of pB = pA − (1 + α) + q + 2α
q
(the lower bound of the
convex segment of the demand function), the RHS and the LHS derivatives are equal at this
kink point of the profit function of platform B.
(a) To compute the RHS derivative, we plug pB = pA− (1 +α) + q+ 2α
q
in equation (5.7) to
obtain:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂(pB)
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA−(1+α)+q+ 2αq ]
+
= −1 + 4
q
− 2p
A + q
q − 2α .
(b) To compute the LHS derivative note that, for pB =
[
pA − (1 + α) + q + 2α
q
]−
, the profit
of platform B is equal to:
πB
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pB
[
1− 1
q − 2α
(
pB − pA − α
)]
.
Then, the derivative is given by:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
=
2(pA + q − 2pB − α)
q − 2α .
Evaluating the derivative at pB = pA − (1 + α) + q + 2α
q
, we obtain that the LHS derivative
in the neighborhood of pB =
[
pA − (1 + α) + q + 2α
q
]−
is given by:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA−(1+α)+q+ 2αq ]
−
= −1 + 4
q
− 2p
A + q
q − 2α .
Then, both derivatives have the same sign and are equal:
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA−(1+α)+q+ 2αq ]
−
=
∂πB(pA,pB)
∂pB
∣∣∣∣
pB=[pA−(1+α)+q+ 2αq ]
+
.
(iv) Conclusion
Thus, combining this result with the fact that πB is concave on 1+α−q− 2α
q
≤ pA−pB ≤ 1−α,
we conclude that the profit function of platform B under vertical dominance is quasi-concave
in pB.
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The proof can be repeated, mutatis mutandis, under vertical and horizontal dominance for
platform A. Let us now consider the profit of platform A :
πA
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pADA(pA, pB),
withDA(pA, pB) = DA|V D
(
pA, pB
)
under vertical dominance, andDA(pA, pB) = DA|HD
(
pA, pB
)
under horizontal dominance. Recall that the demand of platform i is a continuous and non-
increasing function of pi, both under horizontal and vertical dominance.
C. proof under Horizontal Dominance for platform A
In the case of horizontal dominance we obtain that the profit function of platform A is given
by:
πA|HD
(
pA, pB
)
=

0, pA − pB > 1− α; (branch 5)
pA
[
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
]
α2
, 1− α− q + qα
2
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α; (branch 4)
pA
[
1 + p
B−pA
1−α −
q
2(1−α)
]
,−(1− α)− qα
2
≤ pA − pB ≤ 1− α− q + qα
2
; (branch 3)
pA
[
−q+α(1+α−pB+pA+q)+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
]
α2
, −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < −(1− α)− qα
2
;
(branch 2)
2pA, pA − pB < −q − (1− α).(branch 1)
(i) Concave and linear segments of the profit function (branches 1-3 and 5)
Furthermore, in the case of horizontal dominance, DA|HD
(
pA, pB
)
is concave and decreasing
for pA − pB ≤ 1 − α − q + q
2
α and it is constant for pA − pB > 1 − α. Since demand
in those price domains is concave and non-increasing, the profit function of platform A is
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also a concave function of pA in that price domain12. Note that for the concave segment
−q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < −(1− α)− qα
2
of the demand of platform A yields:
∂DA|HD(pA,pB)
∂pA
=
1
2α
−
√
q [q − 2α(1− α + pA − pB + q) ]
2α (q − 2α(1− α + pA − pB + q) ) ;
∂2DA|HD(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
= − 1
2q
1
2 [q − 2α (pB − pA + 1− α) ] 32
< 0.
The profit function of platform A is linear at branch 1 and concave at branches 2 and 3.
The first derivative of the profit function relatively to its price at branches 2 and 3 are,
respectively, given by:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
= 1 + 1
α
− q
α2
+ 2p
A
α
+ q
α
− pB
α
+
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pA−pB+q) ]
α2
− p
A
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pA−pB+q) ]
α[q−2α(1−α+pA−pB+q) ] ;
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
= 2(1−α)+2p
B−4pA−q
2(1−α) .
Evaluating the derivatives at the kink pA = pB−(1−α)− qα
2
, follows that the LHS derivative
(using the profit function expression of branch 2) and the RHS derivative (using the profit
function expression of branch 3) are given by:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB−(1−α)− qα2 ]
−
= 3− q + q
2(1−α) −
pB
1−α +
1−α+qα
α2
;
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB−(1−α)− qα2 ]
+
= 3− q + q
2(1−α) −
pB
1−α .
In the frontier between the two concave segments of the profit function, the following in-
equality must hold:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB−(1−α)− qα2 ]
−
≥ ∂π
A(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB−(1−α)− qα2 ]
+
.
By words, the LHS derivative at the kink point pA = pB − (1 − α) − qα
2
must not be lower
than the RHS derivative to obtain a concave profit function in the domain −q − (1− α) ≤
12Note that since πA
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pADA(pA, pB), follows that
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
= 2DA(pA, pB) +
2pA
∂DA(pA,pB)
∂pA
. Thus,
∂2πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
= 4
∂DA(pA,pB)
∂pA
+2pA
∂2DA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
. Since the demand is (i) decreasing
and (ii) concave at the considered segment follows that (i)
∂DA(pA,pB)
∂pA
< 0 and (ii)
∂2DA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
< 0,
respectively. Then, we obtain
∂2πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
< 0.
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pA− pB ≤ 1−α− q+ qα
2
.We verify that this inequality is verified, since the LHS derivative
is higher than the RHS derivative at pA = pB − (1− α)− qα
2
because:
1− α + qα ≥ 0,
holds under Assumption 5.1.
(ii) Convex segment of the profit function (branch 4)
By contrast, the only domain in which the profit function is not concave is:
1− α− q + q
2
α < pA − pB ≤ 1− α,
where the demand function DA|HD
(
pA, pB
)
is strictly convex, with:
∂2DA|HD(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
=
1
2q
1
2 [q − 2α (pB − pA + 1− α) ]
3
2
> 0
for such values of
(
pA, pB
)
.
In that price domain, yields that the profit function is given by:
πA
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pADA(pA, pB) = pA
[
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α2
]
,
The derivative relatively to price is given by:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
= −
(
αpB − q − 2αpA − α2 + α
)√
ρ− 2αqpB + 3αqpA + q2 − 2αq(1− α)
α2
√
ρ
(5.9)
with ρ = −2αq
(
pB − pA
)
+q2−2α(1−α)q. Alternatively, expression (5.9) can be re-written
as:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
= 1 + q
α2
− 1+pB−2pA
α
−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α2
− p
A
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ] . (5.10)
The second derivative of πA relatively to pA in the mentioned price domain is given by:
∂2πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
= 2
α
+
pA
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]2 −
2
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ] ,
and the third derivative of the profit function with respect to their price is given by:
∂3πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)3
=
3
√
q [q − 2α(1− α + pB − pA) ]
{
q − α
[
2(1− α) + 2pB − pA
] }
[q − 2α(1− α + pB − pA) ]3
.
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Thus, it is straightforward that
∂3πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)3
> 0 under Assumption 5.1, so that
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
is
strictly convex in pA for the price domain 1− α− q + q
2
α < pA − pB ≤ 1− α.
Also considering the behavior of
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
in the neighborhood of pA = pB + (1 − α),
which corresponds to the upper bound of the convex segment of the demand, plugging
pA = pB + (1− α) in equation (5.9), we obtain:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB+(1−α)]−
= −
[
q + α(1− α + pB)
] (√
q2 − q
)
qα2
= 0.
Since the LHS derivative of πA relatively to pA is null at pA =
[
pB + (1− α)
]−
and the
second derivative of the profit function evaluated at pA =
[
pB + (1− α)
]−
is given by:
∂2πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB+(1−α)]−
=
pB + 1− α
q
> 0,
it follows that the profit function πA
(
pA, pB
)
reaches to a minimum at the point pA =
pB+(1−α) and, thus, ∂π
A(pA,pB)
∂pA
= 0 has at most one solution in the domain 1−α−q+ qα
2
<
pA − pB ≤ 1− α.
(iii) Sign of the derivatives at the kink between the linear and convex segment
of the demand function
Furthermore, in the neighborhood of pA = pB + 1 − α − q + q
2
α, the lower bound of the
convex segment of the demand function, the RHS and the LHS derivatives at the kink point
pA = pB + 1− α− q + q
2
α of the profit function of platform A are equal.
(a) To compute the RHS derivative, we plug pA = pB + 1− α− q + q
2
α in equation (5.9) to
obtain:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)
∣∣∣∣
pA=
[
pB+1−α−q+ q
2
α
]+ = −1− p
B
1− α +
q
2
(
3− 2α
1− α
)
.
(b) To compute the LHS derivative note that, for
[
pA = pB + 1− α− q + q
2
α
]−
, the profit
of platform A is equal to:
πA
(
pA, pB
)
= pA
[
1 +
pB − pA
1− α −
q
2(1− α)
]
.
Then, the derivative is given by:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
=
2(1− α) + 2pB − 4pA − q
2(1− α) .
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Evaluating the derivative at pA = pB + 1− α− q + q
2
α, we obtain the LHS derivative in the
neighborhood of pA =
[
pB + 1− α− q + q
2
α
]−
:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA epA=
[
pB+1−α−q+ q
2
α
]− = −1− pB
1− α +
q
2
(
3− 2α
1− α
)
.
Thus, the sign of
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
is the same on both sides of pA = pB + 1−α− q+ q
2
α and both
derivatives are equal:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA) epA=
[
pB+1−α−q+ q
2
α
]+ = ∂πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA) epA=
[
pB+1−α−q+ q
2
α
]−
(iv) Conclusion
Thus, combining this result with the fact that πA is concave on −q − (1− α) < pA − pB ≤
1− α− q + q
2
α, we conclude that on the interval −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB ≤ 1− α the profit
function of platform A under horizontal dominance has a unique maximum with respect to
pA and, therefore, is quasi-concave in pA.
D. proof under Vertical Dominance for platform A
In the case of vertical dominance we obtain that the profit function of platform A is given
by:
πA|V D
(
pA, pB
)
=
0, pA − pB > 1− α; (branch 5)
pA
[
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
]
α2
, − (1 + α) + 2α
q
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α; (branch 4)
2pA
q−2α
(
pB − pA − α
)
, 1 + α− q − 2α
q
≤ pA − pB ≤ −(1 + α) + 2α
q
; (branch 3)
pA
[
−q+α(1+α−pB+pA+q)+
√
q[q−2α(1−α−pB+pA+q) ]
]
α2
, −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < 1 + α− q − 2α
q
;
(branch 2)
2pA, pA − pB < −q − (1− α). (branch 1)
(i) Concave and linear segments of the profit function (branches 1-3 and 5)
As explained in the case of horizontal dominance but, now, under vertical dominance,
DA|V D
(
pA, pB
)
is concave and decreasing for pA− pB ≤ −(1 +α) + 2α
q
and it is constant for
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pA − pB > 1 − α. Since demand in those price domains is concave and non-increasing, the
profit function of platform A is also a concave function of pA in that price domain13.
Note that for the concave segment −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB < 1 + α− q − 2α
q
of the demand
of platform A yields:
∂DA|VD(pA,pB)
∂pA
=
1
2α
−
√
q [q − 2α(1− α + pA − pB + q) ]
2α [q − 2α(1− α + pA − pB + q) ] ;
∂2DA|VD(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
= − 1
2q
1
2 [q − 2α (pB − pA + 1− α) ]
3
2
< 0.
The profit function of platform A is linear at branch 1 and concave at branches 2 and 3.
The first derivative of the profit function relatively to its price at branches 2 and 3 are,
respectively, given by:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
= 1 + 1
α
− q
α2
+ 2p
A
α
+ q
α
− pB
α
+
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pA−pB+q) ]
α2
− p
A
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pA−pB+q) ]
α[q−2α(1−α+pA−pB+q) ] ;
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
= −2(2p
A−pB+α)
q−2α .
Evaluating the derivatives at pA = pB + 1 + α − q − 2α
q
, follows that the LHS derivative
(using the profit function expression of branch 2) and the RHS derivative (using the profit
function expression of branch 3) are given by:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB+1+α−q− 2αq ]
−
= 3− 4
q
+
q
q − 2α −
2pB
q − 2α ;
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB+1+α−q− 2αq ]
+
= 3− 4
q
+
q
q − 2α −
2pB
q − 2α.
Then, under vertical dominance, the LHS derivative and the RHS derivative at pA = pB +
1 + α− q− 2α
q
are equal. Thus, the profit function is concave in the domain −q− (1− α) ≤
pA − pB ≤ −(1 + α) + 2α
q
.
(ii) Convex segment of the profit function (branch 4)
13Note that since πA
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pADA(pA, pB), follows that
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
= 2DA(pA, pB) +
2pA
∂DA(pA,pB)
∂pA
. Thus,
∂2πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
= 4
∂DA(pA,pB)
∂pA
+2pA
∂2DA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
. Since the demand is (i) decreasing
and (ii) concave at the considered segment follows that (i)
∂DA(pA,pB)
∂pA
< 0 and (ii)
∂2DA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
< 0,
respectively. Then, we obtain
∂2πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
< 0.
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By contrast, the only domain in which the profit function is not concave is:
−(1 + α) + 2α
q
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α,
where the demand function DA|V D
(
pA, pB
)
is strictly convex, with:
∂2DA|HD(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
=
1
2q
1
2 [q − 2α (pB − pA + 1− α) ]
3
2
> 0
for such values of
(
pA, pB
)
.
In that price domain, yields that the profit function is given by:
πA
(
pA, pB
)
= 2pADA(pA, pB) = pA
{
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α2
}
,
The derivative relatively to price is given by expression (5.9). The second derivative of πA
relatively to pA in the mentioned price domain is given by:
∂2πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
= 2
α
+
pA
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]2 −
2
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
α[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ] ,
and the third derivative of the profit function with respect to their price is given by:
∂3πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)3
=
3
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]{q−α[2(1−α)+2pB−pA] }
[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]3 .
Thus, it is straightforward that
∂3πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)3
> 0 under Assumption 5.1, so that
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
is
strictly convex in pA for the price domain −(1− α) + 2α
q
< pA − pB ≤ 1− α.
Also considering the behavior of
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
in the neighborhood of pA = pB + (1 − α),
which corresponds to the upper bound of the convex segment of the demand, plugging
pA = pB + (1− α) in equation (5.9), we obtain:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB+(1−α)]−
= −
[
q + α(1− α + pB)
] (√
q2 − q
)
qα2
= 0.
Since the LHS derivative of πA relatively to pA is null at pA =
[
pB + (1− α)
]−
and the
second derivative of the profit function evaluated at pA =
[
pB + (1− α)
]−
is given by:
∂2πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)2
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB+(1−α)]−
=
pB + 1− α
q
> 0,
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it follows that the profit function πA
(
pA, pB
)
reaches to a minimum at the point pA =
pB+(1−α) and, thus, ∂π
A(pA,pB)
∂pA
= 0 has at most one solution in the domain −(1+α)+ 2α
q
<
pA − pB ≤ 1− α.
(iii) Sign of the derivatives at the kink between the linear and convex segment
of the demand function
Furthermore, in the neighborhood of pA = pB − (1 +α) + 2α
q
(the lower bound of the convex
segment of the demand function), the RHS and the LHS derivatives are equal at this kink
point of the profit function of platform A.
(a) To compute the RHS derivative, we plug pA = pB − (1 + α) + 2α
q
in equation (5.9) to
obtain:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB−(1−α)+ 2αq ]
+
= 4
q−2α −
2pB
q−2α +
2α
q−2α −
8α
q(q−2α) .
(b) To compute the LHS derivative note that, for
[
pB − (1 + α) + 2α
q
]−
, the profit of platform
A is equal to:
πA
(
pA, pB
)
=
2pA
q − 2α
(
pB − pA − α
)
.
Then, the derivative is given by:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂pA
=
2pB
q − 2α −
4pA
q − 2α −
2α
q − 2α.
Evaluating the derivative at pA = pB − (1 + α) + 2α
q
, we obtain that the LHS derivative in
the neighborhood of pA =
[
pB − (1 + α) + 2α
q
]−
is given by:
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB−(1−α)+ 2αq ]
−
= 4
q−2α −
2pB
q−2α +
2α
q−2α −
8α
q(q−2α) .
Then, both derivatives have the same sign and are equal.
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB−(1−α)+ 2αq ]
−
=
∂πA(pA,pB)
∂(pA)
∣∣∣∣
pA=[pB−(1−α)+ 2αq ]
+
,
such that the profit function is continuous and decreasing.
(iv) Conclusion
Thus, combining this result with the fact that πA is concave on −q − (1− α) ≤ pA − pB ≤
−(1 + α) + 2α
q
, we conclude that on the interval −q − (1 − α) ≤ pA − pB ≤ 1 − α the
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profit function of platform A under vertical dominance is quasi-concave and it has a unique
maximum with respect to pA. 
Proof of Proposition 22
As the profit function is quasi-concave, for each type of dominance, the equilibrium prices
can be obtained from the first order conditions:
∂πi(pA,pB)
∂pi
= 0, i ∈ {A,B} .
Recall that, we concentrate on interior solutions in which both platforms are active. Thus,
we exclude the pairs of prices
(
pA, pB
)
such that:
pA − pB > 1− α ∨ pA − pB < −q − (1− α).
Consider the case of horizontal dominance, arising when q < 2. When:
−(1− α)− qα
2
≤ pA − pB ≤ 1− α− q + qα
2
,
the profit of platform A is equal to:
2pA
{
1
2
[
1 +
pB − pA
1− α −
q
2(1− α)
]}
while the profit of platform B is given by:
2pB
{
1− 1
2
[
1 +
pB − pA
1− α −
q
2(1− α)
]}
.
Solving the corresponding system of first order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium price
candidate:
pA
∗
= 1− α− q
6
; pB
∗
= 1− α + q
6
,
and the equilibrium market shares:
DA
∗
= 1
2
[
1− q
6(1−α)
]
, DB
∗
= 1
2
[
1 + q
6(1−α)
]
.
Note that in equilibrium:
0 ≤ DA∗ < 1
2
< DB
∗ ≤ 1.
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Then, we must ensure in equilibrium:
DA
∗ ≥ 0⇔ q ≤ 6(1− α);
DB
∗ ≤ 1⇔ q ≤ 6(1− α).
It only remains to verify when the equilibrium price candidate verifies the price domain
condition:
−(1− α)− qα
2
≤ pA − pB ≤ 1− α− q + qα
2
,
which holds for the intersection of the following system of inequalities. Computing, we
obtain:  −(1− α)−
qα
2
≤ pA∗ − pB∗;
pA∗ − pB∗ ≤ 1− α− q + qα
2
.
⇔
 −(1− α)−
qα
2
≤ − q
3
;
− q
3
≤ 1− α− q + qα
2
.
⇔
⇔ q ≤ 6(1−α)
2−3α ∩ q ≤
6(1−α)
4−3α ⇔ q <
6(1−α)
4−3α .
Note that:
6 (1− α) > 6(1−α)
4−3α ⇔ α < 1, resulting q ∈
(
0, 6(1−α)
4−3α
)
.
Therefore, we conclude that q ∈
(
0, 6(1−α)
4−3α
)
, the condition identified in Proposition 22.
Proof of Proposition 23
As the profit function is quasi-concave, for each type of dominance, the equilibrium prices
can be obtained from the first order conditions:
∂πi(pA,pB)
∂pi
= 0, i ∈ {A,B} .
Recall that, we concentrate on interior solutions in which both platforms are active. Thus,
we exclude the pairs of prices
(
pA, pB
)
such that:
pA − pB > 1− α ∨ pA − pB < −q − (1− α).
Focusing only on the linear segment of the profit function under vertical dominance:
1 + α− q − 2α
q
≤ pA − pB ≤ −(1− α) + 2α
q
,
the profit of platform A is equal to:
2pA
[
1
q − 2α
(
pB − pA − α
)]
,
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while the profit of platform B is given by:
2pB
[
1− 1
q − 2α
(
pB − pA − α
)]
.
Solving the corresponding system of first order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium prices:
pA
∗
= q
3
− α; pB∗ = 2q
3
− α,
and the equilibrium market shares:
DA
∗
= q−3α
3(q−2α) , D
B∗ = 2q−3α
3(q−2α) ;
Note that in equilibrium:
0 ≤ DA∗ < 1
2
< DB
∗ ≤ 1.
Then, we must ensure in equilibrium:
DA
∗ ≥ 0⇔ q ≥ 3α;
DB
∗ ≤ 1⇔ q ≥ 3α.
Focusing only on the linear segment of the profit function under vertical dominance, given
the quasi-concavity of the profit function, we obtain that this equilibrium price candidate is
always an equilibrium, as long as:
1 + α− q − 2α
q
≤ pA − pB ≤ −(1 + α) + 2α
q
. (5.11)
First note that:
pA − pB = 1
3
q − α−
(
2
3
q − α
)
= −1
3
q.
The two inequalities of (5.11) above require:
1 + α− q − 2α
q
≤ −1
3
q and − 1
3
q ≤ −(1 + α) + 2α
q
.
Solving the first inequality:
1 + α− q − 2α
q
+
1
3
q ≤ 0⇔ −1
3
(
−3q + 6α− 3qα + 2q2
q
)
≤ 0.
136
The numerator needs to be positive:
−3q + 6α− 3qα + 2q2 ≥ 0. (5.12)
The second inequality requires:
−1
3
q ≤ −(1 + α) + 2α
q
⇔ −1
3
q + (1 + α)− 2α
q
≤ 0⇔ −1
3
(
−3q + 6α− 3qα + q2
q
)
≤ 0.
Again, the numerator needs to be positive:
−3q + 6α− 3qα + q2 ≥ 0. (5.13a)
Comparing inequalities (5.12) and (5.13a), we see that (5.12) always larger than (5.13a)
and therefore when the later is accomplished, (5.12) is also verified. Thus, considering
the inequality resulting from (5.13a) corresponds to a parabole turned up. The roots of
polynomial −3q + 6α− 3qα + q2 are given by:
qCR1 =
3
2
α +
1
2
√
3
√
3α2 − 2α + 3 + 3
2
; qCR2 =
3
2
α− 1
2
√
3
√
3α2 − 2α + 3 + 3
2
.
The roots are always real numbers. The second root defines a value for q that is smaller
than 2 (and, thus, incompatible with the vertical dominance domain):
3
2
α− 1
2
√
3
√
3α2 − 2α + 3 + 3
2
< 2⇔
3
2
α− 2 + 3
2
<
1
2
√
3
√
3α2 − 2α + 3⇔ 3α− 1 <
√
3
√
3α2 − 2α + 3
(3α− 1)2 < 3
(
3α2 − 2α + 3
)
⇔ (3α− 1)2 − 3
(
3α2 − 2α + 3
)
< 0⇔
−8 < 0.
Then, the relevant restriction on q to assure the price domain is:
q ≥ 3
2
α +
1
2
√
3
√
3α2 − 2α + 3 + 3
2
. (5.14)
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Proof of Lemma 25
Under the domain of pure horizontal dominance, the derivatives with respect to the degree
of vertical differentiation are given by:
∂pA
∗
∂q
= −1
6
< 0 and ∂p
B∗
∂q
= 1
6
> 0;
∂DA
∗
∂q
= − 1
12(1−α) < 0 and
∂DB
∗
∂q
= 1
12(1−α) > 0;
∂πA
∗
∂q
= q−6(1−α)
18
< 0 for q < 6 (1− α) and ∂πB
∗
∂q
= q+6(1−α)
18
> 0.
Since 6(1−α)
4−3α < 6 (1− α) ∀ α < 1, we conclude that for q ∈
(
0, 6(1−α)
4−3α
)
:
∂πA
∗
∂q
< 0, ∂π
B∗
∂q
> 0, ∀ α < [0, 1) .
Under the domain of pure vertical dominance, yields:
∂pA
∗
∂q
= 1
3
> 0 and ∂p
B∗
∂q
= 2
3
> 0;
∂DA
∗
∂q
= α
3(q−2α)2 > 0 and
∂DB
∗
∂q
= − α
3(q−2α)2 < 0;
The derivative of the profit of the low-quality platform A with respect to q is given by:
∂πA
∗
∂q
= 2(q−α)(q−3α)
9(q−2α)2 .
Since both equilibrium prices and equilibriummarket shares are increasing in q, also ∂π
A∗
∂q
> 0
because the profit function is a linear transformation of prices and market shares.
On the high-quality platform B it follows that:
∂πB
∗
∂q
= 2(2q−5α)(2q−3α)
3(q−2α)2 Q 0. (5.15)
The denominator of (5.15) is always positive.
The numerator of (5.15) is equivalent to the following polynomial:
8q2 − 32αq + 30α2. (5.16)
The corresponding roots are given by qCR1 = 32α and qCR2 =
5
2
α.
The minimum of the polynomial is obtained at qmin = 2α since d
2
dq2
[8q2 − 32αq + 30α2] =
16 > 0.
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Notice that (5.14) implies q > 3α and, thus, also q > 5
2
α. Then, it is straightforward that
∂πB
∗
∂q
> 0 under pure vertical dominance.
Proof of Lemma 26
Under the region of horizontal dominance, the derivatives of the outcomes with respect to
the intensity of the network effect are given by:
∂pA
∗
∂α
= −1 < 0 and ∂pB
∗
∂α
= −1 < 0;
∂DA
∗
∂α
= − q
12(1−α)2 < 0 and
∂DB
∗
∂α
= q
12(1−α)2 > 0;
∂πA
∗
∂α
= −1 + q2
36(1−α)2 and
∂πB
∗
∂α
= −1 + q2
36(1−α)2 .
The derivatives of πA
∗
and πB
∗
relatively to the network effect are equivalent. Since:
−1 + q2
36(1−α)2 ⇔ q
2 − 36(1− α)2, (5.17)
the roots of the polynomial in (5.17) are given by qCR = ±6(1 − α). Given the sign of the
polynomial, both derivatives are negative for the region of horizontal dominance.
Under the region of vertical dominance, follows that:
∂pA
∗
∂α
= −1 < 0 and ∂pB
∗
∂α
= −1 < 0;
∂DA
∗
∂α
= − q
3(q−2α)2 < 0 and
∂DB
∗
∂α
= q
3(q−2α)2 > 0;
The derivative of the profit of the low-quality platform with respect to α is given by:
∂πA
∗
∂α
= −1 + q
2
9(q − 2α)2 .
Since both equilibrium prices and equilibrium market shares are decreasing in α and the
profit function is a linear transformation of prices and market shares, also the impact of the
inter-group externality on the equilibrium profit is negative (∂π
A∗
∂α
< 0).
On the high-quality platform B, follows that:
∂πB
∗
∂α
=
−8q2 + 36αq − 36α2
9(q − 2α)2 =
q2 − 9(q − 2α)2
9(q − 2α)2 = −1 +
q2
9(q − 2α)2 . (5.18)
Since ∂π
A∗
∂α
< 0 under vertical dominance and because ∂π
B∗
∂α
= ∂π
A∗
∂α
, then ∂π
B∗
∂α
is negative.
Lemma 26 is, now, straightforward. 
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5.7.3 Appendix C - Verti-zontal equilibrium details
The green region in figure 13 corresponds to the equilibrium candidate occurring under the
circumstances described in figure 7(b). In this situation, the equilibrium occurs in the strictly
convex segment of DA and in the strictly concave segment of DB. The profit of platform A
is given by:
πA =
pA
[
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
]
α2
,
while the profit of platform B is given by:
πB = 2pB
{
1−
[
q−α(1−α+pB−pA)−
√
q[q−2α(1−α+pB−pA) ]
]
2α2
}
.
Given the quasi-concavity of the profit function, an equilibrium price candidate is always an
equilibrium as long as the price domain condition is verified. Under horizontal dominance,
the equilibrium is verified for:
1− α− q + qα
2
< pA∗ − pB∗ ≤ 1− α
and under vertical dominance, the equilibrium is verified for:
−(1 + α) + 2α
q
< pA∗ − pB∗ ≤ 1− α.
The best reply functions of platform A given the price charged by platform B are given by:
pA
(
pB
)
= 1− α + pB;
pA
(
pB
)
=
−3q+8α(1−α+pB)−√q
√
9q−16α(1−α+pB)
16α
;
pA
(
pB
)
=
−3q+8α(1−α+pB)+√q
√
9q−16α(1−α+pB)
16α
.
Given an increment on the price of the high-quality platform, the low-quality platform reacts
by also increasing its price. Analytically:
dpA(pB)
dpB
= 1 ∪ dp
A(pB)
dpB
= 1
2
(
1±
√
q√
9q−16α(1−α+pB)
)
.
We obtain that
dpA(pB)
dpB
> 0 in the third equality if and only if q > 2(1 − α + pB), that
is, under pure vertical differentiation. In the case of horizontal dominance, the platform A
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reacts by decreasing its price when pB increases while under the case of vertical dominance,
platform A reacts increasing their price.
From the best reply functions of platform B yield polynomials of degree three relatively to
pA and of degree six relatively to α. Focusing on the polynomial that belongs to the real
space R, we obtain:
pB
(
pA
)
=
3q−16α(1+pA)+−9q
2−288qα2−16α2(−1+pA+3α)2
γ
24α
.
with γ = γ(α, q, pA) representing a polynomial of degree three relatively to pA and of degree
six relatively to α. Because of this polynomial, we are not able to obtain a closed-form
solution. Thus, we apply the theorem of Debreu, Glicksberg and Fan (1952) (see, for example,
pp. 34 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) [52]) to mention that an equilibrium exists for such
parameter region corresponding to the verti-zontal equilibrium.
Remark (Verti-zontal equilibrium)
For any combination (α, q), there exists a price equilibrium candidate in the strictly
convex segment of DA and in the strictly concave segment of DB. The equilibrium candidate
must be an equilibrium:
(i) under horizontal dominance, for 6(1−α)
4−3α < q < 2;
(ii) under vertical dominance for 2 < q < 3
2
α + 1
2
√
3
√
3α2 − 2α + 3 + 3
2
.
Proof : First, the existence of a price equilibrium candidate for such domain region is proved
in Theorem 24 (and by the proof of Lemma 21 regarding to the convex (concave) segment
of the profit function of platform A (platform B) on each type of dominance); secondly, the
threshold for each type of dominance results from Proposition 22 and Proposition 23 together
with the domains under which horizontal and vertical differentiation are, respectively, defined.

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6.0 CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we have considered the simultaneous presence of horizontal and vertical differ-
entiation, which are according to Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57] relevant characteristics
present on the majority of the markets.
In Chapter 3, our innovation relies on embracing vertical and horizontal differentiation
through a non-uniform distribution of consumers on the Hotelling line. We find that a
perturbation (moving from a situation of pure horizontal differentiation where µ = 0, 5 to
a case of mixed horizontal and vertical differentiation where, for instance, µ = 0, 499) that
introduces a negligible difference between the consumer density on the left and on the right
side of the city disrupts the existence of equilibrium in the model of Armstrong (2006) [9].
The introduction of a non-uniform distribution of consumers in the model of Armstrong
leads to a situation where an indifferent consumer will never be located at the middle of
the linear city in the market equilibrium. Instead, the indifferent consumer will always be
located at the right of the city center. This finding contrasts with the socially optimal
outcome, where both platforms operate in the market, but with the high-quality platform
capturing a greater market share than in the market equilibrium.
We also study entry to conclude that inter-group externalities make it easier to deter
entry of an inferior-quality platform and facilitate the entrance of a superior-quality plat-
form. However, we consider in this analysis that the status before entry corresponds to the
equilibrium of the baseline model, i.e., consumers are already in the incumbent platforms.
This means we assume that the entrant faces an additional diffi culty in attracting consumers.
Coordination is, in this sense, assumed to be adverse to the entrant. Indeed, the success-
ful entry of a superior-quality platform or the successful deterrence of an inferior-quality
platform may depend on the level of the inter-group externality if we do not assume that
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coordination is adverse to the entrant because with the presence of network effects it is not
guaranteed that the indifferent consumer location coincides with the setting provided by
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) [57].
In a Chapter 4, combining again simultaneously vertical and horizontal product differ-
entiation, our contribution provides a justification (besides the asymmetric intensity of the
inter-group externality between the sides of the market) for the presence of divide and con-
quer strategies in equilibrium: the asymmetry on the cost of quality provision of the platform
with highest quality between the two sides of the market.
When only the high-quality platform invests in quality provision and assuming that the
cost of quality provision is different between the two sides of the market, we find that the
high-quality platform should be specialized on investing on the side where the cost of quality
provision is lower and the low-quality platform should specialize itself on the side where
the high-quality platform has a higher cost of quality provision. Such strategy appears
in equilibrium because the low-quality platform may charge an equilibrium price below its
marginal cost to the side where the high-quality platform has a lower cost of quality provision.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we embrace the study of vertical and horizontal differentiation but
now in a "square" à la Neven and Thisse (1990) [87]. This model enriches the analysis of the
platforms’and consumers’behavior in two-sided markets since it introduces concepts that
were not captured in the previous chapters: horizontal and vertical dominance. Despite the
tractability problems arising in this model, we were able to prove the existence of an interior
equilibrium for different quality gap levels under both types of dominance.
This manuscript proves that the payoff functions of the active players on the market
are globally quasi-concave in a two-dimensional product differentiation environment with
network effects, allowing to apply the theorem of Debreu, Glicksberg and Fan (1952) (see,
for example, pp. 34 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) [52]) to ensure the existence of an interior
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Moreover we find that, under horizontal dominance, the profit of the low-quality platform
decreases as the quality of the better product improves. This result contrasts with the seminal
contribution of Shaked and Sutton (1982) [105]. We also conclude that, whatever the type
of dominance, the intensity of the network effect has the same impact on equilibrium prices
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and profits and the profit of both platforms is decreasing with the intensity of the network
effect, which confirms the findings of Armstrong (2006) [9].
To conclude, we make an effort to provide a deep study of product differentiation in
two-sided markets modeling the same topic with three different approaches to enrich the
state of art of the mainstream. These findings provide new thoughts on the field, where
it is assumed that only the inter-group externalities are relevant to describe such markets.
With this thesis, we show that there exist other relevant aspects that also influence two-sided
markets which should not be neglected by researchers.
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